Ireland’s membership application was perhaps even more closely linked with that of the United Kingdom. Ireland had not taken part in the EEC/EFTA split of the late 1950s, but had special trading arrangements with Britain dating back to the time when it formed part of the United Kingdom. Edward Heath specifically mentioned Ireland in his opening speech to the EEC governments in October 1961, expressing the hope that their trading relationship would be ‘subsumed in the wider arrangements of the enlarged Community’. The EEC Council of Ministers signalled the start of negotiations with Ireland in October 1962 but, as in the case of Norway, substantial negotiations never actually opened.
The return of de Gaulle to power in France on 1 June 1958 was decisive for the EEC’s development. Given his long antipathy towards the integration efforts of the Six, nobody expected him to look favourably upon the new supranational organization emerging in Brussels. After all, he viewed France’s participation in the ECSC, the EEC and EURATOM as the humiliating policies of a previous regime ‘more concerned with pleasing others’. Thus it was with considerable relief that ‘Europeanists’ saw his early recognition of the Rome Treaties. In part, this reflected the support in French industrial and especially agrarian circles for the EEC. It also marked an appreciation of the usefulness of the Treaty, and its safeguards, for the liberalization of the French economy upon which the regime embarked at the end of 1958. However, it soon became evident that the General had his own concept of ‘Europe’ which differed markedly from the federalist ideal.
At a press conference in May 1960, de Gaulle launched his proposals to develop political cooperation among the Six. He announced his intention ‘to build western Europe into a political, economic, cultural and human grouping organised for action and self-defence … through organised cooperation between states, with the expectation of perhaps growing one day into an imposing confederation’. The use of the phrase ‘une cooperation organisée des Etats’ was particularly significant and reflected a desire to ensure that any future political integration of the Six would not be at the expense of French national sovereignty. De Gaulle obtained the support of Adenauer for this position on 29 July at a meeting at Rambouillet. Central to the plan was the establishment of a permanent political secretariat of the Six in Paris, responsible to a Council of the Heads of Government. It would comprise four permanent directorates; dealing with foreign policy, defence, economics and cultural affairs. There would also be an assembly of delegates from the national parliaments.10
The scheme ran into strong opposition from federalists such as Walter Hallstein and Paul-Henri Spaak who feared that the inclusion of defence and economics within the competence of the new organization would tend to undermine both NATO and the existing Economic Community in Brussels. These problems were discussed by the heads of government of the Six in Bonn in July 1961. The outcome of the meeting was the ‘Bonn Declaration’, which tried to allay doubts about the plan by including references to political union as a means for ‘strengthening the Atlantic Alliance’ as well as an affirmation of the intention to ‘continue at the same time the work already undertaken in the European Communities’. However, the Declaration had been cleverly drafted to conceal the many points of disagreement, and the illusion of consensus proved to be short lived.
The preparatory work was entrusted to a new commission, chaired by the French ambassador to Denmark, Christian Fouchet. Its brief was to submit ‘concrete proposals concerning meetings of the heads of state and the ministers of foreign affairs, as well as all other meetings that might appear desirable’. In November, the French government presented a draft Traité d’union d’Etats which became known as the Fouchet Plan. The Fouchet Plan adhered firmly to de Gaulle’s earlier position and, as such, represented some backsliding from the text of the Bonn Declaration. Most notably, the draft treaty included the key issues of defence and economics within the scope of the Political Union, despite the earlier protests by France’s partners. Negotiations among the Six on the Fouchet Plan commenced in early 1962, with numerous redrafts of the treaty submitted by the Five. However, as the negotiations progressed, a further point of disagreement emerged among the Six, over the issue of British participation in the Fouchet negotiations.
At this time, simultaneous negotiations were being held in Brussels on Britain’s application to the EEC. The Dutch, in particular, were adamant that the UK should also be included in the discussions on political union. Their foreign minster, Joseph Luns, saw British participation as essential to ensure the primacy of NATO and to keep a check on French ambitions. This was in stark contrast to the French position, that Britain would have to make a separate membership application to the Political Community, if and when it came into existence. Throughout the spring of 1962, this divergence of opinion became an ever greater source of antagonism among the Six. Meantime, the British themselves had begun to take a more active interest in the Fouchet negotiations, which, after all, coincided with Macmillan’s preferences for Europe’s organization. In April, at the Council of the Western European Union, Edward Heath made a long statement indicating Britain’s desire to participate directly in the discussions. Coming at a crucial stage in the Fouchet negotiations, his announcement had the effect of rallying Belgian support for the Dutch position. Spaak now declared that he would not sign any proposed treaty until after Britain had been admitted to the EEC. The negotiations were then formally ‘suspended’, and the Fouchet Plan was abandoned.
The failure of the Fouchet Plan represented the first of many political complications to emerge among the Six in the 1960s. Moreover, by stiffening French resistance to British intervention in continental affairs, it had a marked effect on the atmosphere of the Brussels negotiations on British accession. Four weeks after the suspension of the Fouchet discussions, de Gaulle held a press conference in which he defended the Fouchet Plan and delivered one of his most scathing attacks on European federalism. His response to Belgian and Dutch intransigence was to proceed with negotiations on a political treaty with Germany alone. The summer and autumn of 1962 were marked by a number of high profile meetings and state visits. This process culminated, a mere fortnight after the collapse of the first British membership application, in the signature of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation – a treaty which has also been described as a ‘bilateral version of the Fouchet Plan’.
Despite these external threats, and perhaps partly even because of them, the early years of the EEC were startlingly successful. In 1958, it had yet to start its day-to-day operations and still had to recruit its staff. Although its president, Walter Hallstein, was welcomed in Washington almost as if he were a head of state, his position as the head of the secretariat of Europe’s smallest and newest international organization meant he was virtually shown the tradesmen’s entrance in the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, the Commission quickly became a formidable force in European politics. This was partly because it was remarkably well-staffed. For example, Walter Hallstein himself had been involved in European affairs since he had led the German delegation in the Schuman Plan negotiations. Sicco Mansholt, an ardent federalist, had served as an agricultural minister (not usually a post renowned for its length of political tenure) for over a decade. Hans von der Groeben had already served as his country’s representative to the High Authority of the ECSC. Each of these men recruited highly skilled and experienced personal staffs.
Its success, however, was more than a question of personnel. At an organizational level, the Commission was quickly able to establish its own priorities and, still more importantly, to implement them. This, in turn, was facilitated by the compactness of the Commission itself, as evidenced by its small number of portfolios. Only later, when the EEC was merged with the ECSC and EURATOM, did its focus become blurred; it was then further diluted by the addition of new commissioners to satisfy new members in 1973. It is also undeniable that political factors played an important part. Early support from the Americans had certainly helped to increase the legitimacy of the new organization. Additionally, foreign policy challenges, an area in which the Rome treaties had given the commission an important role, presented themselves in the form of GATT trade rounds and in preparing the response to UK initiatives. Finally, the favourable economic climate provided new opportunities in the shape of an accelerated creation of the common market and thus created new areas for the Commission to exercise its influence at an early stage.
I once asked a senior official with a lifetime of service in the Commission,