In a wide ranging, critical review of scholarly usage of the Weberian notions of ‘patrimonialism’ and ‘neo-patrimonialism’ in African contexts, Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009: 149) argue, with particular reference to Botswana, that ‘there is nothing inherent in patrimonialism to prevent creation of a democracy by leaders determined to do so.’ They hold that ‘[f]or Weber, patrimonialism was not a synonym for corruption, “bad government,” violence, tribalism, or a weak state. Instead it was a specific form of authority and source of legitimacy’ (ibid.: 126). Thus conceived, they argue, ‘[a] more complete application suggests that Botswana – one of Africa's success stories – may also be one of its most clearly “patrimonial” or “neopatrimonial” states.’ (ibid.: 150) They claim that this country's ‘elites have not abandoned patrimonialism or overcome it; rather they have built a democratic state on a foundation of traditional and highly personalized reciprocities and loyalties’ (ibid.: 145, emphasis added).
Notwithstanding these authors’ recognition of the significance of indigenous authority-relations for the formation of a modern state in postcolonial Africa, Botswana is not an example of how patrimonialism might constructively underpin the formation of a modern, democratic state. The authors’ conception of what they call ‘patrimonial legitimacy’12 as a matter of highly personalized reciprocities and loyalties leads them to suggest that ‘patron-client’ relationships have been crucial for the successful grounding of the modern state in indigenous political relations. In my analysis, by contrast, the post-colonial leadership in Botswana has succeeded because indigenous authorities have not been linked up with the modern state in relationships of ‘highly personalized reciprocities and loyalties'. Rather, they were, as we shall see, from the outset incorporated in the bureaucratic structures of the modern state as civil servants by means of rational-legal provisions. This means that they were effectively barred by state legislation from engaging in party politics. There have, to be sure, been some instances of informal and tacit impacts by indigenous authorities upon the modern political field. But on the whole they have been kept efficiently at bay. Furthermore, it would be far off the mark to classify the modern political practice as clientelistic. Although the ruling party has increasingly been under attack for support by means of allocating favours and other practices of bribery and corruption, political life in this country contrasts sharply with that of countries like Italy where my recent research made it evident to me how the country's pervasive networks of patron-client relations work in ways highly detrimental to democratic political processes (Gulbrandsen, in prep.).
Importantly, by incorporating indigenous authorities at different levels in the structures of the post-colonial state of Botswana, the political leadership has, quite successfully, encompassed indigenous hierarchies of authority into the process of modern state formation. These are institutionalized hierarchies that do not necessarily open up for the kind of political entrepreneurship associated with a patron's operation of personalized clientelistic networks. Although they certainly have that kind of potentiality also in Botswana, the strength of the state has depended much upon its leaderships’ capacity to prevent this potentiality to manifest in post-colonial politics, especially during the formative and consolidating decades that are, I reiterate, of major concern in this volume.
Even more significantly, I shall explain, these hierarchies and indigenous governmental structures are inseparable from people's everyday lived-in-world, and are institutions right in the middle of it. We are hence faced with the complex task of coming to terms with the intricate ways in which this form of indigenous symbolism, practices and institutions of authority have interfaced with European ideas and practices in the formation of a distinctively Botswana modern state. For this purpose I question the analytical value of the notion of ‘patrimonialism,’ especially when conceived as a matter of ‘personal connections between leader and subject, or patrons and clients’ (Pitcher et al. 2009: 129). That is, a conception of reciprocal relations between ruler and subjects that focuses the transactional pragmatism-aspects of exercise of power (cf. Weber 1978: 1010ff.). Certainly, such an approach might be highly beneficial to analyze particular features of pre-modern political systems especially those of an acephalous kind as eminently demonstrated by Barth (1959). Also in the present study I have found some use of an actor/interaction perspective and, of course, the Weberian conception of sources of authority (1978: 215). Nevertheless, I find use of the Weberian notion ‘patrimonialism’ problematic because it easily leads scholars’ (including Pitcher et al.) attention primarily to personalized relations of power, e.g. in the form of individualized patron-client bonds. While this is a perspective that might be helpful to examine certain features of African, post-colonial politics (as demonstrated by Bayart [1993] and others), it is far too narrow to come to terms with how indigenous authority hierarchies, like the ones with which I am presently concerned, are constructed and operating. Moreover, the highly inclusive hierarchies found in indigenous societies of Botswana are, as already suggested, constructed in ways that make it hard to distinguish between ‘the governmental’ and ‘the social.’ This kind of socio-political system where conventional Western distinctions between ‘the political’ and ‘the social’ are inadequate, does not seem to fit into Weber's comparative range of pre-modern polities, conceived as governmental institutions and relationships (e.g., see Weber 1978: 1006–1110).
Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed, finally, that although the modern state in Botswana is to a great extent legitimized on the basis of ‘rational grounds,’ there have, as we shall see, also been considerable efforts to activate what Weber (1978: 215) has conceived as ‘traditional grounds’ of legitimacy. At the same time, we need to go beyond Weber in order to come to terms with how pre-modern symbolism, practices and institutions of authority are reproduced/transformed under post-colonial circumstances. In this endeavour I now turn to presenting approaches I have found helpful for pursuing this and other issues indicated so far.
Approaching the State and the Social
Machiavelli (1977: 47) observed long ago that ‘every prince’ would like to be both loved and feared. And ‘since it is hard to accommodate both of these qualities, if you have to make a choice, to be feared is much safer than to be loved'. Nevertheless, he asserts, ‘every prince should prefer to be considered merciful rather than cruel'. This was, as we shall see, clearly a strategy adopted by the postcolonial ruling group from the outset, and I shall argue that the modern state in Botswana prevails to a great extent because the ruling group's domination is achieved and reproduced in relation to the population with a minimal exercise of perceived violent, coercive power. Paradoxically perhaps, the broader significance of this point is suggested by a study of authoritarian regimes as extreme as Mobuto's Zaire. Schatzberg (1988: 71–72) argues that no state can rely entirely on coercion for long: ‘Although regimes may arrive in power and initially maintain themselves through force, they most often achieve stability and continuity by encouraging citizens to accept valid symbols and metaphors of authority'. Legitimacy in the population is in other words crucial for the sustainable strength of the state.
In the present case, legitimation involved, at Botswana's independence, the challenge to make such a Western phenomenon as a modern state comprehensible, acceptable and even attractive to the population. Following Taylor's (1999: 127) rendering of Hegel, this is a matter of preventing ‘alienation’ from arising. Alienation, in the Hegelian sense, ‘arises where important ideas of man and society and their relation to nature embodied in the institutions of a given society cease to be those by which its members identify themselves'. This means that the introduction of all the new institutions of a modern state – as in the present case – represents a formidable challenge of ensuring popular identification. As we shall see, this is not only a matter of designing policies to meet expectations that are already prevalent in the population. From the outset