When the troops were on board the ships, they made sail further off shore, as the breeze freshened and confirmed blowing dead on the land; at midnight it fell calm and left us about five miles off the town. At dawn of day the hands were turned up, the soldiers embarked the boats, and the ships stood in for the land, but having light baffling winds, they made but little progress and none came within gun shot except a schooner of 10 guns, and she did not arrive until the men had made good their landing.
After some consultation, the boats were ordered to proceed under cover of the gun boats only, but our favourable opportunity was gone; and the troops knew it as well as ourselves, for, though there was no murmuring, or attempt to disobey orders, their countenances, so different to what they were the evening before, plainly showed they did not obey the orders with that cheerfulness which confidence inspires. The enemy had nearly 24 hours notice, and had made the best use of their time by minute guns, and expresses, to receive strong reinforcements. It being daylight before the boats shoved off from the ships, our motions were definitely perceived by the Americans, who, not being awed by the shipping, had drawn great numbers of men from the town, concealing them among the bushes, behind trees, logs, and rising grounds, just above the beach, which enabled them to take deliberate aim as we approached the shore; they had likewise brought out four field pieces to annoy us.
About 3 am we formed the line, the gun boats leading the van, and commenced pulling in shore about a mile above the town in order to keep out of the range of the shot from the forts and blockhouses. The boats were heavily laden, and proceeded but slowly, while the enemy kept up an ill directed fire from their* field pieces. When within musquet shot of the beach, the gun boats pulled ahead and fired a few rounds of grape and canister shot to scour the beach, but the Yankees had anticipated us, and were so well sheltered, that I believe none were killed or wounded. The batteries and ships’ boats then advanced, and I observed to an officer of the 104th Regt, who commanded the troops in the boat under my charge, that the Americans intended to let us land unmolested, but it soon appeared I was mistaken, for when about [a] pistol shot from the beach, and we had encouraged each other with the usual salutation of three cheers, they opened [such] a well directed fire from their field pieces and rifles that almost every shot did execution, which for a moment staggered us, but [we] soon recovered from the surprise. Every boat made the best of her way to land, [and] the gun boats kept up a continued fire, but having no other mark than the smoke from the enemy’s guns, little execution was done, and in a very short time there was fifteen killed and wounded in my boat, principally picked off from, and about the gun. In passing one of the boats, which appeared in great distress, I hailed the officer, who was wounded, and had but three men who had escaped the effects of the shot of the enemy. As the military officer and myself were obliged to stand up and cheer on the men, we were too prominent a mark to remain long and I took a mental leave of the few friends I had left. The men being so deliberately picked off from the gun, the crew got in some confusion, for as the seamen were disabled, others took their place, and were relieved at the oars by the soldiers. While [we were] occupied in this double transfer, the army officer, with his glass, had discovered a body of men drawn up a short distance from the beach, who being dressed in green, the uniform of all the American foot soldiers, could scarcely be perceived among the trees and underwood. He called me and pointed them out. While [we were] so occupied, the Coxswain of the boat was struck with two balls and fell; the soldier took the tiller, while I went forward to the gun, which being loaded with grape and canister shot, I had it pointed to the spot and made a great havoc among the bushes, if not the men. By this time some of the men had made a precipitate retreat into the town.
When the soldiers were all landed, and the wounded men placed upon the beach, those gun boats, which were not disabled, rowed towards the batteries, and commenced firing, to draw off some of the attention of the enemy from the advancing party. Hence we were kept till half past seven, when we were recalled to the landing place to take on board the troops who were retreating in great haste. They were once in the town, and being dreadfully cut up from some blockhouses, and [with] a great dust seen rising from the opposite entrance, supposed to proceed from a reinforcement to the garrison, a retreat was sounded, but who* gave the orders no one knew, the Governor and his staff positively denying having done so, however, it was not the less obeyed. In a few minutes a smoke was seen rising from their dockyard, which caused an attempt to be made to rally the troops, but [it] did not succeed. Before the soldiers were all embarked it was known to a certainty that, what was supposed to be a reinforcement, was nothing else but the main body of the Americans retreating, leaving some blockhouses manned, until their new ship, and public store houses were on fire, and then [those men remaining were] to follow.
I was informed by several officers of the American army and navy, when I was [later] taken prisoner, that had the attack commenced immediately after we hove in sight the day before, so far from defending themselves, the number of men in the garrison would have scarcely been sufficient to destroy the public works.
We lost nearly 400 men killed and wounded in this disgraceful affair, in every probability the place would have been taken without the loss of a single man had things been conducted as they might. This failure caused a coolness between the Governor and Commodore, [which] at length broke out into an open rupture, in consequence of the loss of our flotilla on Lake Champlain, which, in Sir James Yeo’s public dispatches, he attributed to the misconduct of the Governor, who was soon after suspended, and a court martial called, but he died soon after his arrival in England.
The soldiers were greatly disheartened, and it was well for us that the troops at Fort George, the place the Americans had gone to attack, were better commanded, otherwise their ships would have been down upon us, and from our crowded state, most probably would have taken us all. We arrived in Navy Bay the same evening and disembarked the troops and wounded men; thus ended an expedition begun under the most favourable auspices.
I before remarked that, could we get possession of Sackets Harbour, it would have saved an immensity of blood and treasure.5
On Lake Erie we had several vessels of war under Captain Barclay, who could not face the enemy for want of seamen; others were similarly circumstanced on Lake Champlain. That the Americans should be kept in check on Lake Ontario, was of the most vital importance to the whole country above Montreal, and probably to within a few miles of Quebec; therefore, had we succeeded in this expedition, Sir James Yeo would have been enabled to send a reinforcement of officers and seamen, to each of the above named places on that lake. Or, even allowing that the enemy should have retaken Sackets they could not, in the course of the Summer, have built and equipped a force sufficient to face us, let their activity be what it might; and they are not deficient in that quality, as far as regards ship building; and the following summer we must still have kept the lead, as by that time reinforcements* of seamen and marines, with artificers, and stores, would have arrived at Kingston from England.6
It may be thought that I am somewhat premature in the destruction of the American fleet. I before observed that Sackets was the only harbour they had and without a harbour occasionally to run into, we might have selected our own time, and improved our circumstances in such a manner, that an engagement would have been a morally certain victory. The failure of this expedition may also be said to have caused the loss of our facilities on Lakes Erie and Champlain.
In the autumn of this year, Captain Barclay was forced to engage a superior number of vessels, well manned, equipped, and disciplined. With not thirty British Able Seamen on board, the remainder of his crews made up by soldiers and Canadians, with guns by no means fitted for naval warfare, some of which burst, and others [that] tore their carriages to pieces [with] the first broadside, and though fighting under every possible disadvantage, he did not strike [lower his colours in surrender] until every officer on board his own ship was killed or wounded, himself among the latter, severely; and every officer commanding a vessel in his squadron.
In the Summer of 1814, Captain George Downie lost his life, and ships, on Lake Champlain from being hurried into action