England and the Orléans Monarchy. Hall John R. Clark

interests to which it gave rise, was by far the most delicate. It is not without cause that, for centuries, the Low Countries have been the chief battle ground of the Powers. Bonaparte is supposed to have described the possession of Antwerp as “a loaded pistol held at England’s head.” Unquestionably, during the great war, England had had experience of the difficulties of watching the coastline of Belgium and Holland united to that of France. The lesson had not been thrown away upon Lords Grey and Palmerston, who were fully determined to resist, at all costs, the acquisition of any portion of the Low Countries by a first-class military Power. On the other hand France had excellent reasons for objecting to the system under which the Kingdom of the Netherlands had been created, and the barrier fortresses erected. In the words of General Lamarque, the chief parliamentary spokesman of the war party, these defences constituted, within four days’ march of Paris, a tête de pont behind which the armies of a hostile coalition might assemble at leisure. Moreover, France, in 1815, had been deprived of the fortresses of Marienburg and Philippeville, both of which had been incorporated into the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and it was hoped that in any scheme of re-arrangement these two places would be restored to her. All supporters of the new monarchy were keenly alive to the immense satisfaction with which the smallest modification of the hated treaties of 1815 would be received throughout the country. Men of moderate views, such as Charles de Rémusat and Guizot, looked upon “a brilliant diplomatic triumph” or “some acquisition of territory towards Belgium” as conditions essential to the stability of the Orleans throne.[52] On the other hand, it was the policy of Austria, Prussia and Russia, as it was that of Great Britain, to preserve intact the territorial settlement of 1815 and to resist the aggrandisement of France. But the attitude of the Northern Courts was also greatly influenced by the marriages which connected the King of the Netherlands and the Prince of Orange with the Royal family of Prussia and the Imperial House of Russia. In addition to these considerations of relationship the sympathies of the absolute sovereigns necessarily went out to a monarch struggling with a rebellion of his subjects, and they could not but be reluctant to participate in measures tending to legalize a revolution.

      The first sitting of the conference of the five Powers upon Belgian affairs took place at the Foreign Office in London, on November 4, on which occasion it was decided to impose an armistice upon the contending parties. According to the protocol, the Dutch and Belgian armies “were to retire behind the line which, previous to the treaty of May 30, 1814, separated the possessions of the sovereign prince of the United Provinces from the territories which have since been joined to them.”[53] No further step of much importance was taken until December 20, when Talleyrand proposed that the conference should proclaim the independence of Belgium.[54] After a discussion of seven hours’ duration, the objections of the plenipotentiaries of the absolute Powers were withdrawn, and the plan was acceded to unanimously. A month later, on January 20, 1831, the frontiers of Holland and Belgium were defined, and Belgium was declared neutral under the guarantee of the Powers. At the sitting of January 27, the plenipotentiaries apportioned the share of the general debt which each State would be called upon to bear.[55]

      The difficult question of selecting a sovereign for Belgium was not lost sight of, whilst the delimitation of frontiers had been proceeding. As early as October 19, Molé informed Lord Stuart in confidence that M. Gendebien had brought proposals from the provisional government in Brussels for the enthronement of one of Louis Philippe’s younger sons. But he assured the British ambassador that, as France was about to confer upon the situation with the other Powers, the offer would not be entertained for a moment.[56] Again Talleyrand, on November 7, reported that “a kind of agent of the provisional government” was in London seeking to ascertain whether the elevation to the Belgian throne of the Duc de Leuchtenberg, a son of Eugène de Beauharnais, would be permitted.[57] At first the Powers, France included, had regarded the enthronement of the Prince of Orange as the safest solution of the difficulty. But after the bombardment of the town of Antwerp by the Dutch, at the end of October, he became very unpopular, and, on November 24, the national congress at Brussels resolved that all members of the House of Orange-Nassau should be excluded from the throne.[58] In consequence, possibly, of this action by the Belgian deputies, Lords Grey and Palmerston appear to have mentioned the Archduke Charles of Austria to Talleyrand as a suitable candidate. But he objected, reminding them that his enthronement would constitute a restoration, which the most famous of Whigs had once described as “the worst of revolutions.” Moreover, Metternich, who had no desire to extend the influence of Austria in that direction, soon afterwards declared that the Archduke would decline the crown, both for himself and for his children, were it to be offered to him.[59] Talleyrand himself appears to have been the first to suggest that Leopold of Saxe-Coburg might with advantage be chosen to rule over the new State.[60] In putting forward this plan he seems to have been actuated chiefly by a desire to please the British government, but, for reasons which will be explained later, his proposal met with very little response. Meanwhile, the language of Mauguin and Lamarque in the Chamber, and the evident intention of the military party to object to any settlement which should not admit of the future union of Belgium with France, were rapidly impelling Louis Philippe to adopt an attitude of opposition to Great Britain and the other Powers.[61]

