takes the form of a simple realism or idealism” (PE, 179). That is because they both presuppose an accomplished reality when in fact such “reality” must be traced back to the event of its formation (and deformation), traced back to its happening and genesis. What matters is to recognize that time is not a
given reality, but the happening of being, and this is what thought—phenomenology—must accommodate. More precisely, what thought must “welcome” is the eventful and discontinuous character of time. “This ‘true’ philosophy, which would be neither realist nor idealist, should be able to account for the discontinuity of time and for the fact that there are, for us, events” (PE, 179). At this juncture, phenomenology should assume its vocation as a phenomenology of the event. “Such a philosophy,” Dastur writes, “should be able to explain the discontinuity of time, or what we could name the structural eventness [
éventualité 