The Board of Invention and Research was created by Lord Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty, in July as a way to insert scientific insights into the development of antisubmarine technologies by integrating teams of scientists and engineers into the various experimental stations under Admiralty control. Because the submarine had became a problem of national significance as more and more ships were sent to the bottom, victims of U-boat torpedoes, the BIR was given submarine detection as a high priority. The next step was to assign BIR staff members to the Admiralty Experimental Station at Hawkcraig. They arrived in November, while Commander Ryan was still in the midst of moving from Granton Pier at Edinburgh to this (his) new experimental station. It soon became evident that Ryan was less than enthusiastic about the influx of civilians and what he likely perceived as a disruption in his own approach to solving the submarine detection problem.
A CRITICAL LACK OF COOPERATION
[A]t the time of our arrival at Hawkcraig the state of our knowledge of underwater sound propagation in the sea was very primitive…. It became immediately apparent, however, that this early work was essentially empirical, and that the serving officers at the station were not greatly interested in the physical properties involved.14
These comments by Albert B. Wood, a research assistant from Liverpool University, now on the BIR staff at Hawkcraig, summarized the different approach that would be taken by the BIR over that of Commander Ryan and his naval staff. By the time Wood and his colleagues arrived, Ryan had been demonstrating successful submarine detection with his hydrophones to his Admiralty bosses, who were already authorizing shore-based listening stations using Ryan’s designs.15
There was never a true spirit of cooperation between Ryan’s staff and the BIR, and by the spring of 1916, complaints began to arrive on the desk of BIR chairman, Admiral Fisher. Professor William H. Bragg, from the University College in London and in charge of the BIR efforts at Hawkcraig, wrote to Fisher complaining about the lack of ability to build the various apparatus his team needed for their experimental work. “What holds us back is the lack of instrument fitters and workshops…. It is quite exasperating that so much should turn on getting hold of the instrument makers.”16
Not only was it difficult to have equipment built, the scientists also experienced frustrations having access to test vessels, one of the most important being the British submarine, B-3. In March, Albert Wood wrote to Sir Ernest Rutherford, a principal civilian scientist serving on the BIR in London:
The usual difficulties in obtaining a second ship or submarine still exist. Commander Ryan informs that we have no right to demand two ships and we are only allowed to have them when he considers it convenient … With regard to submarine B-3 … he said that it was to be used by both of us (Navy and BIR). He could not tell us, however, when we could have it for our own use; indicating that it would be possible for us to have it only on those occasions when he did not require it himself—which occasions from our previous experience will probably be rare.17
Rutherford continued to receive negative reports from Hawkcraig, revealing the lack of cooperation between his scientists and naval interests; he also sensed similar attitudes from members of the Admiralty. Rutherford reportedly “attacked the view taken by ‘certain parties’ in the Admiralty which appeared to suggest that research and development of listening apparatus was useless and irrelevant.”18 With pressure being put on the Admiralty, some improvements were made in the operations at Hawkcraig after April, but by the end of summer, rivalries continued to exist. In November, Admiral John Rushworth Jellicoe was appointed Britain’s First Sea Lord; a month later, in response to the growing U-boat threat, he created the Admiralty’s Anti-Submarine Division (ASD). The effect was to re-emphasize the importance of attacking the submarine problem with both research and development, stressing the immediate tactical needs at sea.
One impact was the transfer of the Hawkcraig scientists to the Admiralty Experimental Station at Parkeston Quay, Harwich, where there was access to test ships and laboratory facilities. Ryan would be left to his resourcefulness and his own staff at Hawkcraig. The year 1916 had come to an end, and the United States would soon enter the war. When Rutherford joined other colleagues from Britain and France during a scientific mission to America at the end of May, 1917, the submarine problem was a principal topic (chapter 12). Among the technical discussions, however, it was likely that the friction between British scientists and the military, which had seriously hampered the rapid development of submarine detection devices, was included. To avoid a similar lack of cooperation, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, who was aware of British technological developments, created the Special Board on Antisubmarine Devices (chapter 11), which was instrumental in the rapid integration of science and technology into wartime naval requirements.
A FISH, AN EEL, AND A PORPOISE
All such praise the Nash’s fish
Are frankly forced to own,
It’s nothing near as swish
As the porpoise hydrophone19
British P-class vessels were designed primarily for antisubmarine warfare. P-33 is shown here supporting U-boat hunting operations along the northeast shore of Scotland. (Wilson, 1920)
These lines are from a song sung on board a British submarine hunting vessel, P-33, operating off the northern coast of Scotland. By 1918, in addition to destroyers, British antisubmarine work was carried on by motor launches, trawlers, and drifters, as well as larger P-class vessels used in convoy work and capable of twenty-five knots. Hundreds of these various vessels patrolled the waters around the British Isles and into the North Sea, each carrying one or more of the many hydrophone designs available, including those provided by American designers. Lieutenant Wilson, in addition to his work at Hawkcraig with Ryan, also served on P-33. Wilson described the friendly competition between the listeners on his ship and those on the destroyer HMS Dee:
The Nash fish was the rival form, fitted on the Peterhead trawlers, with which Dee and P.33 hunted. When we were ashore, the Club was often the scene of fierce arguments as to the rival merits of Nash’s fish and the porpoise.20
Spring of 1917 had brought about the development of new directional listening devices, but the most important improvement in their capability was providing a streamlined housing, which could be towed behind the hunting vessel. Prior to this, hunting groups had to stop and then deploy their hydrophones for a listening period. When in pursuit, continuous listening while underway was the goal. With the BIR scientists working from the Parkeston experimental station, the Admiralty also encouraged universities and industries to tackle the submarine detection problem. A very promising device was that created by George H. Nash, chief engineer of Western Electric Company’s British subsidiary. Nash began his work with hydrophones early in 1917. His first trials occurred in June, with final acceptance by the Admiralty four months later. His device was comprised of a free-flooding, one-foot diameter cylinder approximately five feet long with conical ends (several versions were built, see top image above). The fish held two hydrophones—one bi-directional, which provided a measure of the direction to the source; and one uni-directional, which the operator could rotate with an electric motor to provide a more precise bearing. All of this was accomplished while the ship was underway.21
A variety of Nash Fish towed listening devices.
A British assembly and test facility. (Courtesy George Malcolmson)