moral virtues or qualities of character (such as courage, liberality, temperance, modesty and so on). These virtues are connected to the desiderative and hence, the irrational part of the soul. They can only be cultivated through habit.
intellectual virtues or qualities of mind (such as wisdom, understanding and judgement). These virtues are connected to the rational half of the soul, and are to be cultivated through instruction.
1 Moral virtues
In Aristotle’s account there are twelve moral virtues which fall between two vices: the vice of excess or the vice of deficiency. So, for example, the moral virtue of courage would fall between its excess which is foolhardiness or rashness and its deficiency which is, of course, cowardice.
| Excess | Virtue | Deficiency |
| rashness | courage | cowardice |
| licentiousness | temperance | insensibility |
| prodigality | liberality | illiberality |
| vulgarity | magnificence | pettiness |
| vanity | magnanimity | pusillanimity |
| ambition | proper ambition | lack of ambition |
| irascibility | patience | lack of spirit |
| boastfulness | truthfulness | understatement |
| buffoonery | wittiness | boorishness |
| obsequiousness | friendliness | cantankerousness |
| shyness | modesty | shamelessness |
| envy | righteous-indignation | malicious-enjoyment |
| (p.104) |
2 Intellectual virtues
There are nine intellectual virtues comprising five main or primary virtues, and four secondary virtues:
Art or Technical Skill (techne): the practical skill of knowing how to bring something into existence. For example, knowing how to build a house or construct a bridge as well as knowing how to write a poem, paint a picture or sculpt a statue. For the Greeks all things had to meet two criteria: they had to be functional and they had to be aesthetically pleasing or decorative. Plays, poems and statues had a symbolic political, social or religious function as well as possessing what we might call ‘artistic or dramatic beauty’. Similarly, houses and bridges had not only to fulfil their obvious function, but they also had to be pleasing to the eye.
Scientific Knowledge (episteme): This comprises the so-called ‘facts’ of the universe, that is, knowledge of all the objects in the universe as well as all the laws which govern them. Knowledge of biology, astronomy, geography and so on are all covered by this virtue.
Prudence or Practical Wisdom (phronesis): This is one of the most important virtues which helps us to balance our interests with the interests of others. This is the virtue, for example, which helps us to make the decision whether or not to purchase the colour television with stereo sound, or whether to buy the small black and white portable and give the rest of the money to Oxfam. Arguably, without phronesis the remainder of the virtues revert to being mere skills.
Intelligence or Intuition (nous): This is perhaps the basic intellectual virtue in the sense that without it probably few other intellectual virtues could get going. Arguably, without intelligence or intuition nothing else can happen in the mind!
Wisdom (sophia): This is the finished form of all the virtues. Generally speaking, one must have lived to a good age, experienced many things and learned a number of lessons before wisdom is finally cultivated.
The four secondary intellectual virtues are:
Resourcefulness or Good Deliberation (euboulia): This is a form of practical wisdom, and involves knowing where and how to enquire about something so that the best decision can be made. For example, suppose I need a new refrigerator. At the outset this seems to be a perfectly innocuous issue almost completely unconnected with moral concerns. Its relevance, however, will soon be made clear. Resourcefulness will prompt me to examine Which?, the popular consumer guide. This will help me to make a more informed decision about the best fridge to buy.
Understanding (sunesis): This goes beyond the ability to know external facts about the world. To understand something is to recognise all the difficulties and perplexities associated with decision-making. I might choose the best fridge recommended by Which?, but when I get it home it may not fit into my kitchen! In order to understand things I am obliged to deliberate over many interrelated issues.
Judgement (gnome): For a judgement to be a good one it has to take account of what is right and just for all concerned. Suppose, after examining all of the fridges on offer, after measuring my kitchen and so on, I find that my chosen fridge is called ‘The Philippino Special Exploiter’. Its high quality and low price depend upon the poverty and squalid conditions of the Third World workers who help manufacture it. My sympathetic judgement will be not to purchase the fridge and perhaps to begin campaigning on behalf of the exploited workforce.
Cleverness (deinotes): the last of the secondary intellectual virtues. On its own, however, it can hardly be said to be a virtue in the true sense of the word. Cleverness unconnected with judgement can be unscrupulous. A shady second-hand car dealer may be said to be clever, but we would hardly say that he was in possession of a virtue.
Doctrine of the mean
According to the Aristotelian argument we all have the potential to develop these moral and intellectual virtues. However, it is likely that only a few people will be able to cultivate the potential virtues into actual virtues. Similarly, all acorns have the potential to become actual oak trees, but only some of them will become so. Moreover, if we are to cultivate our virtues, particularly our moral virtues, we must be aware of the doctrine of the mean. Put simply, we must regulate our emotions and responses to people and situations so that we are eventually able to conduct ourselves with dignity. We must try to ensure that we veer away from either the excess or deficiency, and so hit the ‘mean’ or midway point, although Aristotle is quick to mention that the midway point is not just a numerical halfway house.
For example, I have the clear capacity to feel intense anger at my computer when it fails to work. I accept my anger for what it is – a natural feeling or emotional response. However, it is my attitude towards that feeling which is crucial. I could, for example, set about my computer with a hammer in order to release my feelings. But this would be to exhibit a poorly developed virtue. On the other hand, I could simply not bother about the failure of my computer, do nothing about it and give up on writing altogether. This would be an equally poor response. The right response would be to control the anger, take the computer to a repair shop, and then hire or borrow another one for the intervening period. My feelings, no matter how overwhelming they are, should not drown my reason. Feelings are clearly important, but our virtues – our attitudes towards our feelings – are more important. What matters is what we do with our feelings so that eventually they can conform naturally to that which reason would advocate. Aristotle makes the point that children have to learn the virtues through habit. They must learn that they cannot simply give vent to all their feelings in whatever way they wish and whenever they want. Although the six-year-old may initially give vent to her emotions in the supermarket by screaming that she wants the chocolate bar, she must gradually learn that the feelings of anger and resentment at being denied it are perfectly natural. However, she must control that anger and resentment and develop a sense of patience instead. Arguably, adulthood is about learning to control and direct one’s emotions. In other words, it is about developing the moral virtues.
By constantly learning through habit to control our feelings we should, according to Aristotle, begin to:
have these feelings at the right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way … (this is) … to feel them to an intermediate, that is, to the best degree; and this is the mark of virtue (p. 101).
There is the obvious criticism that this approach to moral reasoning leads to a kind of blind uniformity of belief, desire and behaviour. The intention, it would seem, is to produce an automatic response in people to other people and to situations. This would