3 The only passage deleted by Edgar Welles that is included in this book is the December 15, 1863, entry about the controversial appointment of a new U.S. marshal for Connecticut (see Chapter 7).
4 Welles probably inserted most of the missing words, but it is likely his son made many of the changes in punctuation – especially the substitution of semicolons for the em dashes of which his father had made prolific use.
5 In several cases where a revision has been replaced with the original manuscript language, the revision is of sufficient interest that the editor has reproduced it in a footnote.
Chapter 1
THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AND BEYOND
Welles’s entries on Lincoln’s decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation constitute one of the diary’s most important contributions to historical knowledge. In Section I of this chapter those entries are reproduced in their entirety. Section II consists of excerpts about a number of related topics, including the possible colonization of African Americans outside the United States, the enlistment in the army and navy of contrabands (slaves who fled to Union lines) and free-born blacks, the limits of the Emancipation Proclamation, the massacre of African American soldiers at Fort Pillow in Tennessee, and Congressional approval of the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery. 1
I
As Welles points out in the following excerpt, Secretary of State Seward and he were the first cabinet members Lincoln sounded out about the possible issuance of a proclamation freeing the slaves in the rebellious states. This was probably no accident. Although virtually all Republicans were opposed to slavery in principle, opinions about how to eliminate the institution ranged across a broad spectrum from gradual, state-initiated, compensated emancipation followed by the forced deportation of the former slaves, to immediate, federally mandated, uncompensated emancipation coupled with citizenship and equal rights for the freed people. It is likely that Lincoln viewed Welles and Seward as the cabinet’s centrists – men who were generally less conservative than Interior Secretary Caleb Smith and the two border-state members, Attorney General Edward Bates and Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, but more conservative than Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase. As a centrist himself, Lincoln may well have wanted to try out the idea on his fellow centrists before soliciting the views of other cabinet members.
Undated2: On Sunday, the 13th of July, 1862, President Lincoln invited me to accompany him in his carriage to the funeral of an infant child of Mr. Stanton. Secretary Seward and his daughter in law Mrs. Frederick Seward were also in the carriage. Mr. Stanton occupied at that time for a summer residence the house of a naval officer, I think Hazard, some two or three miles west, or northwest, of Georgetown. It was on this occasion and on this ride that he first mentioned to Mr. Seward and myself the subject of emancipating the slaves by proclamation in case the Rebels did not cease to persist in their war on the Government and the Union, of which he saw no evidence. He dwelt earnestly on the gravity, importance, and delicacy of the movement, said he had given it much thought and had about come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity absolutely essential for the salvation of the Union, that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued, etc., etc.
This was, he said, the first occasion when he had mentioned the subject to anyone, and wished us to frankly state how the proposition struck us. Mr. Seward said the subject involved consequences so vast and momentous that he should wish to give it mature reflection before giving a decisive answer, but his present opinion inclined to the measure as justifiable, and perhaps he might say expedient and necessary. These were also my views. Two or three times on that ride the subject was adverted to, and before separating the President desired us to give the question special and deliberate attention, for he was earnest in the conviction that something must be done. It was a new departure for the President, for until this time, in all our previous interviews, whenever the question of emancipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in any way alluded to, he had been prompt and emphatic in denouncing any interference by the General Government with the subject.3 This was, I think, the sentiment of every member of the Cabinet, all of whom, including the President, considered it a local, domestic question appertaining to the States respectively, who had never parted with their authority over it. But the reverses before Richmond,4 and the formidable power and dimensions of the insurrection, which extended through all the Slave States, and had combined most of them in a confederacy to destroy the Union, impelled the Administration to adopt extraordinary measures to preserve the national existence. The slaves, if not armed and disciplined, were in the service of those who were, not only as field laborers and producers, but thousands of them were in attendance upon the armies in the field, employed as waiters and teamsters, and the fortifications and intrenchments were constructed by them.
On July 22nd Lincoln informed the entire cabinet of his intention to issue a proclamation of emancipation. Oddly, Welles made no diary entry on that date. But in his October 1st entry he discussed the July 22nd meeting (and a related one on July 21st). By the time that entry was written, Lincoln had issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation (on September 22nd), giving the rebellious states 100 days (i.e., to January 1, 1863) to return to the Union, or else he would declare their slaves emancipated. The October 1st entry is reproduced below, followed by Welles’s September 22nd entry about the cabinet’s final discussion of the preliminary Proclamation preparatory to its issuance later that day. This departure from the chronological order of the diary is necessary in order to see the sequence of events as Welles observed them.
October 1, 1862: When it [Lincoln’s proposal for a proclamation of emancipation] was first brought forward [to the entire cabinet] some six or eight weeks ago,5 all assented to it. It was pretty fully discussed at two successive Cabinet-meetings, and the President consulted freely, I presume, with the members individually. He did with me. Mr. Bates [a Missourian] desired that deportation, by force if necessary, should go with emancipation. Born and educated among the negroes, having always lived with slaves, he dreaded any step which should be taken to bring about social equality between the two races. The effect, he said, would be to degrade the whites without elevating the blacks. Demoralization, vice, and misery would follow. Mr. Blair [from Maryland], at the second discussion, said that, while he was an emancipationist from principle, he had doubts of the expediency of such a movement as was contemplated. Stanton, after expressing himself earnestly in favor of the step proposed, said it was so important a measure that he hoped every member would give his opinion, whatever it might be, on the subject; two had not spoken – alluding to Chase and myself.
I briefly alluded to the strong exercise of power involved in the question, and the denial of Executive authority to do this act, but the Rebels themselves had invoked war on the subject of slavery, had appealed to arms, and they must abide the consequences. It was an exercise of war powers, and I was willing to resort to extreme measures. The blow would fall heavy and severe on those loyal men in the Slave States who clung to the Union, but they must abide the results of a conflict which they had deplored, and unless they could persuade their fellow citizens to embrace the alternative presented [i.e., to end the rebellion forthwith], they must suffer with them. The slaves were now an element of strength to the Rebels – were laborers, producers, and army attendants; were considered as property by the Rebels, and, if property, were subject to confiscation; if not property, we should invite them as well as the [loyal southern] whites to unite with us in putting down the Rebellion. I had made known my views to the President and could say here I gave my approval of the Proclamation. Mr. Chase said it was going a step farther than he had proposed, but he was glad of it and went into a very full argument on the subject. I do not attempt to repeat it or any portion of it, nor that of others, farther than to define the position of each when this important question was before them. Something more than a Proclamation will be necessary, for this step will band the South together, and unite the Border States firmly with the Cotton States in resistance to the Government.