The courts made several attempts to insist on a firm classification, but some of these were conceived in such an unhappy spirit that they actually embroiled matters. The conduct of the king's judges was especially misdirected in one famous case which came up several times before the courts during the thirteenth century. The tenants of Tavistock in Devonshire were seeking protection against their lords, and appealing to the right of ancient demesne. The case was debated two or three times during Henry III's reign, and in 1279 judgment was given against the plaintiffs by an imposing quorum, as many as eight judges with the Chief Justice Ralph Hengham at their head. It was conceded that Tavistock was ancient demesne, but the claimants were held to be villains and not villain socmen, and this on the ground that the Domesday description did not mention socmen, but only villains236. It seems strange to dispute a decision given with such solemnity by men who were much better placed to know about these things than we are, but there does not seem to be any possible doubt that Hengham and his companions were entirely wrong. Their decision is in contradiction with almost all the recorded cases; it was always assumed that the stiff Domesday terminology was quite insufficient to show whether a man was a pure villain or a free man holding in villainage, which last would be the villain socman in ancient demesne. If Hengham's doctrine had been taken as a basis for decision in these cases, no ancient demesne tenancy would have been recognised at all out of the Danelaw counties, that is in far the greater part of England, as Domesday never mentions socmen there at all. In the Danelaw counties, on the other hand, the privilege would have been of no use, as those who were called socmen there were freeholders protected without any reference to ancient demesne. Altogether the attempt to make Domesday serve the purpose of establishing the mode of tenure for the thirteenth century must be called a misdirected one. It was quite singular, as the courts generally went back upon Domesday only with the object of finding out whether a particular manor had been vested in the crown at the time of the Conquest or not. It should be noted that Bracton considered the case from a very different point of view, as one may judge by the note he jotted down on the margin of his Note-book against a trial of 1237-8. He says: 'Nota de villanis Henrici de Tracy de Tawystoke qui nunquam fuerunt in manu Domini Regis nec antecessorum suorum et loquebantur de tempore Regis Edwardi coram W. de Wiltona237.' Wilton's decision must have been grounded on the assumption that the ancestors of the claimants were strangers to the manor, or else that the manor had never formed part of the ancient demesne. This would, of course, be in direct contradiction to the opinion that the Tavistock tenants were descended from the king's born villains.
I cannot help thinking that Hengham's decision may have been prompted either by partiality towards the lord of the manor or by an ill-considered wish to compress the right of ancient demesne within the narrowest bounds possible. In any case this trial deserves attention by reason of the eminent authorities engaged in drawing up the judgment, and as illustrating the difficulties which surround the points at issue and lead to confusion both in the decisions and in the treatment of them by law writers. In order to gain firm ground we must certainly go back again to the fundamental propositions laid down with great clearness by Bracton. It was not all the tenants on ancient demesne soil that had a right to appeal to its peculiar privileges—some had protection at Common Law and some had no protection at all. But the great majority of the tenants enjoyed special rights, and these men of ancient demesne were considered to be free by blood and holding in villainage. If the books had not noticed their personal freedom in so many words, it would have been proved by the fact that they were always capable of leaving their tenements and going away at pleasure.
Bracton's historical explanation.
Bracton does not restrict himself to this statement of the case; he adds a few lines to give a historical explanation of it. 'At the time of the Conquest,' says he, 'there were free men holding their lands freely, and by free services or free customs. When they were ejected by stronger people, they came back and received the same lands to be held in villainage and by villain services, which were specified and certain238.'
The passage is a most interesting one, but it calls for some comment. How is it that the special case of ancient demesne gets widened into a general description of the perturbations consequent upon the Conquest? For a general description it is; by the 'stronger folk,' the 'potentiores,' are certainly not meant the king and his officers only. On the other hand, how can it be said of any but the ancient demesne tenants that they resumed their holdings by certain though base services? The wording is undoubtedly and unfortunately rather careless in this most important passage, still the main positions which Bracton intended to convey are not affected by his rather clumsy way of stating them. Ancient demesne tenure, notwithstanding its peculiarities, is one species of a mode of holding which was largely represented everywhere, namely of the status of free men holding in villainage; this condition had been strongly affected if not actually produced by the Conquest. It is interesting to compare the description of the Conquest, as given at greater length but in a looser way, in the Dialogus de Scaccario. It is stated there that those who had actually fought against the Conqueror were deprived of their lands for ever after. Those who for some reason had not actually joined in the contest were suffered to hold their lands under Norman lords, but with no claim to hereditary succession. Their occupation being uncertain, their lords very often deprived them of their lands and they had no means to procure restitution. Their complaints gave rise to a discussion of the matter before the king, and it was held that nothing could be claimed by these people by way of succession from the time preceding the Conquest, and that actionable rights could originate only in deeds granted by the Norman lords239. The Dialogus as compared with Bracton lays most stress on the opposite side of the picture; the disabilities of persons holding at will are set forth not only as a consequence of the state of things following conquest de facto, but as the result of a legal reconsideration of the facts. As a classification of tenures the passage would not be complete, of course, since neither the important species of free socage recognised by Domesday nor the ancient demesne tenure appears. It is only the contrast between villainage and holding by charter that comes out strongly. But in one way the Dialogus reinforces Bracton, if I may be allowed to use the expression: for it traces back the formation of a very important kind of villainage to the Conquest, and connects the attempts of persons entangled into it to obtain protection with their original rights before the Conquest.
Saxon origin of ancient demesne tenure.
Reverting now to the question of ancient demesne, we shall have to consider what light these statements throw on the origin of the tenure. I have noticed several times that ancient demesne socage was connected in principle with the condition of things in Saxon times, immediately before the Conquest. The courts had to impose limitations in order to control evidence; the whole institution was in a way created by limitation, because it restricted itself to the T.R.E. of Domesday as the only acceptable test of Saxon condition. But, notwithstanding all these features imposed by the requirements of procedure, ancient demesne