"It is at the moment when the First Consul gives such strong proofs of his consideration for the King of Spain, and places a prince of his house on a throne which is fruit of the victories of French arms, that a tone is taken toward the French Republic such as might be taken with impunity toward the Republic of San Marino. The First Consul, full of confidence in the personal character of his Catholic Majesty, hopes that from the moment he is made aware of the bad conduct of some of his ministers, he will look to it, and will recall them to the sentiments of esteem and consideration which France does not cease to entertain for Spain. The First Consul will never persuade himself that his Catholic Majesty wishes to insult the French people and their Government at the moment when these are doing so much for Spain. This would suit neither his heart nor his loyalty, nor the interest of his crown."
In a note written the same day to Talleyrand,27 Bonaparte spoke in a still stronger tone of the "miserable" who was thus crossing his path, and he ordered that Lucien should let the King and Queen know "that I am long-suffering, but that already I am warmly affected by this tone of contempt and deconsideration which is taken at Madrid; and that if they continue to put the republic under the necessity either of enduring the shame of the outrages publicly inflicted on it, or of avenging them by arms, they may see things they do not expect."
Nevertheless Godoy held his ground, well aware that the existence of Spain was at stake, but confident that concession would merely tempt encroachment. History might render what judgment it would of Godoy's character or policy,—with this moral or political question the United States had nothing to do; but Bonaparte's hatred of Godoy and determination to crush him were among the reasons why Louisiana fell at a sudden and unexpected moment into the hands of Jefferson, and no picture of American history could be complete which did not show in the background the figures of Bonaparte and Godoy, locked in struggle over Don Carlos IV.
1 Mémoire, etc., lu à l'Institut National le 15 Germinal, An v. (April 4, 1797).
2 Correspondence, iii. 390.
3 Mémoires du Prince de la Paix, iii. 23.
4 Instruction données au Citoyen Guillemardet, Prarial, An vi. (May 20-June 19, 1798); Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
5 Talleyrand to E. Gerry, June 27, 1798; State Papers, ii. 215.
6 Talleyrand to E. Gerry, July 12, 1798; Ibid. 219.
7 Correspondance de Napoléon Premier, xxx. 330.
8 Mémoires de Miot de Melito, i. 288.
9 Gallatin's Writings, ii. 490.
10 Correspondance, vi. 415; Bonaparte to Talleyrand, July 22, 1800.
11 Alquier to Talleyrand, 19 Thermidor, An viii. (Aug. 7, 1800); Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
12 Note adressée par l'Ambassadeur da la République, etc., 15 Thermidor, An viii. (Aug. 3, 1800); Archives des Aff Étr. MSS.
13 Correspondance, vi. 426; Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 9 Thermidor, An viii. (July 28, 1800).
14 Rapport au Premier Consul, 6 Fructidor, An viii. (Aug. 24, 1800); Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
15 Correspondance, vi. 445.
16 Instructions au Général Berthier, 8 Fructidor, An viii. (Aug. 26, 1800); Projet de Traité préliminaire et secret, 10 Fructidor, An viii. (Aug. 28, 1800); Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
17 Rapport à l'Empereur, 28 Brumaire, An xiii. (Nov. 19, 1804); Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.
18 Mémoires, iii. 20, 55.
19 Traité préliminaire et secret, Oct. 1, 1800; Recueil de Traités de la France, par De Clercq, i. 411.
20 Mémoires, iii. 76-78.
21 Lucien Bonaparte et ses Mémoires, Th. Jung, ii. 104.
22 Correspondance, vii. 190; Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 21 Messidor, An ix. (July 10, 1801).
23 Lucien Bonaparte, Jung, ii. 466.
24 Correspondance, vii. 200; Note à remettre à Lord Hawkesbury, 4 Thermidor, An ix. (July 23, 1801).
25 Ibid.; Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 8 Thermidor, An ix. (July 27, 1801).
26 Correspondance, vii. 225; Projets de Notes, 27 Thermidor, An ix. (15 Aug. 1801).
27 Correspondance, vii. 226; Talleyrand to Saint Cyr, 16 Frimaire, An x. (6 Dec. 1801); Lucien Bonaparte, Jung, ii. 468.
Toussaint Louverture
Fortunately for the Prince of Peace, the world contained at that moment one man for whom Bonaparte entertained more hatred and contempt, and whom he was in still more haste to crush. The policy which Talleyrand had planned, and into which he had drawn the First Consul, could not be laid aside in order to punish Spain. On the contrary, every day rendered peace with England more necessary, and such a peace was inconsistent with a Spanish war. That Bonaparte felt no strong sympathy with Talleyrand's policy of peace in Europe and peaceful development abroad, is more than probable; but he was not yet so confident