The State and the Social. Ørnulf Gulbrandsen

the British if the latter really had wanted to gain the Northern Tswana land, the three dikgosi consented to the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The deal was after all quite acceptable, since the British had promised that ‘the chiefs…might be left to govern their own tribes in their own fashion’¹² and, very significantly, the colonial power firmly restricted the establishment of white settler communities within the tribal territories. The Northern Tswana's geopolitical location had worked to their advantage: the decision to establish a British protectorate was triggered by increasing German activity in what was then South-West Africa. Was there now, the British asked themselves, a ‘danger that the Germans might join hands with the hostile Boers, or with the Portuguese, or even with other Germans who were in East Africa, cut the road to the north and thus permanently bar the Cape from access to central Africa?’ (Sillery 1974: 75). As Maylam (1980: 25) states, being ‘in danger from three sides: South African Republic, Germany and Portugal’ the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate served the British imperial interests in blocking South African and German expansion. These interests were more than ‘political’ (Parsons 1985: 29) as the control over the vast territory of the protectorate helped significantly to secure economic interests further north, especially by the construction of a railway through the country which remained the only direct link between South Africa and Rhodesia until the 1960s.

      That the British considered negotiating the establishment of a protectorate was also due to the existence of somebody to address. That is, somebody in sufficient control of the country and people to be recognized as a partner with enough local authority and political control. Hence the significance of the strength and scale of the Bakwena, the Bangwaketse and Bangwato merafe to be brought under the British wing in order to avoid annexation to the neighbouring violent states.

      The negotiated agreement proved, however, not to be watertight. After only a few years the British saw the protectorate as a base for imperial expansion into central Africa. Meanwhile Cecil Rhodes emerged as a leading figure capable of imposing colonial rule on the protectorate. Queen Victoria paved the way for his British South Africa Company (BSACo) to take control, which encouraged the British to push for more than mere ‘protection’. In an Order-in-Council the British denied the sovereignty of the dikgosi and gave themselves absolute power over all the territories of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. This set in motion a power struggle between the dikgosi and the colonial agencies during which the former's strength was severely tested. On at least one occasion, the British and the Tswana were on the brink of war. Aware that the dikgosi might join forces, the high commissioner decided to give in, and this particular confrontation was resolved peacefully. The British, however, had not abandoned their plans to transfer the protectorate to the BSACo. Rhodes at this time was at the height of his power: ‘For him direct control of Bechuanaland was the stepping stone to the realisation of his greater ambition – to seize the gold-rich Transvaal’ (Ramsay 1998: 75).

      Alarmed by the possibility of annexation, the dikgosi of the Bakwena, Bangwaketse and Bangwato embarked on the famous journey to London (September-November 1895) mentioned above. Not only did they take their case to the British government, they mounted a lengthy – and successful – campaign throughout Britain against the BSACo, accompanied by missionaries and presenting themselves as model Christian rulers. Asking what would have happened if Bathoen, Khama and Sechele had not travelled to Britain, Parsons suggests, I recall, that the protectorate would have been taken over in October-November 1895. Instead, the dikgosi's effect on the electorate made Prime Minister Chamberlain ‘obliged to make partial concessions to the chiefs’ and held him back from ‘throwing his lot completely into the Rhodesian camp’ (Parsons 1998: 255). Perhaps most significantly, their lobbying in London had such an impact on the Colonial Office that it complicated a plan by Rhodes to attack the Boer government. Since this venture subsequently failed to the extent that it became an international scandal, Rhodes's political standing was significantly reduced. The British government abandoned its plans to leave his company with most of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and renewed its promise to protect Bechuanaland. Having apparently defeated Rhodes, the dikgosi were celebrated as heroes by their followers.

      And yet, the ostensible promise of ‘protection’ represented no definite guarantee against annexation. In the wake of the South African war, the British government ‘began to press for the transfer of the Protectorate to the control of the nascent Union of South Africa’ (Ramsay 1998: 82). Once again the dikgosi headed campaigns against such plans, and in 1909 they made a second journey to London, where ‘the Batswana leaders’ views had an immediate, if immeasurable, effect on public discussions'. The Times remarked on their ‘skill in elocution’, concluding that ‘[t]he speeches of these barbarian chiefs…are far better reading than the speeches of most European statesmen’.¹³

      Although the success of the Tswana dikgosi certainly owes considerably to their personal capacity, it must be stressed that their endeavours were decisively conditioned by the conjunction of particular historical circumstance. First, the strength of their respective polities, centred round large, well-organized royal towns and their extent of control over many outlying communities perfectly matched the British strong desire of running the protectorate at minimal cost by implementing extensively practices of indirect rule from the outset by leaving ‘the traditional organization very much alone’ (Ashton 1947). Second, the dikgosi's development of a close, supportive attachment to the London Missionary Society facilitated the development of the British-Tswana relationship. Third, the new orientations emerging amongst ruling groups of the Bakwena, Bangwato and Bangwaketse underpinning the dikgosi's efforts to ensure British protection, was conditioned by the threat of being captured into the violent domains of the expanding settler regimes immediately east and north of their own territories.

      Finally, despite their capacity of incorporating and assimilating foreign groups, these processes were, however, not complete: during the latter part of the eighteenth century a number of communities, some of which large and strong, were located within the territory claimed by one of the three Tswana merafe. As we shall now see, with a privileged position within the colonial state, the dominant position of their ruling communities in relation to other communities was progressively reinforced.

      Expansion of the Dominant Tswana Merafe under the British Wing

      After the Bechuanaland Protectorate had been established in 1885, the eight Tswana merafe officially recognized by the British were each designated a distinct, demarcated territory, known as ‘native reserve’ (see Schapera 1943a: 7ff.; Motzafi-Haller 2002: 86ff.).¹⁴ A kgosi was established as the ‘native’ authority in charge of all the peoples living in each of them. Furthermore, during the three dikgosi's visit to England in 1895, the British made it clear that they would be given full backing, if required, to prevent junior sections of the ruling dynasty from branching off and forming separate establishments. The rulers of these merafe were hence installed by the British as the supreme authority of all those communities living within their respective reserves. This also meant, as suggested previously, that groups that had seceded from the royal centre and taken residence elsewhere, were now subjected to the overlordship of the Tswana kgosi recognized by the British (Schapera 1952: 17). The dikgosi were assured full support in case subject communities should challenge their overlordship. In this section I shall explain how the dominant Tswana expanded the network of power with their respective reserves and how the increasingly repressive structures were countered by resistance.

      As suggested in the Introduction, there were huge differences among the eight ‘native reserves’, both in territorial range (see Map 1) and population size (see Schapera 1952). Moreover, they differed sharply in the extent to which foreign groups were assimilated into a recognized morafe.¹⁵ The three smallest ones – the Barolong, the Malete and the Batlokwa – occupied minute areas and were quite homogenous, with no unassimilated groups of any significance except for a small category of servants (batlankha). The Bakgatla were also relatively homogenous, small in number and confined to a relatively small territory, yet, as we shall see, with one distinct Tswana community with non-Kgatla identification. Of the four larger territories – the Bangwaketse, the Bakwena, the Bangwato and the Batawana – the first two included some sizeable communities which identified