      At the first sitting of the conference it had been decided that M. Bresson, the first secretary of the French embassy in London, and Mr. Cartwright, who held a similar position at the British embassy at the Hague, should act as the commissioners of the Powers at Brussels. Cartwright, however, had soon been recalled in order that he might assume the duties of British minister at Frankfort, and Lord Ponsonby had been sent to take his place at Brussels. Ponsonby was the brother-in-law of Lord Grey and was reputed to be the handsomest man of his time. There was a story that as a youth he had been set upon by the mob in the Rue Saint-Honoré, in the early days of the revolution, and that it was only the protests of the women, that he was too good-looking to be hanged, which had saved him from “la lanterne.” Canning is said to have sent him to Buenos Ayres, in 1826, upon his first diplomatic mission of importance, in order to please George IV., whose peace of mind was disturbed by Lady Cunningham’s too evident admiration of him.[62] In Belgium, at this time, the two chief political parties were the French party, consisting of the advocates of a union with France, and the Orange party, the members of which favoured the enthronement of the Prince of Orange. The first were unquestionably by far the most numerous, but the Orangists, who were to be found chiefly in business and commercial circles, were not without power and influence. Bresson, from the first moment of his arrival at Brussels, appears to have identified himself closely with the aspirations of the French party, whilst Ponsonby espoused no less zealously the cause of the Prince of Orange.[63] There was, thus, keen rivalry and apparently much personal dislike between these two representatives of the conference.

      Louis Philippe would never appear seriously to have entertained the notion of allowing one of his younger sons to accept the crown of Belgium, or of consenting to the union of Belgium with France. Lord Grey had given Talleyrand, who had been directed to sound the British government upon the subject, clearly to understand that the enthronement of a French prince would be regarded as a case for war—a declaration, which, in the words of Sébastiani, “had at least the merit of frankness.”[64] Of all the possible candidates for the Belgian crown Louis Philippe justly considered the Duc de Leuchtenberg to be the most undesirable. To have allowed any one connected with the Bonaparte family to become King of Belgium would have been exceedingly dangerous to the French monarchy. “There are no personal objections to him,” wrote Sébastiani to Bresson, “but all considerations must give way before the raison d’état.”[65] The candidate for whose success Louis Philippe was in reality most anxious, and whose selection Sébastiani instructed both Bresson and Talleyrand to advocate cautiously, was Prince Charles of Naples. This young prince was a Neapolitan Bourbon, a brother of the Duchesse de Berri and a nephew of the French queen, Marie Amélie, and Louis Philippe was always as desirous as any king of the old régime to promote the aggrandizement of his family. But when Talleyrand mentioned his name to Lord Grey he was told at once that his connection with the reigning House in France constituted an insuperable objection,[66] whilst from Brussels Bresson reported that “the Prince of Naples had no following.”[67]

      

      A second attempt, on the part of the provisional government at Brussels to persuade Louis Philippe to accept