Northcliffe wanted Philip to stay in contact with him over the summer while he was holidaying in Italy and told him to send messages via the British Embassy in Rome and his political adviser in London, Geoffrey Robinson. He encouraged Philip to stay close to Robinson and to allow him to come and visit out at the front. He told him that Robinson was his closest adviser on the thoughts and actions of members of the cabinet: ‘It is our system that he should know them and I should not, which we find an excellent plan. They are a pack of gullible optimists who swallow any foolish tale. There are exceptions among them, and they are splendid ones, but the generality of them have the slipperiness of eels, with the combined vanity of a professional beauty.’43
The opening barrage from the politicians was delivered by Winston Churchill, who after leaving the cabinet had served at the front in early 1916, but by the summer had returned to London to speak up in the House of Commons as the champion of the soldiers serving in the trenches.fn12 On 1 August he prepared a memo for the cabinet, which was circulated with the help of his friend F. E. Smith. Churchill argued that, following the start of the Battle of the Somme, the energies of the army were being ‘dissipated’ by the constant series of attacks which despite the huge losses of life on both sides had failed to deliver a decisive breakthrough.44 This memo immediately captured the attention of Lloyd George. Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, tipped off Haig that ‘the powers that be’ were beginning to get a ‘little uneasy’ about the general situation, and Haig prepared a note in response to Churchill’s criticisms which was circulated to the War Committee, the cabinet committee that oversaw the national contribution to the war effort.45 The King visited GHQ on 8 August and discussed Churchill’s paper with Haig in detail. Haig recalled in his diary that he had told King George ‘that these were trifles and that we must not allow them to divert our thoughts from the main objective, namely “beating the Germans”. I also expect that Winston’s head is gone from taking drugs.’46
Philip Sassoon heeded Northcliffe’s request to keep him informed of developments at GHQ and wrote to tell him that ‘We have heard all about the Churchill Cabal from the King and his people who are out here this week … The War Committee are apparently quite satisfied now at the appreciation of the situation which the Chief had already sent them and proved a complete answer to Churchill’s damnable accusations.’ Philip then added suggestively, ‘Lloyd George is coming to dine here Saturday night. I shall be much interested to hear what he has to say. I do trust that he and Carsonfn13 will be made to realise how damaging any flirting with an alliance with Churchill would be for them. Do you think they realise this? Sufficiently?’47
On 14 August Lord Esher wrote to reassure and warn Philip that
No combination of Churchill and F. E. can do any harm so long as fortune favours us in the field. These people only become formidable during the inevitable ebb of the tide of success. It is then that a C in C absent and often unprotected by the men whose duty it is to defend him, may be stabbed in the back. It is for this reason that you should never relax your vigilance and never despise an enemy, however despicable.48
Philip certainly had complete faith in Haig’s strategy and the ongoing Battle of the Somme, writing to his uncle Leopold Rothschild the same day, ‘Everything is going very satisfactorily here and the whole outlook is good. If we can, as I hope, keep up combined pressure right into the autumn, the decision ought not to be far off.’
During Lloyd George’s visit to GHQ he reassured Haig that he had ‘no intention of meddling’.49 Yet, the following month, news reached Haig directly from the French commander General Foch that Lloyd George had been asking his opinion about the competence of the British commanders. Haig could not believe that ‘a British Minister could have been so ungentlemanly as to go to a foreigner and put such questions’.50 Philip Sassoon was given a full debrief on Lloyd George’s visit to see Foch, which could only have come directly from Haig, and he immediately set to work on Northcliffe. His response was designed to be personally wounding, saying that Lloyd George’s visit to both the British and French headquarters had been a complete ‘joy ride from beginning to end’. He also told Northcliffe that Lloyd George had been discourteous by keeping General Foch waiting an hour and a half for lunch, without giving an apology, and then he had asked him why the French guns were more effective than the British, which Foch refused to answer. Lloyd George also found only fifteen minutes of private time for Douglas Haig during his visit. ‘If this is the man some people would like to see PM,’ Philip told Northcliffe, ‘I prefer old Squifffn14 any day with all his faults. It is my private opinion that he has neither liking nor esteem for the C in C. He has certainly conveyed that impression to all. No doubt Churchill’s subtle poison has done its deadly work.’51
Philip’s intervention led to a series of articles in Northcliffe’s newspapers praising Haig and the work of the British army in France, and sniping at the ‘shirt-sleeved politicians’ who were interfering with the war. Philip’s efforts on behalf of his Chief were also coming to the attention of Lloyd George’s advisers, who warned him that Haig was ‘trying to get at the press through that little blighter Sassoon’.52
The growing pressure on GHQ for a real success in the field led to the use of tanks for the first time during the later stages of the Battle of the Somme, at Pozières. The idea of an armoured trench-crossing machine had first been suggested in October 1914 by Major Ernest Swinton, who was the official British war correspondent on the Western Front. It captured the imagination of Winston Churchill, who in early 1915 urged Asquith to allow the Admiralty to develop a prototype for a ‘land ship’. To help keep the programme secret, designs were developed under the misleading title of ‘water-carriers for Russia’. When it was pointed out that this could be abbreviated to ‘WCs for Russia’, that name was changed to ‘water-tanks’, then to ‘tanks’.53
Churchill had begged Asquith not to allow the machines to be used until they could be perfected and launched in large numbers and to the complete surprise of the Germans. Haig, however, was agitating to get them into the field as soon as possible, and their initial deployment in September 1916 met with limited success. Nevertheless, they caused yet more intrigue between the politicians and GHQ over who should take the credit for them. Northcliffe wrote to Philip on 2 October:
You may have noticed that directly the tanks were successful, Lloyd George issued a notice through the Official Press Bureau that they were due to Churchill. You will find that unless we watch these people they will claim that the great Battle of the Somme is due to the politicians. That would not matter if it were not for the fact that it is the politicians who will make peace. If they are allowed to exalt themselves they will get a hold over the public very dangerous to the national interests.54
Lord Esher’s advice to Philip earlier in the summer, that all would be well for Haig as long as there was success in the field, was true not just for the generals but also for the politicians. The Battle of the Somme had not produced the decisive breakthrough that Philip had hoped for, and there was concern that Britain might actually be losing the war. Northcliffe decided that Asquith had to be replaced as Prime Minister, and his papers led the calls for change at the top of government. He