This was not a phenomenon confined to the Western Front; the Soviet air force was virtually annihilated in the first weeks of the war by experienced pilots in better aircraft, and it took considerable time for the Russians to be able to make their numbers and manufacturing superiority show. In the Pacific the RAF was surprised to discover how proficient the Japanese were, with the result that the hopelessly outclassed Brewster Buffalo could do nothing to contain the Japanese advance. The Americans also found their aircraft were outclassed by the A6M Zero-sen, but found ways to overcome the difficulties. American fighters carried a far heavier armament than Japanese aircraft and were better armoured. This meant that if American pilots could at least get a shot in at the Japanese they stood a good chance of seriously damaging or destroying their opponent. As a result, the US air services sought to develop suitable tactics to force the Japanese to fight on terms that gave American pilots the opportunity to exploit these advantages in their equipment. This did much to rectify the problem initially, until new aircraft types entered service. Once the Vought F4U Corsair, Grumman F6F Hellcat and Lockheed P-38 Lightning arrived, the Japanese found that they were outnumbered and facing aircraft that were in many ways (if not absolutely) superior to theirs. Once again the Japanese began to haemorrhage experienced pilots as a result of this, creating what might be termed the qualitative-quantitative cycle of aerial attrition.
This applied in both World Wars. It was all very well having more experienced pilots, but if they were hopelessly outnumbered there was little they could do. If they flew machines that were clearly inferior to those of their enemies, the situation was the same. Alternatively, possessing an aircraft that was clearly superior to the opposing air force was of little use if the pilots were not experienced enough to exploit the advantages their machines possessed. However, where numerical and qualitative variables were more closely matched, the results of aerial combat (and the campaigns of which they were part) were less easy to predict. A smaller number of superior aircraft, coupled with well-trained pilots, could tilt the balance, even when numerical superiority lay in the hands of the enemy. A classic case in point may be said to have been the Battle of Britain. Although the RAF was outnumbered, it had two splendid fighter aircraft in the Spitfire and the Hurricane, which were able to deal with the German attacks. Had the RAF settled in the 1930s for vast numbers of the Gloster Gladiator, even if this type had outnumbered the Me109 and Me110, it is hard to perceive a positive outcome for the RAF in the summer of 1940. Although a slightly different case, the possession of large numbers of Fairey Battle bombers did little for the RAF’s efforts in France in 1940 – a smaller number of Hurricanes equipped for the fighter-bomber role would perhaps have been better, though not sufficiently so to have changed the overall outcome of the German campaign against France and the Low Countries. As ‘Johnnie’ Johnson noted, ‘Good aeroplanes are more important than superiority in numbers’.31
Air forces were of course not slow to recognise the importance of having machines that could match those in enemy service, and to have pilots capable of matching their opponents. Although the leading ‘aces’, as noted, possessed certain personal qualities that other pilots lacked, such as enhanced Situational Awareness, training organisations understood that fighter pilots tended to be slightly different. It was all very well possessing superior aircraft, but if their pilots were inferior they would lose. Von Richthofen argued that ‘the quality of the box matters little. Success depends upon the man who sits in it’.32 This was recognised by all air forces in both wars, although the losing side in each conflict suffered from an inability to obtain enough men with ‘the right stuff’.
The term ‘right stuff’ has now entered the realms of cliché, but was applicable. In the case of the First World War, the pilots were regarded as ‘intrepid aviators’, who required great courage and fortitude to leave the safety of the ground in their potentially dangerous machines. This meant that many of the first men to enter into air combat were of a notably strong character, which in some cases manifested itself in eccentricity. Perhaps the most notable example here was the inimitable Louis Strange, who as well as being probably the first British pilot to conduct a ground-attack mission, survived falling out of his aircraft and hanging inverted on to the ammunition drum of his Lewis gun before managing to swing himself back into the cockpit. Strange ended the First World War commanding 80 Wing, RAF, flying Sopwith Camels, and then distinguished himself in the Second World War.
He managed to persuade the authorities that he was still capable of flying, and in June 1940 he found himself at Merville airfield commanding the efforts to transport men and equipment away from the advancing Germans. A number of serviceable Hawker Hurricanes were on the airfield, and Strange decided to fly one back to England. Although he had never flown a Hurricane before, he successfully took off, only to be ‘bounced’ by a flight of Me109s. Although the Hurricane was not carrying any ammunition, Strange simply outmanoeuvred the enemy fighters, including some hair-raising low-level flying. He returned safely to Britain, and was awarded a bar to the Distinguished Flying Cross, 20 years after he had first won that award.33
The RFC produced a number of pilots whose behaviour was extremely unusual during the Great War, but this was more by virtue of circumstances at the commencement of the conflict than by design. As the war went on, it was neither possible nor desirable to track down men who were noticeably unusual in their general behaviour in order to train them for air fighting. Instead, pilots were asked if they had experience of riding horses, or motor vehicles. The employment of the former question by recruiting officers has been ridiculed, but made perfect sense.34 A man who could control a horse probably had the necessary reflexes and dexterity to control an aircraft. An interest in motor vehicles (which, by virtue of being considered more plebeian, does not receive the same level of amusement) was of use, and remained so. Robert Stanford Tuck, upon applying to join the RAF in 1935, was asked of his knowledge of ‘ICE’. Tuck had no idea what his inquisitor was talking about, but managed to bluff an answer in general terms. Upon leaving the interview, he suddenly realised that ‘ICE’ stood for ‘Internal Combustion Engines’.35
Technical aptitude was important, but was not the only factor. Even if fighter pilots did not need to be brilliantly adept at flying, they needed to be competent. The demands of air combat placed heavy psychological and physiological demands upon pilots. Not only did pilots have to cope with the violence, speed and ferocity of air fighting, they had to sustain heavy g-loadings, cold, and changes in air pressure, all of which had a cumulatively fatiguing effect. In the First World War pilots rarely had the benefits of oxygen supply, and the majority flew for their entire careers without it. At heights above 10,000 feet, the thinner air combined with the cold to make air fighting a difficult task. The effort required to change the ammunition drum on a machine-gun was substantial, as the thinner air made exertion more taxing. The lack of oxygen also had the effect of dulling mental agility, crucial to air fighting, which demanded swiftness of thought. The Second World War at least saw the use of oxygen, but sub-zero temperatures remained a challenge, even with the provision of heating systems in the enclosed cockpits. The physical stresses of flying in both wars meant that pilots became fatigued. This, coupled with psychological fatigue, created dangerous and often fatal circumstances.
The fighter pilot was invariably on his own in combat.36 This required a certain type of person. Research conducted after the Second World War suggests that a combination of physical and psychological factors were important in selection of pilots. Good pilots were not anxious types and had good psychomotor adaptation and co-ordination. In addition, they tended towards introversion, but – crucially – had the ability to get on well with others when they wished.37 The top-scoring ‘ace’ Erich Hartmann noted this, and contended, with the benefit of empirical observation rather than science, that fighter pilots tended towards individualism. This is supported by the historical examples of Billy Bishop, Georges Guynemer and Albert Ball from the First World War, and George ‘Screwball’ Beurling from the Second, all of whom preferred to operate alone.38 This did not mean that they were anti-social on the ground, although