In such a predicament, it is very important to EU elites – both the sovereigntists and the integrationists – that there is no common definition of “ever closer union.” The phrase has performed quite a service. It has proved open-ended enough to keep the supranationalists, such as Schuman, Kohl and Barroso, together with the nationalists such as de Gaulle and Thatcher.
THE WORLDVIEW AND DIRECTION OF EVER CLOSER UNION
“Ever closer union” is not only a way of keeping the EU project going despite a lack of agreement on ultimate goals. It also expresses a worldview. Whatever its meanings when the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, “ever closer union” has by now come to reflect a postmodern, relativistic worldview in which nothing is fixed or certain. Everything is constantly moving, constantly changing. The EU is like an amoeba continuously changing shape as the fluctuating currents push its outer membrane in all directions. “Ever closer union” has become the animating idea behind this state of constant change, because it can be reinterpreted at whim to fit every shape and every current, expressing an aspiration vague enough that everyone can implicitly share in it.
The haziness is deceptive, though. Underneath the soothing flux of postmodernity lurks a steely determination to achieve supranational governance. After all, while ever closer union is ambiguous, it is inspirational enough to serve as a rallying cry for the supranationalists, spurring them on to further European integration. Upon closer reflection, if one resists being lulled to intellectual sleep by the vaguely noble-sounding “ever closer union,” the phrase aims at more than merely a free-trade area or a traditional international organization of sovereign member states.
The framework for relations between sovereign members of traditional international organizations is fixed, decided by a mutually understood balance between members’ national sovereignty and their cooperation within the organization. In contrast, “ever closer union” entails fluid, undecided, evolving relations among the EU member states as they move toward some sort of political union. The British prime minister David Cameron seems to understand this. In an important speech in January 2013, he called for a stop to the push for ever closer union, advocating instead a flexible EU of cooperating, sovereign member states. (More on Cameron’s speech in Chapter 17.) And Cameron is not alone in this view. Even the Netherlands, a core member state, shows signs of pulling back decidedly from the supranationalist model. In a press release in June 2013 after its own review of EU vs. national powers, the Dutch government said, “The Netherlands is convinced that the time of an ‘ever closer union’ in every possible policy area is behind us.”9
As European integration has unfolded in the real world over the past sixty-five years, the EU’s striving toward “ever closer union” has taken on a distinctly postdemocratic coloring, as we will see in the next section. And in the final analysis, despite the attempts of the British and the Dutch and others to push back, “ever closer union” symbolizes the victory of the visionaries over the pragmatists. Lost in their focus on hard facts, the pragmatists are too complacent. They seriously underestimate the power of ideas, dreams and worldviews, especially if they seem unrealistic or logically incoherent. Meanwhile, the supranationalists have it in black-and-white: “ever closer union” is the declared purpose of the Rome Treaty, and every member state has signed up for it.
GETTING IT RIGHT THE SECOND TIME
“Europe’s nations should be guided towards the superstate without their people understanding what is happening . . . which will eventually lead to federation.”1 Adrian Hilton’s synopsis of the Monnet method could not be more apt. By stealth and subterfuge, ever closer union is to be made inevitable. This means overriding any voters, even majorities of voters, if they stand in the way.
Perhaps the most blatant indicator of the EU’s disrespect for democracy is its refusal to accept the results of votes in the EU member states that do not turn out “correctly.” It is a disturbing story. More unsettling is that so few people seem to care that their voices are slowly being silenced. It might be more accurate to say that few are fully aware of what has been happening, because of the sheer distance of Brussels and the disarming rhetoric of democracy that EU leaders employ.
GETTING THE DANES TO YES
The first time that EU elites refused to accept a democratic vote occurred more than twenty years ago. On June 2, 1992, Denmark held a referendum on the Treaty on European Union, or the Maastricht Treaty, which had been signed that February. By a 50.7% vote, with 83.1% of voters participating, the Danes rejected the treaty. This was a major setback for European integration, delivered directly by voters themselves.
The reaction of EU elites was largely a combination of shock and incomprehension, followed by resolve to keep moving forward, with or without the Danes. Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission at the time and a mythic figure in supranationalist lore, said, “the Commission takes note of the views of the Danish people, who are fully entitled to make these views known and have done so in accordance with democratic procedure.” Nevertheless, he went on, “the Commission is bound to say that it fears the result will have consequences not only for the Community itself but also for Denmark and the Danes.” Delors expressed the Commission’s hope that member states would “proceed to ratify on schedule.”2
Even some of those associated with Euroskeptics did not want to listen to the Danes. After all, the negotiations had been so arduous. According to John Major, then the British prime minister and a member of the generally Euroskeptic Conservative Party, “The Maastricht treaty began to build the kind of European Community that we wish to see. . . . I do not believe that a substantial renegotiation of the Maastricht treaty is a practical proposition at this time. We must wait and see what action the Danish Government will take, but I still hope that the full provision of the Maastricht treaty will be carried forth into law.”3 The Danish prime minister, Poul Schluter, sounded somewhat nonplussed: “We all know that we must find a solution which does not necessitate re-ratification processes in the other countries,” he said, adding that he thought such a solution was possible.4
Clearly, the verdict of the Danish voters could not be allowed to stand. Unless all EU member states ratify a treaty, it cannot come into effect. And Maastricht had to come into effect. The dream depended on it. It was the Treaty on European Union, heralding the birth of the EU and charting the path toward the common currency, which was to unify Europe not only economically, but also politically. Exactly there, of course, was the rub. The Maastricht Treaty impinged extensively on national sovereignty.
Therefore, at their December 1992 summit, European Community leaders concluded the Edinburgh Agreement, giving the Danes opt-outs from the Maastricht Treaty to allow them to guard their national prerogatives in areas they considered vital to national sovereignty. Denmark thus opted out of closer cooperation on matters related to national defense. Neither would it participate in the common currency. It would not be subject to monetary or fiscal measures related to the euro, and would remain outside the jurisdiction of the European Central Bank. The Edinburgh Agreement also clarified that “citizenship of the Union” as foreseen in the treaty did not “in any way take the place of national citizenship,” nor would it “create a citizenship of the Union in the sense of citizenship of a nation-state.”5
Denmark then held a second referendum, in May 1993. The defeat of the first referendum