What had also become clear by the 1970s was that an exercise in the history of ideas such as mine could not be confined to a mere content analysis of a limited range of texts from the colonial past. The reading of such texts, as of the whole phenomenon of colonial and transcultural encounter, had been and were being transformed in the aftermath of the colonial era by the rise of Third World scholarship and anti-colonial polemics, and by a revolution in our understanding of the discursive, cognitive and linguistic processes that condition all truth claims. My project, it appeared, would require not only a distant reach into the very origins of European ideas about Africa, but a broad survey of whether, why, how, and to what extent not only European but all observers are purportedly trapped within historically and cognitively conditioned horizons. It seemed important to establish whether, in the language of popular neuropsychology, we are hard-wired to see only what our conceptual grids allow us to see; for if this should indeed be the case, no genuine cross-cultural enlightenment could ever be possible.
A seminal work in the revisionary discourse of Europe’s encounter with its ‘others’ was Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) – to which we shall come – but that work was itself the product of a ferment of debate and rewriting of history that had both inspired and recorded the processes of decolonisation. Said had been anticipated by writers and activists such as J.A. Hobson (1901, 1902), E.D. Morel (1920), Frantz Fanon (1952, 1961), Oscar Mannoni (1950), C.L.R. James (1958, 1963) and Albert Memmi (1965), but it was Said who launched that particular wave of the discourse of postcolonialism, in the ebb of which we still find ourselves.
Before moving on to an examination of the impact of figures such as Fanon and Said on postcolonial debates, however, we need to glance at the broader context of these polemics in the changing dimensions of the historiography of Africa, and as they were deployed in the dismantling of colonial empires.
Hegel had notoriously argued in 1822 that Africa was ‘the land of childhood’ (1822/1902, 111) and that its people were beyond the grasp of history: ‘The Negro … exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state…. In Negro life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence…. At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again’ (95–103). By 1850, Robert Knox would ask: ‘What signify these dark races to us? Who cares particularly for the Negro, or the Hottentot or the Kaffir?’ and go on to suggest that ‘it matters little how their extinction is brought about’ (cited by Malik, 1996, 101). From here it is not difficult, with the benefit of hindsight, to draw a genealogy of European perceptions of Africa and Africans that leads directly to Hugh Trevor-Roper’s equally shocking claim in the early years of the postcolonial debate:
Perhaps, in the future, there will be some African history to teach. But at present there is none, or very little: there is only the history of the European in Africa. The rest is largely darkness … the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe (1965, 9).
Such views have survived in surprising quarters. In a cult novel of the 1980s, Milan Kundera’s The Unbearable Lightness of Being, the following sentiment occurs: ‘We need to take no more note of it [a soul not reincarnated] than of a war between two African kingdoms in the fourteenth century, a war that altered nothing in the destiny of the world, even if a hundred thousand blacks perished in excruciating torment’ (1984, 3). From Hegel to Trevor-Roper, the relationship between Africa and Europe became that summed up by Stanley Leathes in Volume 12 of the Cambridge Modern History: ‘Almost the whole of Africa has thus become an annex of Europe’ (1910, 4), or, perhaps more ominously, by E.A. Benians: ‘In Europe the occupation of Africa has increased wealth and trade, and cheapened some of the comforts of life; what it will mean for Africa cannot yet be judged’ (1910, 666).
By the time Trevor-Roper made his pronouncement, such meanings for Africa were being vociferously judged. It should be remembered, however, that Trevor-Roper’s verdict was at least partly provoked by an emergent African historiography making equally startling claims about the originary status of Africa itself, legitimated in turn by Perham’s ‘colonial reckoning’ (1961) that had set in after the Second World War. In South Africa in 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had memorably reminded the apartheid government of the ‘winds of change’ blowing through colonial Africa, and of which they would soon feel the cold blast. Ghana had achieved independence in 1957, a triggering event that would not only fundamentally change the political dispensation of Africa, but that would also inspire a discourse of dismantlement aimed not just at the institutions, but at the discursive maintenance of the assumptions of colonialism.
Reviewing two quite contradictory early myths about Africa, that of Hobbes and that of Rousseau, in which Africa was either a continent ‘in which there was no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and, which [was] worst of all, continued fear and danger of death’ or the site of ‘a golden age of perfect liberty, equality and fraternity’, T. Hodgkin captured the simplistic terms in which the discourse of Africa had traditionally been conducted, and warned that such binaries would no longer do (1957, 174–5). Lord Elton’s Imperial Commonwealth of 1945 was probably the last magisterial review of its subject that could sum up British colonial activity in Africa as follows: ‘British explorers had called a new Continent into existence, and gradually British emigrants had begun to people it’ (1945, 363) – evidently on the assumption that the continent’s own inhabitants did not count as ‘people’. Pervasively discriminatory assumptions about what had transpired between colonisers and colonised still prevailed. Boies Penrose, whose Travel and Discovery in the Renaissance 1420–1620 remains a seminal study of its subject, nevertheless was of the opinion that ‘intermarriage with the natives resulted in the creation of a half-caste population with the weaknesses of both races and few of their better qualities’ (1952, 74).
Such verdicts I recognised as the absolute creeds of the world in which I had grown up. They also suggested that all travel writing and colonial history was irresistibly appropriative, as remarked by James Duncan and Derek Gregory: ‘All travel writing, as a process of inscription and appropriation, spins webs of colonizing power’ (1999, 3).
But a ‘discourse switch’ was under way. In another seminal work of the time, Margery Perham and John Simmons’s African Discovery: An Anthology of Exploration, the compilers placed their selections from the greats of nineteenth-century African exploration into a new context, despite betraying assumptions that Africa was not in ‘the civilized world’:
The contemporaries for whom the explorers wrote were probably more interested in the character of the continent than of its peoples. That order is reversed today and to many the most interesting subject upon which their evidence can be sought is that of the state of African society when untouched by direct contact with the civilized world (1942, 16).
In 1920, E.D. Morel, appalled by his own experiences in the so-called Congo Free State, had published one of the first major exposures of colonial atrocities, The Black Man’s Burden: The White Man in Africa from the