Number 4. Uneasiness caused in Nueva España, and what can be feared in the islands
The innovation and disquiet caused by these commissions in Nueva España (where it is known that they have arrived) has been very great, and as notable is the uneasiness and embarrassment among the citizens and exporters of Filipinas, who—without recognizing in themselves any guilt which accuses them, any crime which burdens them, or any proof which condemns them—have, for the sole purpose of not becoming liable to denunciations,7 whether false or true (for all denunciations are troublesome), and to what ignorant witnesses, the evil-intentioned, or their enemies may depose, tried to serve your Majesty beyond what their wealth allows and their abilities permit. On that account, so great has been the assessment on the inhabitants of Filipinas, that it will be impossible to pay it without their total ruin, and they are not those who are guilty of the violations of law which some are attempting to prove. Consequently, the inhabitants have petitioned that this assessment be not made. Nothing is said at present of the other things that will result from it to [the harm of] the islands. [In the margin: “In numbers 45 and 87.”—Ex. his.] This memorial will hint at some things, and time will continue to show them, if not by the causes that are now operating, then by the effects, which will reveal themselves. And even if these are less than those that may be expected, they will require very considerable attention and cause very sensible injury—as is usual with any innovation of the magnitude of this; for that which only changes and embarrasses the course of affairs, causes more damage than gain in what it reforms.
[V. Purpose to which this memorial is directed.—Ex. his.]
In order to avert the dangers that threaten, it is the intention to present some measures and the reasons on which they are based; so that, without departing from what must be considered in the first place (namely, the service of your Majesty), and then the conservation of those islands and of their citizens and residents, the evils may be corrected, the violations of law prevented, and the welfare of that so remote and afflicted community attended to—which, although so far away, attends so conscientiously to its obligations, ever preferring those duties to the possessions and lives of those who form and sustain that colony, risking and even losing them for the defense of that (although remote) very important part of this Catholic monarchy.
[VI. Proposition to abandon the islands, and its foundations.—Ex. his.]
The Filipinas Islands, which dominate the archipelago of Sant Lazaro, merit, for many claims, causes, and reasons, the esteem in which they have always been held. Contrary to all these, it was represented already, in the times of the sovereigns your Majesty’s grandfather and father, that it seemed advisable to abandon the islands, and leave them to whomever cared to occupy them. It was remarked in the Council of State, where the matter was ventilated, and where a consultation was held, the question being presented with the motives for this resolution, that those islands not only did not increase the royal revenues, but even decreased and diminished them, and were a continual cause of great and fruitless expense, as they are so many, so remote, and so difficult of conservation. The instigators of this proposition availed themselves, as says the author of the History of the Malucas,8 of the example of the kings of China—who being the sovereigns of the islands, and so near that they could reënforce them in a short time, as being so adjacent and near their great continent, abandoned them, in order not to be under obligation for the expenses and cares that were necessary to maintain them. They said that España’s method of governing them was very burdensome and prejudicial to the monarchy, and was without any hope of being improved, because of the great amount of silver that was sent to the islands from the Indias on that account, both for the ordinary expenses of war, and for the conservation of commerce—all of that silver passing to Assia, whence it never issued. They said that the states, so scattered and so weakened by so many wide expanses of water and remote climes, could scarcely be reduced to union; nor was human foresight sufficient to introduce union in that which nature itself, and the way in which the world was put together, separated by so distinct bounds. That was proved not only by reason but also by experience, which had discovered and proved how difficult and even impossible was the conservation of those islands, unless the cost were very greatly in excess of the profit—although, in this matter, one should first decide whether [questions of] honor and polity counted for anything.
Number 7. More attention should be paid to the conservation of states than to the increase of the royal revenues
These reasons, and others which were advanced, were originated and accepted by some who paid more heed to the increase of the royal revenues than to the advantage with which those revenues ought to be, and generally are, spent; for, although kings are obliged to regard that increase as the blood of the mystical body of their states, it must be without injury to the reputation of the states. For since, as is a fact, they must try to acquire riches in order to preserve their reputation and to increase their treasure by avoiding superfluous and little-needed expenses, it will not be a well-founded argument that, in order to avoid spending their revenues, they should allow what they already possess and enjoy legitimately to be lost. Such a course would be to prefer the less to the greater, and the means to the ends; since we see not few millions spent on the conservation of a fortified post to which belongs, at times, nothing but the reputation of arms. If its defense is justifiable for that reason, it would be more justifiable if on such a place depends not only the reputation of the crown, but the preservation of many other reputations, which would be risked by losing that post, and which will be assured by maintaining it. Such is the peculiar importance of the Filipinas Islands, as will be proved in this memorial. [In the margin: “In numbers 41, 42, and 43.”]
Number 8. As, and for the reasons that, Flandes is preserved, the islands should be preserved
What state does your Majesty possess that costs as much as Flandes, although it is almost the least one of this monarchy? Because in Flandes all the reasons may be verified that are alleged in regard to the islands—namely, that they are costly, difficult to preserve, a drain of so much money, and separated from the other states—would it be prudent to influence [the crown] by those reasons to abandon that state? There can be no doubt that even the first proposition of such a nature would be condemned as imprudent, and lacking the basis of policy that such measures ought to have; and that from its execution would result, leaving aside other damages, the loss of many states of this crown, and their allies, which are now maintained by only maintaining Flandes, although at the price of so costly a war. Therefore, if the Filipinas possess that same importance, and if the conservation of the two Yndias results from their conservation—or at least from their being less exposed to notorious risks, which, were that Flandes of the new world lacking, would threaten them—what more notable reason of state can there be for not deserting them, and for characterizing as justifiable and necessary all that is spent in them, as is above mentioned?
Number 9. Resolution of preserving the islands well founded
Giving more heed to this than to all the propositions [made to him], King Felipo [Phelipe—MS.] Second, not lending ear to so pernicious an opinion, resolved that the Filipinas should be preserved as they had been thus far, by adding strength to the judiciary and military—one of which maintains and the other defends kingdoms—devoting and applying them both to the propagation of the holy gospel among those remote nations, although not only Nueva España,