“Minister, an examination of the statistics for the native population in Canada reveals two general trends. First, there is an unprecedented growth in population on reserves. Second, despite this fact, and contrary to some media reports and public opinion, social conditions and health and welfare on some reserves are stable and even improving. Which is good news, of course. However, many investigators are worried that in the middle distance, rapid population growth and worsening social services are on a collision course. As you may know, minister, scholars warn us that revolutions often occur when conditions are improving and people’s expectations of a better future are suddenly dashed.”
Conway smiled to himself. He very much doubted that Riley knew any such thing, even though it was a concept particularly germane to Canada’s present situation. But then, Canadian ministers of national defence tend not to know much about warfare, international relations, or history. But it didn’t help to embarrass them – thus Bishop’s tactful attempt to guide the minister through the fundamentals of revolutionary warfare.
“In the near future,” Bishop continued, “the open question is whether the improvements in current standards of living can continue fast enough to avert a security challenge to the government of Canada, especially from the rapidly growing and increasingly frustrated young male population on reserves. Analysts who have applied the Canadian circumstances to models of, as they say, ‘perceptions of disaffection’ in so-called failed states, in the Horn of Africa for instance, conclude that the young members of the native community in Canada are a dangerously fertile ground for recruitment by radical leaders within that community. The concern here is not militant protest, minister. The possibility of a large-scale revolt by native people against Canada is, according to these models, very possible.”
Riley broke in irritably. “Models, African failed states, surely this is just academic mumbling. We’ve got programs, comprehensive negotiations, we know they – ”
“I’m afraid not, minister,” the CDS interrupted quietly but firmly. “It’s true that we’re paid to take such notions seriously and be prepared for the worst while others hope for the best. But Sunday’s raids and Molly Grace’s television tape strongly suggest that the analysts’ scenario is in fact very serious, plausible, and immediate, not some theoretical case concocted by defence academics.”
“Well, I don’t sympathize with these attitudes. Our government provides billions in cash and support to the First Nations and their chiefs every year.”
“Indeed you do, minister. And that brings me to something else very serious, plausible, and immediate. Over the years, Canadian governments have deliberately created something approaching a parallel government within Canada run by native leaders. True, it is a reasonable way to work with the more responsible and moderate elements to improve conditions without provoking accusations of paternalism and trampling of the right to self-government.
“The problem is that, if these leaders fail to deliver or are found wanting, as seems the case in some regions, then this organization, this parallel government, is ripe for a coup staged by any well-organized native leader. Put simply, the official native leaders, the ones who get invited to Rideau Hall and to federal-provincial meetings, are extremely vulnerable, and the radicals wouldn’t have to create a governing structure from scratch under difficult conditions, just take over the one we’ve built for them.”
“Sure, yes, you’re right,” Riley acknowledged. “But the dilemma for the federal government is that it has to support someone, even ineffective leaders, even ones compromised in the eyes of residents on reserves, or risk the collapse of years of policy built with these leaders. We can’t just throw out the whole framework for national policy.”
“I understand the situation, minister, but the entire hollow structure that governments have created is highly vulnerable to an internal radical takeover.” Bishop raised a hand to fend off an interruption from Riley. “If such a thing were to occur, it would likely come from someone within the middle ranks of the community, from some generally unknown radical chief, for instance.
“The chiefs and grand chiefs aren’t likely to be the leaders – they’ve got too much going for them to take such risks. As you may know, minister, rebellions and revolutions are rarely directed from the comfortable bunch at the top of the hierarchy.” In a flicker of the wit familiar only to his close associates, Bishop added, gesturing around the room, “That’s why I always have to watch the colonels.”
Riley smiled. “You should see it in my profession.”
“Indeed, minister. Actually, I have.” He paused. “I’ll ask Colonel Conway to flesh out these thoughts with some detail of the facts we face today. This briefing is complex and longer than most, minister, but it can’t be avoided if you’re to get a good sense of the seriousness of the situation. As I said earlier in your office, we’ve been building this file with the RCMP and CSIS for years, but your colleagues on both sides of the House would have none of it. It’s time you got the whole picture.”
Ed Conway looked up from his notes, waited for the CDS to sit down, and then focused on Jim Riley. “Minister, the Native People’s Army, the NPA, is a formidable force, deeply embedded in the native community, especially in the reserves. It is secretive, secure, and very difficult to penetrate by ordinary intelligence means. The force is lightly armed, although after last night’s raids it has added significant capabilities to its arsenal. The NPA, in any case, has for a long time had access to, and possession of, heavy weapons on the reserves in Quebec and eastern Ontario, but the RCMP hasn’t been allowed to confiscate them.”
Conway paused just long enough to let Riley absorb that message then continued. “We believe that many leaders have had professional training in the Canadian Forces regular and reserves, and in U.S. Army units, including airborne battalions and special forces units. In fact, the American forces have been more successful in recruiting Canadian natives than we have over the years. We have tried to track the natives recruited by the Americans, but it is difficult to do, and in any case, the effort, though we thought it was clandestine, was challenged last year before the Privacy Commissioner by the Council of Native Leaders and the government lost the case.
“Our problem, minister, isn’t just that a significant paramilitary force has been assembled on the reserves. The problem is more profound. So now I’d like to run briefly through the main issues relating to the native population.” He glanced towards one of the two screens just behind his lectern as if to direct the minster to his slides.
“The aboriginal population of Canada – North American Indian, Inuit, and Métis – numbers nearly 1.2 million people – four per cent of the Canadian population. And it’s growing very rapidly. Between 1996 and 2006 the aboriginal community grew by forty-seven per cent, six times faster than the non-aboriginal Canadian population.
“According to the 2006 census, approximately 700,000 people identify themselves as North American Indians and most identify themselves with one of 615 First Nations. This Indian community is expected to increase to 730,000 individuals by 2021, but the statistics are a bit dated and some scholars and policy analysts think the population is already larger than measured and will increase more dramatically by 2012.
“Approximately forty per cent of the population live on one of the 2,720 reserves of vastly different sizes that are scattered across Canada. The strongest concentrations, more than forty-eight per cent of the total Indian population, live on reserves in Manitoba and Saskatchewan.
“In 2006, the median age in the national Indian population was twenty-five. In other words, exactly half the population is older and half is younger than twenty-five. The norm in the general Canadian population is forty. The on-reserve population is very young – thirty-four per cent are children under fourteen years of age.
“Although there are exceptions, as you know, the majority of the natives on reserves live in miserable conditions, are poorly educated, and have few employment opportunities on and near the reserves. The 55,000 young people between fifteen and twenty-four years of age – that’s a