19 Deputies from the Oroandensians afterwards brought more particular intelligence; that “the state of the Tolistoboians had seized Mount Olympus, but that the Tectosagians, taking a different route, were gone to another mountain called Magaba; and that the Trocmians, leaving their wives and children in charge with the Tectosagians, had resolved to carry their armed force to the assistance of the Tolistoboians.” The chieftains of the three states were at that time, Ortiagon, Combolomarus, and Gaulotus; and this was their reason in particular for choosing this mode of warfare, because as they had possession of the highest mountains in that part of the world, and had conveyed thither stores of every kind, sufficient for their consumption during the time, although long, they thought that they would weary out the enemy by the tediousness of the enterprise: “for neither would they dare to climb over places so steep and uneven; and if they should attempt it, they could be prevented and driven down, even by a small band; nor would they, sitting in inactivity at the foot of the frosty mountains, endure cold and hunger.” Although the height of their posts was in itself a strong defence, yet they drew, besides, a trench and other fortifications round the summits which they occupied. The least part of their care was employed in providing a stock of missile weapons; for they trusted that the rocky ground itself would furnish stones in abundance.
20 The consul, as he had foreseen that the fight would not be hand to hand, but at a distance, in the attack of the enemy’s post, had prepared an immense quantity of javelins, light infantry, spears, arrows, balls of lead, and small stones, fit to be thrown with slings. Furnished with this stock of missile weapons, he marched towards Mount Olympus, and encamped within five miles of it. On the next day, as he was advancing with four hundred horse, and Attalus, to examine the nature of the mountain and situation of the camp of the Gauls; a party of the enemy’s cavalry, double in number to his, sallying from the camp, forced him to take to flight. A few of his soldiers were killed in the flight, and several wounded. On the third day, marching to explore the ground at the head of all his cavalry, as none of the enemy advanced beyond their fortifications, he rode round the mountain with safety, and saw that on the south side the hills were composed of earth, and rose to a certain height, with a gentle slope, but that on the north there was nothing but steep and almost perpendicular cliffs; and that there were but three practicable ways, almost all the others being impassable; one at the middle of the mountain, where the ground was earthy, and two others, both very difficult, one on the south-east, and the other on the north-west. After taking a full view of all these places, he pitched his camp that day close to the foot of the mountain. On the day following, after that, offering sacrifice, he had received favourable auspices with the first victims, he proceeds to lead his army, in three divisions, against the enemy. He himself, with the greatest part of the forces, marched up where the mountain afforded the easiest ascent. He ordered his brother, Lucius Manlius, to ascend on the south-east side, as far as the ground allowed him to do so with safety; but if any dangerous and steep precipices should lie in his way, then not to contend with the unfavourable nature of the place, or attempt to conquer insuperable obstacles, but by a slope across the mountain to incline towards him, and join the body under his command; and he directed Caius Helvius, with the third division, to march round leisurely, by the foot of the mountain, and to climb the hill on the north-east. The auxiliary troops of Attalus he distributed equally among the three divisions, ordering the young prince to accompany him. The cavalry and elephants he left in the plain, at the foot of the hills; orders were given to the prefects to watch attentively every thing that should happen, and to be expeditious in bringing succour wherever circumstances should require it.
21 The Gauls, (thoroughly satisfied that the ground on their two flanks was impassable,) in order to secure, by arms, the ascent on the side which was situated towards the south, sent about four thousand soldiers to keep possession of a hill which hung over the road, at the distance of near a mile from their camp; hoping that they might stop the enemies’ progress by this as by a fortress. Which when the Romans saw, they prepared for battle. The light infantry marched a little in advance of the line, supported by draughts from Attalus’s troops, composed of the Cretan archers and slingers, the Trallians and Thracians. The battalions of infantry, as the ground was steep, marched at a slow pace, holding their shields before them, merely to ward off missile weapons, as they did not seem likely to fight in a close engagement. The fight commenced with the missile weapons, at the proper interval, and was at first equal. as the situation aided the Gauls, the variety and abundance of weapons, the Romans. But, as the contest advanced, there was no longer any equality: their shields, long, but too narrow for the breadth of their bodies, and besides being flat, ill protected the Gauls. Nor had they now any other weapons except their swords, which they had no opportunity of using, as the enemy did not come to close action. They used stones, and these not of a proper size, as they had not previously laid them up, but whatever came to the hand of each in his haste and confusion, as persons unaccustomed generally do, aiding the blow neither by skill nor strength. Incautiously exposing themselves, they were transfixed on all sides by arrows, leaden balls, and darts; nor did they know what to do, their minds being paralysed by rage and fear; and they were engaged in a kind of fight for which they were least of all qualified. For, as in a close encounter, where they can receive