The Germans accuse the Austrians of having drained their front in Galicia of artillery for their Italian offensive, and also of holding the line with troops of poor quality. However that may be, Gen. Brussiloff’s army, “after a relatively short artillery preparation … got up from their trenches and simply marched forward.” Falkenhayn has a delightful observation on the whole business: “A ‘reconnaissance’ like Brussiloff’s was only possible, of course, if the General had decisive reason for holding a low opinion of his enemy’s power of resistance. And on this point he made no miscalculation.”
The immediate effect of the Russian success was the transfer of three divisions from the Western Front, and later more followed; but the Germans were still very strong in numbers, and there was no slacking off of their efforts on Verdun. They were able to help the Austrians to check the Russian advance and eventually to repulse it, but, on the other hand, the Italian counter-attack met with success and drove the Austrians back.
Sir Douglas Haig says that
“The heroic defence of our French Allies had already gained many weeks of inestimable value and had caused the enemy very heavy losses; but the strain continued to increase. In view, therefore, of the situation in the various theatres of war, it was eventually agreed between Gen. Joffre and myself that the combined French and British offensive should not be postponed beyond the end of June. The object of that offensive was threefold:
(1) To relieve the pressure on Verdun.
(2) To assist our Allies in the other theatres of war by stopping any further transfer of German troops from the Western Front.
(3) To wear down the strength of the forces opposed to us.”
We begin to see now the dominating influence of Verdun. In any case the offensive could not have been postponed much longer, and if it was an alteration of plan forced by the enemy, it was not to be compared with the abandonment by the Germans of their offensive—which Falkenhayn says he had prepared against the British with the object of forestalling the Entente blow on the Western Front—due to the uncomfortable situation of the Austrians.
Probably, however, the date did influence the approaching action of the 56th Division. The new front line was still a long way from the enemy. The Queen’s Westminster Rifles succeeded in advancing a small sector of the line by a hundred yards and, had there been time, the whole division would have crept closer before jumping on the enemy.
The weather, too, was very bad.
In due course Gen. Hull issued his preliminary instructions, from which it will be seen that the decision to attempt the capture of the Quadrilateral in one operation had been taken:
“The attack of the 56th Division will be carried out by the 168th and 169th Brigades, whose tasks will be as follows:
(a) The objective of the 168th Brigade will be to capture the German line from Fair Trench, about K11d13, along Farm, Fame and Elbe, Felon, to a point in Fell fifty yards north-west of the trench junction at K5c52, and to establish itself in three strong points:
(1) About Farmyard, Farmer, Farm.
(2) About Elbe, between Et and Felon.
(3) About cross-trenches of Fell and Felon with Epte.
168th Brigade will be responsible for the construction of a fire trench facing south-east to connect the right flank of the captured line to our present line in W47.
(b) The task of the 169th Brigade will be carried out in three phases. The object of the 169th Brigade in the first phase will be to capture the line of German trenches from the left of the 168th Brigade along Fall, Fellow, the Cemetery, Eck, the Maze, Eel, and Fir, and to establish strong points:
(1) From Feud through Ems to the Cemetery inclusive.
(2) About the Maze.
(3) About the south-east corner of Gommecourt Park.
The second phase of the 169th Brigade attack will take place immediately after the first phase.
The objective of the second phase is the Quadrilateral of the trenches in the south-east portion of K5a. The artillery lifts will be timed on the assumption that the infantry will reach Ems (between Etch and Fillet) twenty-five minutes after zero; and Exe (between Etch and Fillet) twenty-seven minutes after zero time.
The third phase will take place directly after the Quadrilateral is captured, and will consist of the securing of the cross-trenches at K5a78 (where Indus crosses Fill and Fillet) and joining hands with the 46th Division along Fill. Fillet will be consolidated facing east.
The following will be carried on the man:
200 rounds S.A.A.;
Waterproof sheet;
Haversack;
Iron ration and current day’s ration;
Two to three sand-bags;
Two tube helmets;
Proportion of wire-cutters, bill-hooks, tools.”
The instructions for the 167th Brigade are practically embodied in the following paragraphs:
“One company 167th Brigade will be placed at the disposal of the Brigadier-General commanding 169th Brigade, to hold sectors Y49 and Y50.
Seven officers and 200 men of the 167th Brigade will be detailed for the control of smoke, and will be under the orders of the Divisional Gas Officer. Approximately 1,200 men will be required for work under the C.R.E. on communication trenches across No Man’s Land and for carrying parties.”
Practice attacks, based on these instructions, were carried out by the brigades in reserve.
We have written of the constructive preparations which were going on all along the line of proposed attack. These preparations were continued until the last moment. But meanwhile another element was introduced—that of destructive preparation. It is scarcely necessary to point out that neither form of preparation could be concealed from the enemy. The Germans knew as well as we did where we would attack.
The Gommecourt sector to be attacked was held by the German 169th and 170th Regiments, with about 1-1/2 battalions on the front line, 1 battalion in support, 2 battalions in reserve in Bucquoy, and 2 companies at Ablainzeville. Their artillery consisted of 5 batteries of heavy artillery and 12 batteries of field artillery. These batteries were divided into three groups at Quesnoy Farm, on the left of the British position, Biez Wood and Puisieux. There was a further group of guns near Adinfer Wood which could assist in the defence.
The 56th Divisional Artillery, together with the heavy VII Corps guns, had now to prepare for the infantry assault by smashing up not only the wire and trench system, but billets and gun positions behind the German lines as well. As regards villages, most attention was given to Bucquoy, Essart, Ablainzeville, and Achiet-le-Grand.
Three groups of artillery were formed—a northern group, under Lieut.-Col. Southam, a southern group, under Lieut.-Col. Macdowell, and a wire-cutting group under Lieut.-Col. Prechtel. The northern and southern groups were under the orders of the Corps, and consisted of:
3 batteries of 18-pounders (until zero day, then 4 batteries).
1 battery 4·5 howitzers.
Affiliated at zero to the 169th Brigade.
4 batteries of 18-pounders.
1 battery 4·5 howitzers.
Affiliated at zero to the 168th Brigade.
5 batteries of 18-pounders until zero and then 4 batteries.
1 battery 4·5 howitzers.
Two of the guns of the 4·5 battery will be at the call of the counter-battery group.
In the preliminary instructions it will be noticed that a party of officers and men were detailed to act under the Divisional Gas Officer.