– Страна чистая, эпидемий нет, рестораны соблюдают гигиену (М.М.).
– Преступность есть, в том числе мелкая. Мотоциклисты вырывают сумочки у женщин (М.М.).
– У персов присутствует комплекс, что большие государства норовят их обидеть (М.М.).
24 января 2000 года, 14:35
Сегодня мы с утра на конференции «The Persian Gulf: Towards the 21st Century» в ИМПИ. Оба выступили, наверное, ничего. Помимо этого, дали интервью TV и радио Ирана, беседовали с послами Грузии и Азербайджана, представителями Ирана, Швейцарии, Норвегии, Италии и др. Вот текст Натулиного выступления «Угрозы безопасности в районе Персидского залива» (на английском языке):
Threats to Security in the Persian Gulf
First of all I’d like to clarify two points.
First. This conference is devoted to the problems of the Persian Gulf. Talking about security in the Persian Gulf, however, one cannot help, but to take into account developments in the rest of the Middle East as well as in the Caspian Sea area since many security threats are common for this entire region and inseparable from each other. For the sake of convenience I’ll be referring in my paper to this whole vast region as the Middle East.
Second. As a Russian scholar I’ll be talking about security threats in this part of the world from the Russian perspective. In order for the audience to appreciate this perspective better I’d like to start my presentation by making a few remarks on the general course of the Russian foreign policy.
As you may remember the new Russian state was created in the end of 1991 following disintegration of the USSR. Democratic forces who came to power at that time oriented Moscow’s policies fully to the West. They saw in the Western nations their chief ideological and political allies, the main source of economic aid and a model for Russia’s development. The Russian democratic authorities inяuenced by these motives initiated a completely fresh policy of unrestrained partnership and integration with the West. As a result Moscow conducted a clearly pro-Western policy throughout the world. It went out of its way to be cooperative, to approve the actions and positions of Western governments, and to follow a similar, if not identical, line in international affairs, including the Middle East.
Quite soon though a number of internal and external factors began to inяuence the original strategy. Externally, Russia has become disappointed with the behavior of the West: it has failed to be a reliable ideological and political ally; the aid was limited; the Western model did not seem to work well on the Russian soil. In addition to this Moscow was loosing ground in other parts of the world, among them the Middle East.
As a result of the internal and external inяuences, the new Russia’s foreign policy was gradually modiёed. On the threshold of the XXI century this foreign policy can be characterized as multidirectional and balanced.
Russia has come to the conclusion that in order to defend national security and to create favorable external environment for domestic reforms it must promote cooperation and partnership on an equal footing with the West, the East and the South. We should not tilt to any side or seek alliances with some foreign governments against others. The natural product of this philosophy is our concept of a multi-polar world. We reject attempts of the United States to turn the entire mankind into its own zone of inяuence, into so-called “Pax Americana”. Instead we propose to combine efforts of all nations to build an international system based on international law, diversity of cultures, democracy and common decisions made through the United Nations and other international organizations. To achieve this goal Russia is prepared to work together with interested parties everywhere.
The above-mentioned foreign policy doctrine of Russia is fully applicable to the Middle East. Due to its vast human and natural resources as well as geography the region has strategic importance for universal peace and world economy. For this reason alone it attracts close attention of Russia. The fact that the Middle East is located in Russia’s neighborhood increases its value in our eyes. Russia has various concrete interests in the Middle East:
First of all, security of our country depends on security of the Middle East. If peace and stability are broken here it may undermine security of Russia, suck us into destructive conяicts, damage our economic interests, disrupt transportation and communication lines utilized by us. We also have to make sure that states, movements and citizens of the Middle East maintain positive attitude towards Russian Federation and don’t take actions, threatening our territorial integrity, sovereignty and internal peace in general.
Second, Russia has political goals in the Middle East. We want to work closely with each and every state of this region in the pursuit of the universal peace and cooperation, solution of global problems and creation of a stable multipolar international system.
Third dimension of Russia’s policy in the Middle East is economic. We intend to actively participate in the excavation of the Caspian oil and its transportation to world markets. We need an access to energy resources of the Persian Gulf and other parts of the Middle East. We want to export technology and goods to the regional countries and at the same time to import their products as well as to receive their investments into Russian economy. As it was mentioned earlier, Russia utilizes transportation and communication lines of the Middle East. Moscow would also like to recover huge debts from such states as Iraq, Syria, Libya. It is enough to mention here that the UN sanctions against Iraq and Libya have brought about a loss to us of at least 20 billion US dollars.
Another aspect of Russia’s interest in the Middle East is cultural. Our Federation has large Moslem population, over 20 mln persons. Moscow’s obligation is to facilitate religious, spiritual and ethnic contacts between peoples of Russia and the Middle East and at the same time to make sure they don’t create negative political consequences.
To realize the above-mentioned interests Russia is keen on tackling the outstanding security threats in the Middle East.
1. The most long-standing and hard to overcome is probably the threat connected with Middle Eastern energy resources. The questions of oil excavation, transportation and marketing have been brewing tensions, conяicts and even wars among states, both regional and outside powers. The same questions have been undermining internal security of local states, their economies, social and ethnic peace.
What can be offered to at least ease struggle for oil and hopefully prevent new collisions? The following measures seem reasonable.
In the Persian Gulf we should strive for normalization of relations among all oil-producing states as well as between them and outside powers interested in oil. Regimes of oil transporting sealines must be strengthened.
In the Caspian subregion we need to work out a new status for the Caspian Sea, which will secure the political control of the area by the littoral states and will simultaneously