The next morning, the first western Reform caucus of the session met behind closed doors.46 Immediately there was trouble. Some of the moderate members expressed doubts as to the wisdom of moving the Convention resolutions in parliament directly. It was all very well, they contended, to adopt the Convention platform as a unifying statement of aims and ideals; but to press it in the existing House would be to cut off Upper Canada Reform from those who were disgusted with the present administration but not yet ready to transform the union. Far better to warn that if misgovernment did not cease the Convention plan would be insisted on. Then there would be room to compromise with potential allies and, above all, to gain more Lower Canadian support.47
But those who held with Brown believed that the very purpose of the party was to transform the union, that misgovernment was inherent in its nature, and that further warnings were quite meaningless. Better, indeed, to push to the issue at once, and, if the first try failed, to push again – rather than postpone a test that the electorate expected, and fritter away reputation and support in chasing useless superficial compromises.48 It was the age-old political debate between compelling principle and temporizing opportunism; or between self-defeating inflexibility and wise adjustment to realities, depending on the side one argued for.
Brown had expected trouble. There were already rumours abroad of reluctance and backsliding in some Reform circles, even as parliament assembled.49 For that very reason, and to commit the party definitely, he had immediately given notice of his motion.50 It was a bold move, and an imperious one. It brought an excited protest in the caucus (from those disposed in any case to hang back) that he had acted without authorization. Brown’s reply was wholly typical. Though admitting the general need for consultation, he was forthright, single-minded – and again imperious. “In this particular case,” he said emphatically, “there is no room for parley or modification – and whatever may be the result, these resolutions must be moved”51
He could also note that he was the party’s chosen leader; that the caucus had unanimously confirmed him in authority at the end of the preceding session, when he had offered to step down for any more desirable candidate;52 that the fullest possible party meeting had adopted the resolutions; and that, further, the party’s new official organization, the Constitutional Reform Association, had embodied them in its Address with the promise that they would be introduced in parliament. What more authorization could one possibly want? Why not act on the patently obvious?
All this was true. Unfortunately it was just as true that the Reform party organization in Upper Canada could not direct the parliamentary caucus at Quebec. The underlying rifts were there still; and Brown had not succeeded, as he had hoped, in vaulting over them in one quick leap. Furthermore, the political skills he unquestionably displayed in shaping public opinion or managing huge popular meetings did not include the restraint, finesse, and shrewd understanding of differing viewpoints that were so necessary in this affair. He could deal far better with a roaring audience of a thousand than a roomful of restless politicians. Still, for the time being the trouble was allayed. The question of authorization was let drop with Brown’s acknowledgement of its general necessity. And the resolutions were not introduced on March 5 as had been announced, on the ground that a number of the western members still had not reached Quebec.53 One, John Sheridan Hogan, never did arrive. Months later his body was found in the Don River near Toronto: he had been killed in a highway robbery.54
In any case, nothing had been settled. Brown and many with him were unshaken in their determination to bring in the constitutional resolutions. A week or two of March passed by, while parliamentary business went forward uneventfully, and the Reform opposition strove earnestly to keep its internal problems under control. Meanwhile, however, the ministerial press had picked up the scent. The Toronto Leader, chief government organ in the West, gleefully reported “a terrible row” in the Grit caucus over the resolutions and Brown’s leadership. Nothing had been heard since of his motion. “Why the delay?” it asked sweetly.55 Furthermore, two prominent western Reform journals, the Hamilton Times and London Free Press, which the year before had questioned Brown’s suitability as leader, returned to their refrain.56 The old “moderate” charges, in fact, were being raised again: that Brown was too extreme to head the party, that Lower Canadians would not work with him, and hence that he was keeping Liberalism out of office.
At the other, the radical, end of the scale, dissolutionists were capturing local party meetings in the western peninsula – since they found Brown’s federation policy too tame, too much concerned with maintaining ties with Lower Canada!57 That primeval Clear Grit, Charles Clarke, was writing vigorous new Reformator letters to the press.58 His friend George Sheppard confidently informed him, “The ‘joint authority’ commands no respect anywhere.”59 Sheppard could perceive a dissolutionist reaction rising, and the coming overthrow of Brown. No doubt the wish bore some relation to the thought; and no doubt the lead the Hamilton Times was taking in attacking Brown bore some relation to the fact that its editor, George Sheppard, now had the chance of getting a little of his own back.
Brown was being threatened from both sides; but in Quebec the threat from the moderates seemed far more serious. It was said that five members of the Reform caucus who looked to Sandfield Macdonald would vote against the Convention resolutions if introduced.60 The Leader heard that others would abstain.61 Foley was a dubious quantity: moderates considered him a likely successor to Brown. Malcolm Cameron had even raised his name in caucus at the end of the previous session, although Foley had then denied any desire to lead.62 Whether or not he had aspirations, or could be drafted, he was a natural rallying point for antagonism to the Convention plan. Foley was hearty, companionable, and clever. He had some of the charm and eloquence of his compatriot McGee, though not his breadth of intellect or force of character. Associated with him, moreover, was another prominent Reform figure, Skeffington Connor, Solicitor-General in the late Brown-Dorion government. Connor’s habit of speaking as if about to burst into tears had not made him one of the party’s best parliamentary orators;63 but he was of old and respected Liberal lineage – had helped to found the Globe, in fact. In consequence, the prospect of revolt loomed large in George Brown’s party. It could very well doom the policy of federation before it even reached the House.
5
To meet the crisis, the leader called a special caucus. It sat for days through the middle of March in rooms provided at the Collège de Laval, wrangling desperately over the Convention resolutions, as the moderates again insisted on postponement in order to conciliate Lower Canada and to gain a chance at office.64 At least, in opposing such a weak-kneed policy, Grit radicals made common cause with Brownite Liberals; and thus Brown was effectively relieved from further dangers on the left. But rebellion on the right was coming to a head. “We have had sharp work in our own ranks here,” he reported wrathfully on March 28 to Alexander Mackenzie, his old associate in Sarnia. “Sandfield Macdonald we expected nothing of, but Foley and Connor have acted badly as can be.”65 Frightened to death at the prospect of having to declare themselves on the resolutions, they were seeking to get rid of him, to form a new “humbug alliance”. They were “snakes in the grass”, Brown fumed, “who will make their spring the first moment they dare.”66
He sprang first. He boldly placed his resignation in the hands of the caucus, and offered to make way for a moderate to lead the party.67 It was a flat challenge to a test of strength. He would even resign his seat, Brown said positively, if