World War I - 9 Book Collection: Nelson's History of the War, The Battle of Jutland & The Battle of the Somme. Buchan John. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Buchan John
Издательство: Bookwire
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Жанр произведения: Документальная литература
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isbn: 9788075833518
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to her total strength at sea. But her version was not true ; it was not half the truth. The port of Wilhelmshaven was closed to the world that no man might verify the actual casualties. It is probable that Pommern, whose loss was admitted, was not the old Pommern of that name which was believed to have been sunk by Commander Max Horton in the previous July, but a new first-class battle ship. It is not yet possible to estimate the total German losses, owing to the conditions of low visibility during the day battle, and the approach of darkness before the action was completed. Sir John Jellicoe, basing his calculation upon the results of careful enquiries, issued a list that in his opinion gave the minimum as to numbers. According to this list Germany lost two battle ships of the largest class, and one of the Deutschland type ; one battle cruiser ; five light cruisers, one of which may have been a battle ship ; six destroyers and one submarine. These were certain and observed losses. In addition, one first-class battle ship, one battle cruiser and three destroyers were seen to be so severely hit that in all likelihood they went down before reaching harbour. It should further be remembered that many of the ships which escaped were so seriously damaged by gun fire and torpedo attack that they would not be available for many months. The German fleet returned to the Elbe bases, lacking some of its finest ships, and with most of the remainder out of action.

      REAR-ADMIRAL SIR ROBERT K. REAR-ADMIRAL THE HON. HORACE ARBUTHNOT, Bt., C.B., M.V.O. L. A. HOOD, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.

      (Killed in Action.) (Killed in Action )

      REAR-ADMIRAL H. EVAN-THOMAS, C.B., M.V.O.

      It is only the ignorant who imagine that the loss of a few ships could mean a weakening of British naval prestige. A fleet, if it is to be better than scrap iron, must be risked gallantly when occasion offers. The real test of success is the fulfilment of a strategic intention. What was Germany's aim ? Her major purpose was to destroy the British command of the sea. In that she never came near succeeding. From the moment of von Scheer's return to port the British fleet held the sea and is still holding it. The blockade which Germany thought to break was drawn tighter than ever. Her secondary aim was so to weaken the British Fleet that it should be more nearly on an equality with her own. Again she completely failed, and the margin of British superiority was in no way impaired. Lastly she hoped to isolate and destroy a British division. That, too, failed. The British Battle Cruiser fleet is to-day a living and effective force while the German Battle Cruiser fleet is only a shadow. The result of the battle of May 31st was that

      Britain was more confirmed than ever in her mastery of the ocean. Its effect on the campaign at large was at once apparent. Russia was established in her control of the Eastern Baltic, and Germany's grandiose scheme for aiding her Eastern campaign by sea perished in the smoke of the Jutland battle.

      One word must be said upon British tactics and strategy. From a technical point of view the battle appears as an example of a tactical division of a fleet, undertaken in order to coax a laggard enemy to battle. Such a plan has, of course, its own risks, but without risks no Admiral or General has ever won success. Criticism and discussion inevitably follow all naval actions, unless, as in the case of Nelson's three battles, they are so obviously conclusive that argument is futile. But if the Battle of Jutland had not the dramatic close of Trafalgar or the Nile, yet, in a true sense, it was decisive. It defeated, utterly defeated, the German plan. If it was not—as with two hours more daylight it would have been—a complete destruction of Germany's sea power, it was a complete demonstration of Britain's crushing superiority. Sir David Beatty faced great odds and great difficulties in the spirit of Hawke and Nelson.—" He once more showed," wrote the Commander-in-Chief, " his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct strategical insight. He appreciated the situation at once on sighting his enemy's lighter forces, then his battle cruisers, and finally his battle fleet. I can fully sympathise with his feelings when the evening mist and failing light robbed the fleet of that complete victory for which he had manoeuvred, and for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard." It is a tradition of the British Admiralty that it praises sparingly and only praises when the merit of an achievement is beyond question. The well-chosen words in which it approved Sir John Jellicoe's leadership are more impressive than the rhetoric of the chiefs of parvenu navies. " The results of the action prove that the officers and men of the Grand Fleet have known both how to study the new problems with which they are confronted and how to turn their knowledge to account. The expectations of the country were high, they have been well fulfilled. My Lords desire to convey to you their full approval of your proceedings in this action."

      Not less conspicuous than the leadership was the amazing fighting quality of the British sailors. It was more than a century since Britain had had the opportunity of a first-class naval action, and it may confidently be said that not even at Trafalgar did the spirit of her seamen shine more brightly. The story of the fighting of a battleship like Marlborough, a cruiser like Southampton, and destroyers like Tipperary, Onslow and Defender will become part of our national epic. It is no case for the flowers of rhetoric. Such a spirit is best praised not in the literary epithets of the historian but in the simple and heartfelt tribute of the man who guided it. " The conduct of officers and men," wrote Sir John Jellicoe, " throughout the day and night actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine can do them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld, whether in heavy ships, cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers—the same admirable spirit prevailed.

      Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all. I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the fleet filled me."

      THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

       FIRST PHASE

       Table of Contents

       CHAPTER I. PRELIMINARIES.

       CHAPTER II. THE FIRST STAGE.

       CHAPTER III. THE SECOND STAGE.

       CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSION.

      CHAPTER I.

       PRELIMINARIES.

       Table of Contents

      From Arras southward the Western battle-front leaves the coalpits and sour fields of the Artois and enters the pleasant region of Picardy. The great crook of the upper Somme and the tributary vale of the Ancre intersect a rolling tableland, dotted with little towns and furrowed by a hundred shallow chalk streams. Nowhere docs the land rise higher than 500 feet, but a trivial swell—such is the nature of the landscape— may carry the eye for thirty miles. There are few detached farms, for it is a country of peasant cultivators who cluster in villages. Not a hedge breaks the long roll of cornlands, and till the higher ground is reached the lines of tall poplars flanking the great Roman highroads are the chief landmarks. At the lift of country between Somme and Ancre copses patch the slopes, and sometimes a church spire is seen above the trees from some woodland hamlet. The Somme winds in a broad valley between chalk bluffs, faithfully dogged by a canal—a curious river which strains, like the Oxus,