The Chancellor of the Exchequer: I stated, I think, or at all events referred on Monday to the fact, that communications had been made to the Porte to ascertain whether permission would be given, or a firman be granted, for the British fleet to enter the Dardanelles. That permission was refused, but Her Majesty's Government thought it right to direct the ships to proceed, and they have proceeded accordingly. No material opposition was offered, and they are by this time, I presume, anchored in the neighbourhood of Constantinople. I may perhaps mention that a communication has been made by the Russian Government to the effect that, in view of the intended sending of the fleet by Her Majesty's Government to the neighbourhood of Constantinople, it would be a matter for the consideration of the Russian Government whether they should not themselves occupy the city. In answer to that Her Majesty's Government have sent a communication which will be laid on the table of the House to-night, in which they protest against that view, and state that they cannot acknowledge that in the case of the two countries the circumstances are parallel, or that the despatch of the British fleet for the purpose indicated justifies the Russian Government in the step which they announce it to be their intention to take.
II
The uncertainty which has prevailed during the last few days respecting the course which our Government would pursue, in view of the difference respecting the Congress which had arisen between ourselves and Russia, has received a startling and momentous solution. When the House of Lords met yesterday, Lord Derby no longer occupied his seat on the Ministerial Bench, and he at once announced that he had resigned the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs… The explanations given yesterday remove all doubt respecting the relative positions assumed by our Government and Russia in regard to the Congress. Sir Stafford Northcote stated in the House of Commons the import of the communications which have passed between ourselves and Russia… Russia's reply amounted to a clear intimation that she claims to withhold from the cognizance of the Powers any articles of the preliminary Treaty she may choose. Such a reserve as she asserts is tantamount to a definite claim to alter an existing Treaty by force of arms without consulting the other Powers who signed it, and towards whom she is under honourable obligations. There being this imminent danger that the Congress may not meet – it being, as Lord Beaconsfield said, "the belief" of the Government "that the Congress would not meet," it became necessary for the Government to consider what further course they would take… We do not know what course Lord Derby would have advised, and it is possible he would not immediately have taken any fresh steps. But the rest of the Government decided that in the interests of peace, and for the due protection of the rights of the Empire, it was their duty "to advise Her Majesty to avail herself of those powers which she has for calling for the services of her Reserved Forces." As subsequently explained by Mr. Hardy in the House of Commons, this step is one which is rendered necessary by the new organization of the Army… Its result will be to raise our regular forces to their utmost efficiency. In other words, it will place the land forces which actually exist in readiness for prompt action; and it is thus a plain declaration – a declaration rendered emphatic by Lord Derby's resignation – that we are prepared to act promptly if the course on which Russia has entered directly injures our honour or our interests. Such a declaration of our being determined to adhere to the claims we have put forward is perhaps the most momentous step which has yet been taken by this country.
PEACE WITH HONOUR (1878)
The Premier alighted at his official residence in Downing Street, and was met on the threshold by General Ponsonby, bearing a bouquet of rare flowers, sent to him by the gracious forethought of Her Majesty the Queen… The ground was well kept by the police, till the Prime Minister appeared at a window and began to speak. Then a rush swept the police away. Three cheers for Lord Beaconsfield were given. For the second time in the day the Prime Minister was visibly affected. He had to wait long for silence, but when an approach to quiet had been obtained Lord Beaconsfield said: "I can assure you that no recognition of neighbours could be more gratifying to my feelings than these expressions of the sentiments of those among whom I see many of my oldest and most cherished friends. Lord Salisbury and myself have brought you back peace, but a peace, I hope, with honour, which may satisfy our Sovereign, and tend to the welfare of the country."
THE SECRET AGREEMENTS IN BEACONSFIELD'S POCKETS (1878)
The Earl of Rosebery rose to call attention to a memorandum purporting to have been signed by the Marquis of Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff on May 30, 1878, and to ask if it was the intention of the Government to lay it on the table of the House… The course the Government had pursued with respect to their policy was, he would venture to say, one of obscurity enlivened with sarcasm. In the whole history of the negotiations there were five cardinal points – points which became salient to everyone who had studied the history of these transactions. First, there was the San Stefano treaty; the second was the circular of the 1st of April; the third, the alleged secret agreement of May 30th; the fourth, the secret convention of June 4th with Turkey; and the fifth was the treaty signed at Berlin on the 30th of July. As to the secret agreement between Russia and England, it would be well to recall how they came to have any cognizance of it at all. The substance of it appeared in the Globe within, he thought, three or four days after it was signed, and it was on the 14th of June, he thought, that the entire text was given in the columns of the same journal… They had all heard that the agreement was not to be laid on the table, because there were documents in connection with it which it would be necessary to present at the same time; but other Powers would not allow us to produce them. What he gathered from all this was that, if it had not been for the ill-advised conduct of a very subordinate clerk in the Foreign Office, who was entrusted with the copying of the agreement at the rate of 10d. an hour, the English public would not at this moment have the faintest conception of such an agreement, and the keystone of the whole purpose of the Government would be wrapped in obscurity. This was alarming in itself, because, if these subterranean methods were employed as a rule, they would give the public some little dismay in regard to the course of further negotiations… Having signed this agreement, and having signed another secret agreement within two or three days with Turkey, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries proceeded, fortified with them, to the Congress. Now came the most extraordinary point in all the history of these negotiations, so far as they knew it. Eight days after the signature, or alleged signature, of this agreement, in which, if the House would remember, we consented to the abandonment of Batoum and other Russian conquests in Armenia, the Foreign Secretary addressed a despatch to our Resident Plenipotentiary in Berlin, in which he urged him to use his exertions to the utmost on behalf of Batoum. The words were so remarkable that he might be pardoned for quoting them to their lordships. On the 8th of June the noble Marquis wrote to Lord Odo Russell: "There is no ground for believing that Russia will willingly give way in respect to Batoum, Kars, or Ardahan; and it is possible that the arguments of England urged in Congress will receive little assistance from other Powers, and will