This was becoming the equivalent of an epic centre court final at Wimbledon, with Brown the veteran competing against two younger, rising stars. Brown had responded to Cameron’s statement on Friday with one that was crafted with the same level of political artistry, a stunning return to Cameron’s beautifully played stroke. Yes, Brown would be going. No, he would not be going quite yet – an echo of Blair’s resignation statement in September 2006. Brown had highlighted two priorities, the economy and political reform. He was looking for a graceful exit, one that would bristle with historic possibilities as he left in place a progressive coalition, but he was realistic enough to realize that he could play no part in the medium-term future. He had recognized this, or almost had, for a long time.
After Brown’s statement some of the key figures in Number Ten rushed out to proclaim the new progressive opportunity. Adonis, Douglas Alexander (who never really believed that this was a progressive opportunity) and Alastair Campbell toured the studios to put the case for a Lib/Lab coalition. Brown sat back and watched, his career almost over whatever happened next.
What did happen next revealed quite a lot about Clegg, his favoured Liberal Democrats and parts of the Labour party. The first meeting between Labour’s negotiating team and the Lib Dems’ equivalent had been fairly informal on the Saturday afternoon. Labour’s team consisted of Adonis, Mandelson, Balls, Ed Miliband and Harriet Harman. During that meeting they sensed that the Lib Dems were moving towards Labour. Mandelson was certain throughout that they were playing Labour along to get more from the Conservatives, but the others dared to wonder, and with mixed feelings, whether they were about to begin a fourth term in partnership with the Lib Dems. Before the cabinet meeting on the Monday afternoon, Balls was with Brown when he got another call from Clegg. By that point Clegg appeared to be moving fast towards Labour. He said to Brown that Labour and the Liberal Democrats were the two progressive forces and were therefore natural partners. By late Monday afternoon Brown and Balls were briefly convinced that a deal was on. Early on Monday evening Brown chaired his final cabinet meeting. No one knew for sure that this would be the end. Quite a few assumed now that Brown would be Prime Minister until the autumn. Brown also thought for a few hours this was likely.
No cabinet minister spoke out overtly against a Lib/Lab coalition, although several had intense private doubts, in particular Jack Straw. Brown talked through the situation with considerable enthusiasm showing none of the bad-tempered lack of patience he could display when chairing cabinet meetings in less tempestuous times.
The Labour and Lib Dems’ negotiating teams met immediately after the cabinet, so quickly that ministers had no time to discuss in advance what they would be willing to concede. In the event they offered to move at least as far as the Conservatives, especially in the area of civil liberties, a policy area where the government had acquired a ragbag of policies, adopted for reasons of neurotic insecurity rather than principled machismo. The policies had never been fully supported by anyone on Labour’s negotiating team. Perversely, a sticking point in the discussions was Labour’s commitment not to start cuts in public spending until the following year. Even though the Lib Dems had argued for the same policy in the election campaign, David Laws was now insisting that immediate cuts should be part of the package. Chris Huhne also called for immediate legislation on the Alternative Vote followed by a wider referendum on other options for electoral reform. Even Adonis was taken aback at such a prospect. Huhne suggested ‘this would be an experiment in an experimental coalition’. Although Labour’s team was much more wary after this meeting, they assumed that Clegg was sincere in his willingness to do a deal and agreed to meet again on the Tuesday morning. Labour’s team also proposed a separate meeting between Cable and Alistair Darling.
Hungry for power almost as an end in itself, Cameron and Osborne rushed out a new offer in response to Labour’s moves, a referendum on the Alternative Vote. This was the same as Labour was offering in relation to electoral reform, although Labour was committed to campaigning for the change whereas the Conservatives were opposed. The duo had spent the last four years seeking a route to power, changing economic policy on the basis of the latest focus-group findings and proclaiming their party’s modernization without changing many of the assumptions and polices that they had inherited. Cameron and Osborne opposed voting reform, but their desire for power meant they did not hesitate to make the offer.
Their move was decisive. When Clegg got the news, a few minutes before it was released to the media, his mind was more or less made up. He wanted to do a deal with the Conservatives and take part in a formal coalition. He had never had much doubt. Later Clegg was hailed for his ruthless negotiating techniques, but he did not have to try very hard. Both sides were desperate for a deal and at times he had been genuinely torn, not least because Ashdown had moved some distance over the weekend towards Labour, and his other former leaders – Charles Kennedy and David Steel – had always been keener on a deal with Labour.
But Clegg was reaching a firm decision on Monday evening and acquired ammunition from former cabinet ministers David Blunkett and John Reid who led the charge against a Lib/Lab coalition. Reid spoke out passionately against an arrangement. In fact Labour was not proposing a formal arrangement with the SNP, only with the Lib Dems, but Reid was not one to allow details to intervene. Blunkett was far more perceptive and his opposition carried more weight. The left of the Labour party started to speak out as well. On the other side Cameron faced similar problems with the right of his party, but Clegg had found his soulmate, two pragmatic leaders bound by their hostility towards the state and their capacity for polite, almost apolitical negotiations.
The dynamics revealed much about Labour’s diminished hunger for power. Reid and Blunkett had been cabinet ministers. Straw had served in the cabinet from 1997 to the very end. If they had been eager for their first ministerial posts their reaction to the result might have been very different. Sated personal ambition played a part in the cries within Labour against a Lib/Lab coalition.
On the Tuesday morning Brown and Clegg had one further meeting, but Labour’s negotiating team sensed they were being played along. The Lib Dems had briefed misleadingly that Labour’s team had been aggressive in the negotiations, especially Ed Balls. Adonis, no natural ally of Balls, was adamant that Balls behaved politely throughout. Labour’s team sensed trouble, assuming the briefing was aimed at showing Ashdown and others that they had tried but faced immovable objects. Brown, who had been in some ways the most enthusiastic for a coalition, moved from high hope on Monday night to pessimism by Tuesday morning. Still he clung to a shred of optimism. At midday, hours before his resignation, he had a phone call with Sir Ming Campbell, spelling out in detail how the mechanisms were in place for a Lib/Lab coalition and how he had prepared for the appointment of Lib Dems in senior departments.
During a phone call with Brown early in the afternoon Clegg was evasive. ‘Look, I’m not in a position to give you a definitive answer,’ he told Brown. ‘I want to continue to speak to both sides. Coalition talks take a long time in other countries. There’s nothing unusual about this. Why the hurry?’
Brown responded: ‘The country will not understand if this ambiguity continues. The public needs certainty and we must provide an answer.’ He issued one last plea to Clegg: ‘I am convinced this is the right time to create a Progressive Alliance. I know the electoral arithmetic is difficult but I think there is a way round that.’
Clegg fudged again: ‘I still want to go on talking to both sides.’
Brown struggled to hide his frustration as he replied: ‘I have to go the Palace soon. If you are not prepared to commit yourself you have to tell me. Now.’
Clegg: ‘I will call you back in five minutes