Regarding the nexus between internal and external definitions (or between group identification and social categorization), Jenkins claims that these two processes are analytically distinct but not isolated from each other. As he notes, “each is chronically implicated in the other in an ongoing dialectic of identification. The categorization of ‘them’ is too useful a foil in the identification of ‘us’ for this not to be the case, and the definition of ‘us’ too much the product of a history of relationships with a range of significant others.… Ethnicity—the production, reproduction and transformation of the ‘group-ness’ of culturally differentiated collectivities—is a two-way process that takes place across the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (2008, 55). Similarly, Eriksen (2010, 77) asserts that “the Barthian view of ethnicity as a system of mutually exclusive self-ascriptions must be slightly modified: the ascription attributed by others also contributes to creating ethnicity, and may be of paramount importance.” Cornell and Hartmann (2007, 83) also acknowledge the impact of both internal and external construction processes and dynamics on group identity and boundaries:
Construction involves both the passive experience of being “made” by external forces, including not only material circumstances but also the claims that other persons or groups make about the group in question, and the active process by which the group “makes” itself. The world around us may “tell” us we are racially distinct, or our experience at the hands of circumstances may “tell” us that we constitute a group, but our identity is also a product of the claims we make. These claims may build on the messages we receive from the world around us or may depart from them rejecting them, adding to them, or refining them.
Returning to the impact of external boundary contestation on ethnic boundaries, we should acknowledge that it almost always involves processes of “external definition” or “social categorization.” As outsiders contest ethnic boundaries, they usually attempt to impose alternative categories or labels (usually disparaging ones in the case of conflictual situations) on the ethnic group or movement that they challenge. As the empirical chapters of this study illustrate, rival political movements with conservative or Islamic orientations constantly label the secular, leftist Kurdish movement as “infidels,” “heretical,” or “un-Islamic.”
Such attempts of external definition, however, might have major consequences for boundary processes. Facing challenge or threat by outsiders, group members are likely to become much more defensive about their ethnic identity. As a result, they are likely to put internal divisions or conflicts aside and be more assertive with respect to issues related to their group identities and boundaries. As R. Jenkins (2008, 59) suggests, “the experience of categorization may strengthen existing group identity through a process of resistance and reaction. Thus, the experience of being categorized as ‘A’ may, only apparently paradoxically, contribute to the reinforcement, or even perhaps the formation, of [the] group identity as ‘B.’” Likewise, Cornell and Hartmann (2007, 64) note, “Competition … often leads, via social closure, to an emphasis on ethnic or racial boundaries. It is thereby likely to reinforce and reproduce [these boundaries].” In the same way, Eriksen (2010, 81) remarks, “Conspicuous forms of boundary maintenance become important when the boundaries are under pressure.” Thus, contestation of group boundaries by outsiders is likely to solidify internal identification, group attachments, and cohesiveness (see also Hale 2004). In other words, rather than weakening or undermining ethnic boundaries, external contestation might empower or thicken them. In brief, given the dialectical relationship between external and internal identifications, external boundary contestation might lead to major consequences for ethnic identification. It might result in either boundary reinforcement or boundary shift.
The preceding explanations suggest that contestations of ethnic boundaries by out-group members should also be regarded as one form of ethnic boundary work. As indicated earlier, the notion of boundary by definition presumes two separate spheres (i.e., inside and outside). Since contestations stemming from outside the boundary are likely to affect (directly or indirectly) what goes on within the boundary, these should qualify as one type of boundary work by outsiders. To put it differently, external boundary contestation can also be interpreted as boundary work, which might lead to the construction or reconstruction of the boundaries of ethnic groups and of movements. As the empirical chapters discuss in detail, Islamic or conservative political actors have been trying to delegitimize the secular, leftist Kurdish movement in the eyes of the conservative Kurdish masses by externally defining or categorizing the movement as “Marxist,” “atheist,” “Satanic evil,” and “un-Islamic.” Such an external identification or social categorization by competing conservative or Islamic political actors was one of the triggering factors behind the Islamic opening of the secular Kurdish movement in the past decades.
Internal boundary contestation, on the other hand, encompasses conflicts over ethnic boundaries among insiders (i.e., in-group members or coethnics) and may be relatively more destabilizing. Although several conceptualizations assume or treat ethnic groups as unitary actors or highly homogeneous entities with a shared culture and identity,10 we should not exaggerate the internal homogeneity and cohesion of ethnic groups. Several studies even openly reject the idea that an ethnic group is constituted by a unique, common culture and shared identity. For instance, claiming that a common culture cannot be regarded as a defining feature of ethnic groups, Chandra (2012c) suggests that it is not realistic to expect all ethnic-group members to share all the same values, symbols, codes, and norms. Chandra (2012c, 88) suggests that instead of associating ethnic groups with a common culture by definition, we should take a common culture to be a variable: “Ethnic groups can vary in the degree to which they share a common ‘content’—of which culture can be one component.” Similarly, Brubaker (2009, 30) claims that “the strength, salience, content, and consequences of ethnic, racial, and national identifications are variable across time, contexts and persons.” In the same way, Wimmer (2008b, 981) also draws attention to ethnic-group heterogeneity: “[Several authors] assume, rather than demonstrate, that an ethnic category represents an actor with a single purpose and shared outlook. Such ontological collectivism overlooks, however, that ethnic categories may shift contextually and that there might be substantial disagreement among individuals over which ones are the most appropriate and relevant ethnic labels” (emphasis in original; see also Wimmer 2009, 245–246).
Ethnic-group heterogeneity might originate from several sources. For instance, group members might attribute quite different meanings to the cultural markers delineating ethnic boundaries, including relatively more objective markers or diacritics, such as shared ancestry, language, or region (see also Eriksen 2010). In addition, it is quite often the case that an ethnic category or movement might be divided along other dimensions, such as religion (e.g., Alevi Kurds vs. Sunni Kurds), class, ideology, and region. Hence, borrowing from Wallman (1978), an ethnic category or movement might involve “sub-boundaries” due to nonethnic divisions and cleavages. As a result, one can find quite diverse views and opinions within an ethnic group or movement about how and where symbolic and/or social boundaries should be drawn (see also Cornell and Hartmann 2007; Conforti 2015). Internal diversity or heterogeneity, in turn, creates a favorable environment for internal boundary contestation. The following section presents hypothetical expectations