The Jesuit theory of the infallible Pope and the extent of his powers is in no way less extravagant than that which deluded Agostino Trionfo into his deification of the Pope under John xxii.12 Once admit the maxim of the Syllabus, that the Popes have never exceeded the just limits of their power, and it must obviously be their right to dispose of crowns and peoples, property and freedom, since they have in fact claimed and exercised the right. Thus, for instance, Nicolas v. did not at all violate the common rights of men, but only made a proper use of his own absolute authority, when he gave full power to King Alfonso of Portugal, and his successors, to subjugate unbelieving nations, appropriate their territories and all their possessions, and reduce their persons to perpetual slavery. Nor was Alexander vi. less justified in conferring on Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain and their successors the newly discovered countries of America, and then drawing the famous line from north to south through the New World, and dividing it between Spain and Portugal. It was to the authority of the Pope, as the lord of all mankind, to whom all men are subject, wherever born, and of whatever religion, since God has subjected the whole earth to his jurisdiction, and made him master of it, that the Spanish conquerors appealed against the natives. On this plea they treated all refusal to submit as rebellion, for which they meant to take vengeance on the natives – as in fact they did in the most horrible manner – by cruel wars, confiscation of property, and slavery. Their lust of conquest, with all the abominations they perpetrated, could always be excused and justified by the remembrance that they were only acting with the sanction of God's earthly representative, and punishing the refusal to recognise his legitimate dominion over the world.
In the article we have cited, the Civiltà affirmed anew, on the authority of the Minorite, Bonaventure of S. Bernardino (Trattato della Chiesa), that the Pope can dispose of the whole “Temporali” of kings and princes, their authority and possessions, whenever, in his judgment, the good of the Church requires it. The work of a French writer, Maupied, gives the Fathers of the Society of Jesus the desired opportunity of again commending their Magna Charta– their favourite Bull, Unam Sanctam– as the completest exposition of the relations of Church and State (p. 213): “Fall down on your faces, and adore your lord and master in Rome, who can after his pleasure depose you, deprive you of your rights and bishoprics, and bid you draw or sheathe the sword.” This is a compendium of the teaching the Civiltà addresses to princes and magistrates. If Papal Infallibility is defined by the Council as an article of faith, the whole system is sanctioned, down to its extremest consequences, and the Jesuits will not fail to point to it as proving that their political doctrines also are now approved.
Under such auspices does the Council open, when the Bishops, according to the Civiltà– “the faithful echo of the Holy See,” – have only to say Yea and Amen to the teachings and commands of their master. Never in her whole history has the Church had a severer task imposed upon her, or passed through a more perilous and decisive crisis than the present. It is not only a question of internal freedom; it is, above all, the question whether she is to be involved in an endless war with the political order and civilisation of the modern world, or by keeping to the really religious sphere, and thus guarding her rightful independence, is for the future too to fulfil throughout the widest area her blessed mission towards mankind. The Council, which has to decide on this alternative, acquires a weight and significance such as none had before it.
First Letter
Rome, December 1869.– The Council is opened. It is, we may say, in full swing, and the situation has to a certain degree revealed itself. Two great questions are in every mind and on every tongue —first, “Wherein will the freedom promised to the Council consist, and how far will it extend?” and secondly, “Will Papal Infallibility be erected into a dogma?”
As regards the freedom of the Council, the position of the episcopate is in some respects better and in others worse than at Trent three centuries ago. Then the Italians had the most complete and undeniable preponderance over the Spanish and French Prelates, who were the only others that came into the reckoning at all. The opposition of the latter could at best only stop the passing of some particular decrees, but, generally speaking, whatever the legates and their devoted troop of Italian Prelates desired was carried, and as they desired it. The numerical relations are entirely changed now, and there is a far more comprehensive representation of National Churches. The Italian Bishops, even if unanimous among themselves, do not form a third of the whole Synod. But what they have lost in numbers is abundantly made up by the lion's share the Papal Court seizes beforehand for itself, and thereby for the Italian prelatura.
The first step taken, and the regulations already made by Pius ix. for the present Council, prove that it is not to follow the precedents of the ancient free Councils, or even of the Tridentine. At Trent all decrees still ran in the name of the Council. “The Œcumenical Tridentine Synod, lawfully assembled in the Holy Ghost, ordains and decrees, etc.,” is the heading of every session and its decrees. Very different is to be the arrangement at Rome. There has already been distributed to the Bishops a Methodus in primâ Sessione Concilii observanda, which prescribes thus: “The Pope will hand over the decrees to the Secretary or another Bishop to read, who reads them with the heading, ‘Pius, Episcopus, servus servorum Dei, sacro approbante Concilio, ad perpetuam rei memoriam.’ ” After reading them he asks the Cardinals and Bishops whether they assent. If all say Placet, the Pope declares the decrees carried “nemine dissentiente.” If some answer, Non placet, he mentions the number, and adds, “Nosque, sacro approbante Concilio, illa ita decernimus, statuimus atque sancimus ut lecta sunt.” This is the formula first introduced after Gregory vii.'s time, when the Papacy had climbed to its mediæval eminence. The first to use it was Alexander iii., at the Roman Synod of 1079.13 It stands in glaring contrast to the practice of the ancient Synods for the first thousand years of Church history, which drew up and promulgated all their decisions freely, independently, and in their own name. Here the Pope appears as the author of the decrees, the one authoritative legislator, who out of courtesy allows the Bishops to express their opinions, but finally decides himself, in the plenitude of his sovereign power, as seems good to him. In another Papal document communicated to the Bishops it is said still more emphatically, “Nos deinde supremam nostram sententiam edicemus eamque nunciari et promulgari mandabimus, hâc adhibitâ solemni formulâ, Decreta modo lecta, etc.” Meanwhile one concession has been made, which might possibly have some value: the Pope has declared that, though the right of initiating measures belongs entirely to himself, he is willing to allow the Bishops to exercise it. This would give them the opportunity of at least bringing forward for discussion some of the worst evils – such as, e. g., what many of them feel to be the hateful nuisance of the Index – and preparing remedies. But then it must be borne in mind that on every question the Curia has at its disposal a majority of Prelates, who are its own creatures, and many of them in its pay. With the help of this troop of devoted followers it can get rid of every disagreeable proposal before it is even submitted to discussion.
The Sessions of the Council are solemnities only held for the formal promulgation of decrees already discussed and passed; the real business is done in the previous Congregations. Every Bishop who wants to speak there is to give notice the day before, but those who wish to speak without having given notice are not to be prevented. A congregation of twenty-four members is to be chosen by the Bishops from among themselves, for the purpose of specially investigating subjects on which differences of opinion have been expressed, and reporting on them. At least nine-tenths of the Prelates are condemned to silence simply from being unable to speak Latin readily and coherently through want of regular practice. And to this must be added the diversities of pronunciation. It is impossible, e. g., that Frenchmen or Italians should understand an Englishman's Latin even for a minute.14
There will no doubt be some subjects on which the Bishops may really speak and determine freely. But the moment a question in any way affects the interests and rights of the Roman Curia,