There were basically three distinct strata to the peaceable attempts. The vast majority were low-level suggestions made by neutrals, junior German diplomats or the odd German official at loose in a neutral state. The second stratum, which was of some interest to the Foreign Office, emanated from respected neutrals, such as the King of Sweden, and upper-echelon German nationals, such as former War Minister Otto Gessler and even top Nazis such as Goebbels. These pitches for peace were made with an eye to the credit that would accrue to their originators, particularly with Hitler, if they brought Germany peace.
There was however, a third stratum of peaceable attempts, and these were of a different ilk altogether. They were top-grade offers that received the personal attention of the Foreign Secretary, and frequently the Prime Minister as well. Furthermore, there were occasions when these attempts were of such importance that they required the Prime Minister to consult the dominion heads of government in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa before they could be rejected.
The most intriguing fact about these top-grade offers is not only that they clearly emanated from Adolf Hitler himself, transmitted to the British authorities through his own personal emissaries, but that there was a discernible pattern to them. As each attempt failed or began to flounder, a new one was immediately initiated through another avenue to replace it, thereby creating an almost unbroken chain of peaceable attempts from the summer of 1939.
It was a situation that caused much interest and speculation within Britain’s Foreign Office and Intelligence Services. By the summer of 1940 it was realised that these secret Hitler-initiated attempts at peace mediation revealed a psychological flaw deep within the Führer’s character that Britain could, with skill and guile, exploit to Germany’s disadvantage.
Even as it became clear to Hitler that Birger Dahlerus’s attempts at mediation in September-October 1939 would fail, moves began to open another channel to the British government. However, the German Führer was still a relative novice at the art of opening secret lines of communication to Britain’s leadership, and rather than stepping back to assess the situation, calling upon expert advice before dispatching an eminent diplomat or well-respected neutral, he accepted the services of the SS. That was not a good idea.
On 17 October 1939 SS Colonel Walter Schellenberg was summoned to a meeting with the head of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), Reinhard Heydrich, at RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt – the Directorate General of Security for the Reich) headquarters on Prinz Albrechtstrasse in Berlin – a building it shared with the Gestapo, which reveals much about the RSHA’s interests. Ushered into the presence of this extremely dangerous man, second only to Himmler in the SD–SS chain of command, Schellenberg was surprised to find Heydrich in congenial mood. ‘For several months,’ Heydrich confided, ‘one of our agents in the Low Countries … has been in contact with the British secret service.’23 He went on to inform Schellenberg that this agent, a man named Morz, had made several important contacts with British Intelligence, including two agents based in Holland. These were Major Richard Stevens, the Passport Control Officer at the British Embassy in The Hague (all Passport Control Officers were members of Britain’s intelligence service MI6, better known as SIS), and Captain Sigismund Payne-Best, who ran the Z Network in Holland (an intelligence-gathering unit which reported to Passport Control Officers). Schellenberg’s orders were to use these two men to ‘get in touch with the English government’24 in order to initiate Anglo–German peace negotiations.
Within a few days of his meeting with Heydrich, Schellenberg found himself in Holland, under the alias of Captain Schaemmel of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) Transport Service, pretending to Stevens and Payne-Best that he represented a group of leading Wehrmacht officers who wanted peace. This pretence was almost certainly adopted not only to protect Heydrich and Himmler should anything go wrong, but also because the British would have blanched at finding themselves negotiating with the SS. Schellenberg offered the very tempting bait that his faction might even be prepared to accept conditions that limited Hitler’s position within Germany, although he stressed that it was desirable that Hitler remained head of state – which in Nazi terms meant that in public Hitler would have remained the German head of state in a purely ceremonial capacity, while in private he continued in charge. This curious suggestion was not as improbable as it might first appear, for the SS was all-powerful in Nazi Germany, and Himmler secretly harboured great ambitions for it, planning that it would eventually supplant the Nazi Party as the controlling power in Germany.
Within hours of his meeting with Schellenberg, Stevens dispatched a ‘most secret’ telegram to London, putting forward the German peace proposals and relating the remarkable suggestions concerning Hitler’s future status. He soon received a reply that stated:
In the event of the German representatives enquiring whether you have had a reply to the questions which you said … you would refer to H.M.G., you should inform them as follows (not, however, handing them anything in writing):-
Whether Hitler remains in any capacity or not (but of course more particularly if he does remain) this country would have to see proof that German policy had changed direction … Germany [would not only] have to right the wrongs done in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but she would also have to give pledges that there would be no repetition of acts of aggression …25
The message concluded:
It is not for H.M.G. to say how these conditions could be met, but they are bound to say that, in their view, they are essential to the establishment of confidence on which alone peace could be solidly and durably based …
Neither France nor Great Britain, as the Prime Minster said, have any desire to carry on a vindictive war, but they are determined to prevent Germany continuing to make life in Europe unbearable.26
On receiving the bulk of this communication via Stevens, Schellenberg promptly reported to Heydrich: ‘The British officers [have] declared that His Majesty’s Government took great interest in our attempt which would contribute powerfully to prevent the spread of war … They assured us that they were in direct contact with the [British] Foreign Office and Downing Street.’27 He concluded by informing Heydrich that the British had invited him to secret peace negotiations in London, and that Stevens had even given him a transmitter (call sign ON4) with which he could covertly contact the British directly.
Heydrich’s response was most interesting, indicating that there was a great deal more going on behind the scenes than Schellenberg ever knew about. ‘All this seems to me a little too good to be true,’ the head of the SD commented. ‘I find it hard to believe that it’s not a trap. Be very careful going to London. Before making a decision I shall have to talk not only with the Reichsführer [Himmler] but more particularly with the Führer. Wait for my orders before proceeding.’28 Evidently from the German side the negotiations emanated from the pinnacle of Nazi government.
Events, however, were about to take a bizarre and unexpected twist. In distant Munich, on the night of Wednesday, 8 November, there was an attempt on Hitler’s life when a bomb blew up the Bürgerbräukeller just twenty minutes after he had cut short a speech and unexpectedly departed early. Outraged that this assassination attempt might have been prompted by the British, the SD took immediate action.
The very next afternoon, Stevens and Payne-Best, who were waiting to meet Schellenberg at the little Dutch–German frontier post at Venlo, were kidnapped by SD agents who dashed across the border, shot up the Dutch customs post, grabbed the two startled British Intelligence officers and made off with them across the frontier into Germany. Stevens and Payne-Best were intensively interrogated by German Intelligence, and after the German conquest of the west in 1940 the whole of Britain’s secret service network in western Europe would be brought crashing down, leaving it with virtually no intelligence-gathering assets. On the German side, the Venlo Incident, as it became known, ended any possibility of Schellenberg negotiating an end to the war.
As far as the British were