It got to the point where it wasn’t just the ANC benches who groaned in agony when Mashaba began speaking of these backlogs. But he didn’t mind. He knew from his marketing background that it was only when people started to complain about your stubborn repetition that you knew your message was sinking in.
When he came into office, Mashaba spent the first few weeks contemplating the nature of the minority coalition arrangement. It involved no fewer than seven political parties: the IFP, ACDP, COPE, UDM and FF+, which were to formally partner with the DA, as well as the EFF, which would vote on an issue-by-issue basis, taking each decision on its merits. Every decision of council would therefore require consultation with the EFF. It was a precarious situation in which the smallest issue had the potential to sound the death knell for our government.
The arrangement involved a razor-thin, eight-seat majority in council, the kind that could be undone by a few people needing to visit the bathroom at the same time during a meeting. This kind of coalition could only endure if nurtured by daily engagement.
Critically, Mashaba understood that there was no place for the kind of arrogance that had become commonplace in South African politics. The size of any party in this arrangement, whether a one-seat party or the DA with its 104 seats, was irrelevant. The coalition had rendered every party, irrespective of size, equally important because the DA’s 104 seats meant nothing without at least 32 more votes from the other six parties on any particular decision.
The arrangement with the EFF was the source of the greatest anxiety for Mashaba in those early days. The EFF stood diametrically opposed to the capitalist system that he had spent his whole life publicly championing. This was why Julius Malema had chosen Mashaba as the candidate on whom to hang his ‘however’.
Mashaba winced when he recalled a particular debate during the election campaign that had included then ANC mayor Parks Tau and the EFF’s Floyd Shivambu. During the debate, Mashaba had likened someone leaving the ANC and voting for the EFF to a patient with diarrhoea being prescribed laxatives. At that stage he hadn’t realised the extent to which he would have to rely on the support of the EFF.
How were we going to agree on a budget for Johannesburg when the time came? How would we approach the work of an economic strategy to grow the economy and create jobs? These and other questions flooded my mind, but Mashaba was determined that enough common ground could be achieved.
Mashaba knew he was a relative newcomer to politics, but he adopted the view that politics is not brain surgery. It does not require advanced training in the same way that medicine and engineering do. By operating in good faith, applying common sense and never forgetting the wishes of the people who sought change, he could do the job. And with no time to waste, he got to it.
First came the appointment of his mayoral committee: 10 MMCs who would serve as his cabinet. It was an impressive group. A medical doctor who specialised in public health became the MMC for health and social development. A former head of Johannesburg Water took up the mantle as MMC for environment and infrastructure services. An assistant director of the HIV/AIDS Counsellor Association became the MMC for community development. A specialist in somatology (the practice of improving general wellness) with a PhD in health professions education became the MMC for corporate services. A practising attorney with advanced training in municipal governance became the MMC for public safety. Clearly, Mashaba wanted the right people around him. To fulfil the deal struck by the coalition negotiation teams, he appointed two MMCs from the IFP to oversee the critical portfolios of transport and housing.
One of the immediate challenges facing Mashaba’s government was that we would have to operate under an ANC-approved budget for the first year. Because the election had happened so late, the ANC had already approved the 2016/17 budget for Johannesburg a few weeks before the poll. The incoming multiparty government would have to operate under this ANC-approved budget until June 2017, even though the people of Johannesburg had voted the party out of office.
Mashaba brought together a group, including our coalition partners, and indicated that we needed to develop a clear plan with deliverables. So we came up with a 10-point plan, something we could champion while having to operate under the existing budget.
Broadly, we committed our administration to the following:
1. To work together in a coalition arrangement, based on the recognition that not one party received majority support from the electorate.
2. To run a business-friendly and pro-poor government that would see the majority of our budget being directed to poor communities.
3. To orientate plans and policies towards achieving a minimum of 5 per cent economic growth by 2021, thereby countering unemployment.
4. To create a professional, highly skilled, competent and performance-driven public service.
5. To ensure that corruption was public enemy number one.
6. To complete the official housing waiting list and get it signed off.
7. To identify the number of incomplete houses built by the city and the province where construction had ground to a halt and to complete these projects.
8. To fast-track the handover of title deeds.
9. To launch a pilot project to investigate extending the operating hours of clinics throughout the city.
10. To revive the inner city to bring people and business back to Johannesburg.
The 10-point plan was workshopped with the senior executives of the city, who you could tell weren’t accustomed to seeing a mayor engaged in planning. This was to become our plan for the remainder of that first financial year. It was the most we could do to stamp the multiparty government’s agenda, and our residents’ demands for change, on plans and budgets created by the ANC.
A press conference was called and the 10-point plan was presented to the residents of Johannesburg. It would become the origin of Mashaba’s entire programme of governance. It evolved over time, but its focus was carried through in every budget that followed.
Mashaba had come to appreciate the council-appointed city manager, Dr Trevor Fowler, during those first few months in office, but he knew that we needed someone at the helm of the administration who could do things differently. The council initiated a process to recruit a new city manager, and with the help of a panel we settled on Dr Ndivho Lukhwareni. He impressed the panel in the interview and captured the essence of what we wanted from a leader of the administration to turn the city around.
With our new city manager, we got to work on implementing our first strategic plan. I continued to be surprised by how senior city officials were evidently not used to a hands-on mayor. Knowing Mashaba, it was something they were just going to have to learn to live with.
We immediately began making progress, executing the plan to the point where we were holding daily briefings about our achievements. It demonstrated that we had some excellent civil servants who leapt at their responsibilities and could be relied upon. At the same time, we observed others who found any opportunity to obfuscate, delay or obstruct our efforts to achieve our goals. They soon learnt that Mashaba’s nature and experience in business had taught him not to place blind faith in strangers.
A few weeks after becoming mayor, Mashaba had his first event to hand out title deeds to residents who had been given state-built houses. Some of these people had waited for more than 20 years for their title deeds, which could now provide them and their families with an asset of value. One particular woman, her face weathered by the hardships of a long and unjust life, wept in his arms.
Soon afterwards, Mashaba extended the operating hours of the Princess Clinic