Gersony argued in 1997 that ‘Corruption at officer levels has also limited the army's commitment and morale and has filtered down to the enlisted ranks’ (1997; 35).5 Behrend felt that, for Government and rebel soldiers alike, the war had become a mode of production ‘which was more profitable than peace’ (1998; 116), and even NRM members made allegations ‘that the commanders who are sent to the regions are only interested in doing business and not defending the people from Joseph Kony's brutality’.6 The national papers also reported on specific instances of corruption. These included embezzlement of monies intended for fuel ‘for military operations against Joseph Kony rebels’,7 the diversion of supplies (including medicines) from the UPDF to the LRA,8 and the payment of salaries to ‘ghost soldiers’.
These various constraints on the UPDF's capacity, however, could not explain why the UPDF was only selectively unsuccessful; why did they manage to deal with groups such as the ADF, but not the LRA? For many people, Museveni's apologies rang hollow and the real question was not the Government's military capacity to solve the situation in the north, but its political will. In short, as the quotation with which I open this chapter implies, the reality of a war in which the uneducated survive well beyond expectations and the educated perform seriously below expectations, demands that the standard presentation of the LRA-GoU war needs revisiting, starting with the nature and motivation of the two parties concerned.
This chapter therefore first assesses the considerable ambiguities about the LRA's composition, numbers and civilian support base, and then look at its modus operandi. Survival strategies, internal organisation, and political messages are scrutinised, and the 1994 Peace Talks between the two parties are examined (drawing on an account developed from two primary sources (see Annex B)), for further evidence of the LRA's political position. The Peace Talks also exemplify the position of the Government, which is further considered through a scrutiny of subsequent initiatives to deal with the LRA, including the 1999 Nairobi Peace Accord, the 2000 Amnesty Act, Operation Iron Fist and the 2004 referral to the International Criminal Court.
The findings suggest that the LRA did present a military challenge, indeed was more organised than derogatory terms such as ‘rag-tag army’ would imply, but was a self-limiting force which it should have been possible for the Government to deal with decisively; it was resilient but not invincible. The 1994 talks demonstrate a power-play between Government and LRA in which the LRA attempts to maximise the recognition and validation given it, the Government makes strenuous efforts to minimise these by seeking to humiliate and belittle the LRA instead, and the LRA eventually resorts to violence. As such, the talks were an instance of ‘war-talk’ rather than peace talks, and set a precedent for subsequent initiatives and dynamics that, under the same guise of a wish for peace, in essence created the space for further militarism and the dynamics of social torture.
The LRA's Ambiguities
Anyone attempting to assess the role of the LRA in northern Uganda is faced with a number of ambiguities, particularly concerning its composition and the extent of civilian support and links with the LRM. They are also faced with a media which fuels rather than resolves these ambiguities.
Composition
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