Section VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of Pure Cosmological Dialectic
Section VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem
Section VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the Cosmological Ideas
Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason
Section I. Of the Ideal in General
Section II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale)
Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God
Section V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God
Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof
Section VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles of Reason
Appendix. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason
II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method
Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason
Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism
Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics
Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis
Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs
Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason
Section I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason
Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief
Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason
Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason
Preface to the First Edition, 1781
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.
It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.
Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba:
Modo maxima rerum,
Tot generis, natisque potens . . .
Nunc trahor exul, inops.1
At first, her government, under the administration of the dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding — that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that — although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims — as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness and complete indifferentism — the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort.
For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity. Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge