Peirce had not read Abbot’s Way Out of Agnosticism, but he knew him from earlier times, had liked his 1885 book on Scientific Theism,55 had recently selected a lengthy quotation from that work for the Century Dictionary entry on “realism,” and thus he was sympathetic. He wrote to Abbot from Fay’s office saying that, even though he doubted that the pamphlet was “a wise publication,” he was confident that Abbot had not plagiarized Hegel and, moreover, that he had himself long regarded Royce as “one of the large tribe of philosophical blunderers,” so he was prepared to lend a hand (c. 30 Oct. 1891). Peirce wrote a letter to the Nation editor in support of Abbot and it was published about two weeks later (sel. 40). In his letter, Peirce reviewed Abbot’s charges against Royce—that Royce had maliciously libeled Abbot and had used unfair means to stifle Abbot’s reply—and concluded that while Royce’s “warning” was clearly an “unwarranted aspersion,” it could not strictly be regarded as libelous though it seemed clear enough that Royce had contrived to have Abbot’s reply first postponed and then excluded from publication. Peirce noted that Royce seemed almost openly intent on “ruining Dr. Abbot’s reputation,” and that is a conclusion often drawn by scholars who examine this dispute.56 Abbot quickly wrote to thank Peirce for his support, noting that of course Royce had “every advantage of position” on his side: “All the more do I feel the nobility of spirit which moves you to strike a brave blow for me…. If it is a high minded thing to champion a just cause against great odds, you have earned, as you certainly receive, my very grateful thanks” (15 Nov. 1891).
Peirce’s letter, appearing in such a prominent periodical, brought to the public eye a dispute that had up to that point been isolated to a rather small circle of insiders. James quickly wrote to set Peirce straight, admitting that Royce had taken a harsh and pretentious tone and that Abbot was justified in feeling “sore,” but fully taking Royce’s side in the dispute (12 Nov. 1891). “Abbot,” he wrote, “seems to me simply insane, in all that touches on his philosophic or personal pretensions.” James said he wished Peirce had just “let the thing die away in silence.” Peirce replied that Abbot surely didn’t deserve Royce’s “sweepingly contemptuous criticism” and that if, indeed, he was “almost insane,” then “all the more reason for gentle treatment.” James responded that Peirce’s view of the matter “does honour to your head and heart, but doesn’t convince me that Royce is not now the party sinned against” (16 Nov. 1891). James felt duty-bound to now come openly to Royce’s defense in the pages of the Nation.57 He wrote that Peirce’s professed neutrality in the dispute was perhaps more apparent than real, given that Peirce’s knowledge of the facts had come principally from Abbot, so “it seems but fair that one with a less exparte knowledge of the facts should also be heard.” James sought to completely absolve Royce and the editors of International Journal of Ethics from any moral or legal blame and concluded by asserting that “Mr. Abbot’s remedy of heaping personal outrages upon Prof. Royce and his motives, admits of no excuse but a pathological one” and he chastised Peirce for spreading the quarrel “beyond the academic world.”
Peirce, having been shown James’s letter in the offices of the Nation prior to its publication, wrote privately to express his irritation (17 Nov. 1891): “I am sorry you should see fit to sneer at my impartiality.” Peirce told James that he knew Abbot and Royce about equally well and that “in searching my consciousness, I cannot detect any more leaning to one side than to the other.” Peirce acknowledged that he had adduced some new facts concerning the conduct of the editors of the Journal which he would reflect on but he insisted that a philosopher could criticize another without hoping to injure him, contrary to what he thought James had implied: “Philosophy has not reached the position of an exact science where being in the wrong is somewhat of a reflection upon a man’s competence.” Royce was plainly trying to injure Abbot, Peirce wrote; his general tone “is that of contempt.”
James showed Peirce’s letter to Royce and, to his credit, Royce wrote a long and respectful letter to Peirce hoping both to defuse the controversy and to win Peirce’s respect: “James knows that I like candid criticism … [and] that I deeply respect your work, and your opinion of philosophical matters” (18 Nov. 1891). Royce proceeded to set out a long explanation of the dispute and a detailed defense of his position—he assured Peirce that previously his relations with Abbot “had always been cordial” and that he deeply regretted “having so touched his heart when I struck home at his work.” This might have ended the matter for Peirce had not yet another letter appeared in the Nation, just two days later, purporting to present evidence mitigating, if not refuting, Peirce’s account of the Abbot-Royce dispute. The author of the new letter was Joseph Bangs Warner, a lawyer who had been retained by Royce as an advisor, and who, like Abbot, had been a member of the old Cambridge Metaphysical Club. Warner, like James, while admitting that Royce may have “transgressed the limits of courteous controversy,” contended that Abbot’s transgressions were greater than Royce’s. Warner downplayed any legal culpability on Royce’s part but openly warned Abbot that the circulation of his reply to Royce “in its present shape” might “entail a serious legal responsibility” on his part.58 By so openly demanding that Abbot revise his reply or face legal consequences, Warner was unwittingly strengthening Abbot’s position and Peirce’s representation of the controversy.
Yet, with Warner’s letter, the Abbot-Royce controversy had about run its course. On 3 December, one final letter would appear in the pages of the Nation, Abbot’s retort to Warner.59 Abbot proclaimed Warner’s letter to be “the lawyer’s attempt to put forward his own baseless assumptions in his client’s behalf” and took the opportunity to quote three long paragraphs from his “suppressed” reply to Royce’s review. He concluded by arguing that “when Dr. Royce blew his bugle-blast of defiance, ‘We must show no mercy, as we ask none,’ he deprived himself of all excuse … for seeking refuge behind a menace of prosecution.” Following Abbot’s letter, Nation editor W. P. Garrison announced that no more letters respecting the controversy would be printed. Peirce had submitted a second letter but withdrew it and nothing further appeared in the Nation. Two months later, a second pamphlet by Abbot was issued: Is Not Harvard Responsible for the Conduct of her Professors, as well as of her Students? A Public Remonstrance Addressed to the Board of Overseers of Harvard University, but Harvard ignored it and the controversy came to an end.60
It is difficult to comprehend this strange altercation. Abbot and Royce, though cordial up to this point, could no longer hide their lack of mutual professional respect. Abbot hoped for a Harvard professorship and had even offered to endow a chair for himself, but Royce, as Assistant Professor, clearly had the inside track. Each may have seemed a threat to the other. Abbot was convinced of his importance as a philosopher,61 but was far from having garnered the professional recognition that the much younger Royce had achieved. Abbot was unstable and tended to react brashly to criticism, while Royce was surprisingly insensitive to the human factors involved in philosophical debate.62 In hindsight, Royce was admittedly the superior philosopher, but he unfairly discounted the strength and originality of Abbot’s thought. Royce’s review was overly aggressive, but Abbot’s response was so abrasive that there was really no chance for reconciliation.
Why did Peirce, alone among Abbot’s peers, come to his defense? He had long harbored genuine esteem for Abbot’s philosophical powers, so that he could not but have been struck by how arbitrary Royce’s “professional warning” was. That sort of condemnation, to be credible, would require “that there could be no two opinions about it on the part of men qualified by mature study to pass judgment on the merits of philosophical writers” (W8: 245). Explaining to James why he had made a “plea for