22. Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, p. 59.
23. Ibid., p. 192; boldface in the original text.
24. On this, see Vatican Council II, Declaration on Religious Liberty (Dignitatis humanae), no. 3; Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et spes), no. 16; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, 94, 2, 4.
25. On this, see in particular the essay co-authored by Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate End,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987), 121. See also Chapter Three, below, pp. 104-105.
26. In Summa theologiae (1-2, questions 55-67), St. Thomas offers an extended treatment of virtue and its kinds (intellectual, moral, cardinal, theological), its causes, duration, etc. In Summa theologiae (2-2), he considers in depth (1) the theological virtues of faith (questions 1-16), hope (questions 17-22), and charity (questions 23-46); and (2) the cardinal virtues of prudence (questions 47-57), justice (questions 58-122), fortitude (questions 123-140), and temperance (questions 141-170).
27. Among the more significant are the following: (1) Josef Pieper’s “classical” presentation of The Four Cardinal Virtues (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), a reprint of three books — one on prudence, another on justice, and the other on fortitude and temperance — published originally in the 1950s by Pantheon Books, New York; (2) Romanus Cessario, O.P., The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991); The Virtues or the Examined Life (New York: Continuum, 2002); (3) Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1993). See also Pieper, Belief and Faith (New York: Pantheon, 1963); Pieper, Hope (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1986); Pieper, About Love (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978). In 1997, Ignatius Press published the three titles of Pieper listed here in one volume, entitled Faith, Hope, and Love.
28. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, 56, 1-6; the citation is taken from 56, 4.
29. See ibid., 57, 1-5.
30. Ibid., 56, 3. The Latin text, which I translated freely above, reads as follows: “Cum enim prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, requiritur ad prudentiam quod homo se bene habeat ad principia huius rationis agendorum, quae sunt fines; ad quos bene se habet homo per rectitudinem voluntatis, sicut ad principia speculabilium per naturale lumen intellectus agentis. Et ideo sicut subiectum scientiae, quae est ratio recta speculabilium, est intellectus speculativus in ordine ad intellectum agentem, ita subiectum prudentiae est intellectus practicus in ordine ad voluntatem rectam.” See the excellent treatment of virtue and in particular of prudence in St. Thomas in John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (New York: Oxford, 1998), pp. 163-170.
31. Ibid., 58, 2: “… ad hoc quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis intellectualis; sed etiam quod vis appetitive sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis moralis. Sicut igitur appetitus distinguitur a ratione, ita virtus moralis distinguitur ab intellectuali. Unde sicut appetitus est principium humnani actus secundum quod participat aliqualiter rationem, ita habitus moralis habet rationem virtutis humanae, inquantum rationi conformatur.”
32. See, e.g., ibid., 61, 2.
33. See ibid., 65, 1.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. 2-2, 123, 1. “… secundum Philosophum, ‘virtus est quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit’ (Nicomachean Ethics, 3.8, 1116a16); unde ‘virtus hominis,’ de qua loquimur, ‘est quae bonum facit hominem, et opus eius bonum reddit.’ Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse.… Et ideo ad virtutem humanam pertinet ut faciat hominem et opus eius secundum rationem esse. Quod quidem tripliciter contingit. Uno modo, secundum quod ipsa ratio rectificatur: quod fit per virtutes intellectuales. Alio modo, secundum quod ipsa rectitudo rationis in rebus humanis instituitur: quod pertinet ad justitiam. Tertio, secundum quod tolluntur impedimenta huius rectitudinis in rebus humanis ponendae. Dupliciter autem impeditur voluntas humana ne rectitudinem rationis sequatur. Uno modo, per hoc quod attrahitur ab aliquo delectabili ad aliud quam rectitudo rationis requirat: et hoc impedimentum tollit virtus temperantiae. Alio modo, per hoc quod voluntatem repellit ab eo quod est secundum rationem, propter aliquod difficile quod incumbit. Et ad hoc impedimentum tollendum requiritur fortitudo mentis, qua scilicet huiusmodi difficultatibus resistat: sicut et homo per fortitudinem corporalem impedimenta corporalia superat et repellit. Unde manifestum est quod fortitudo est virtus, inquantum facit hominem secundum rationem esse.”
36. T.C. O’Brien, “Virtue,” New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), Vol. 15, pp. 704-708.
37. Grisez and Shaw, Fulfillment in Christ, pp. 84-85.
38. Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, p. 195.
39. On this, see Grisez and Boyle, “Response to Our Critics and Our Collaborators,” in Natural Law & Moral Inquiry: Ethics, Metaphysics and Politics in the Work of Germain Grisez, ed. Robert P. George (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998), pp. 213-237, at 235-236.
40. Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1949), pp. 3-4.
41. John Macquarrie, Three Issues in Ethics (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 111.
42. In the New Testament, the use of conscience was apparently limited to consequent conscience or the judgment of one’s past actions. On this, see James Turro, “Conscience in the Bible,” in Conscience: Its Freedom and Limitations, ed. W.C. Bier, S.J. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971), pp. 3-8. But see Eric D’Arcy, Conscience and Its Right to Freedom (New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1961), pp. 8-12, for an interesting argument that St. Paul has a directive or antecedent sense of conscience as well.
43. In his Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 211, Charles E. Curran mistakenly argues that the traditional view of conscience as one’s best moral judgment cannot account for the legitimate role of affectivity in conscience. For a more adequate account, see Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, ch. 10, q. D; ch. 31, q. E.
44. On this, see St. Thomas Aquinas, Dc Veritate, q. 17, a. 3. See D’Arcy, Conscience and Its Right to Freedom, pp. 87-112, for a commentary on St. Thomas’s position.