The Boys of '98. Otis James. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Otis James
Издательство: Public Domain
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Жанр произведения: Зарубежная классика
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isbn: http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/30684
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telegraphic news from Spain was to the effect that the Minister of Marine had cabled the commander of the torpedo flotilla at the Canaries not to proceed to Havana; that the government arsenal was being run night and day in the manufacture of small arms, and that infantry and cavalry rifles were being purchased in Germany.

      The United States revenue cutter cruiser McCulloch was ordered to proceed from Aden, in the Red Sea, to Hongkong, in order that she might be attached to the Asiatic squadron, if necessary.

      March 18. The cruiser Amazonas, purchased from the Brazilian government, was formally transferred to the United States at Gravesend, England, to be known in the future as the New Orleans.

      March 19. The Maine court of inquiry concluded its work. The general sentiments of the people, as voiced by the newspapers, were that war with Spain was near at hand, and this belief was strengthened March 24th, when authority was given by the Navy Department for unlimited enlistment in all grades of the service, when the revenue service was transferred from the Treasury to the Naval Department, and arrangements made for the quick employment of the National Guards of the States and Territories.

      March 24. The report of the Maine court of inquiry arrived at Washington.

      March 27. Madrid correspondents of Berlin newspapers declared that war with the United States was next to certain. The United States cruisers San Francisco and New Orleans sailed from England for New York, and the active work of mining the harbours of the United States coast was begun.

      March 28. The President sent to Congress, with a message, the report of the Maine court of inquiry, as has been stated in a previous chapter.

      March 29. Resolutions declaring war on Spain, and recognising the independence of Cuba, were introduced in both houses of Congress.

      With the beginning of April it was to the public generally as if the war had already begun.

      In every city, town, or hamlet throughout the country the newspapers were scanned eagerly for notes of warlike preparation, and from Washington, sent by those who were in position to know what steps were being taken by the government, came information which dashed the hopes of those who had been praying that peace might not be broken.

      There had been a conference between the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the chairman of the committee on ways and means, regarding the best methods of raising funds for the carrying on of a war. A joint board of the army and navy had met to formulate plans of defence, and a speedy report was made to Secretary Long.

      Instructions were sent by the State Department to all United States consuls in Cuba to be prepared to leave the island at any moment, and to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to Havana in order to embark for the United States.

      April 2. A gentleman in touch with public affairs wrote from Washington as follows:

      “To-day’s developments show that there is only the very faintest hope of peace. Unless Spain yields war must come. The administration realises that as fully as do members of Congress.

      “The orders sent by the State Department to all our consuls in Cuba, especially those in the interior, to hold themselves in readiness to leave their positions and proceed to Havana, show that the department looks upon war as a certainty, and has taken all proper precautions for the safety of its agents.

      “Such an order, it is unnecessary to say, would not have been issued unless a crisis was imminent, and the State Department, as well as other branches of the government, has now become convinced that peace cannot much longer be maintained, and that the safety of the consular agents is a first consideration.

      “General Lee has also been advised that he should be ready to leave as soon as notified, and that the American newspaper correspondents now in Havana must prepare themselves to receive the notification of instant departure.

      “The Secretary of the Navy has instructed the Boston Towboat Company, which corporation had charge of the wrecking operations on the U. S. S. Maine, to suspend work at once. The Secretary of War has authorised an allotment of one million dollars from the emergency fund for the office of the chief of engineers, and this amount will be expended in purchasing material for the torpedo defences connected with the seacoast fortifications. The United States naval attaché at London has purchased a cruiser of eighteen hundred tons displacement, capable of a speed of sixteen knots, and the vessel will put to sea immediately. The Spanish torpedo flotilla is reported as having arrived at the Cape Verde Islands.”

      April 4. Senators Perkins, Mantle, and Rawlins spoke in the Senate, charging Spain with the murder of the sailors of the Maine, claiming that it was properly an act of war, and insisting that the United States should declare for the independence of Cuba and armed intervention.

      April 5. Senator Chandler announced as his belief that the United States was justified in beginning hostilities, and Senators Kenny, Turpie, and Turner made powerful speeches in the same line, fiercely denouncing Spain. General Woodford was instructed by cable to be prepared to ask of the Madrid government his passports at any moment.

      Marine underwriters, believing that war was inevitable, doubled their rates. The merchants and manufacturers’ board of trade of New York notified Congress and the President that it believed Spain was responsible for the blowing up of the Maine; that the independence of Cuba should be recognised, and that it should be brought about by force of arms, if necessary.

      April 7. The representatives of six great powers met at the White House in the hope of being able to influence the President for peace. In closing his address to the diplomats, Mr. McKinley said:

      “The government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made in behalf of the powers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavours to fulfil a duty to humanity by ending a situation, the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable.”

      Americans made haste to leave Cuba, after learning that Consul-General Lee had received orders to set sail from Havana on or before the ninth. The American consul at Santiago de Cuba closed the consulate in that city.

      Solomon Berlin, appointed consul at the Canary Islands, was, by the State Department, ordered not to proceed to his post, and he remained at New York.

      The Spanish consul at Tampa, Florida, left that town for Washington, by order of his government.

      The following cablegram gives a good idea of the temper of the Spanish people:

      “London, April 7. – A special dispatch from Madrid says that the ambassadors of France, Germany, Russia, and Italy waited together this evening upon Señor Gullon, the Foreign Minister, and presented a joint note in the interests of peace.

      “Señor Gullon, replying, declared that the members of the Spanish Cabinet were unanimous in considering that Spain had reached the limit of international policy in the direction of conceding the demands and allowing the pretensions of the United States.”

      April 9. Guards about the United States legation in Madrid were trebled. General Blanco, captain-general of Cuba, issued a draft order calling on every able-bodied man, between the ages of nineteen and forty, to register for immediate military duty. At ten o’clock in the morning, Consul-General Lee, accompanied by British Consul Gollan, called on General Blanco to bid him good-bye. The captain-general was too busy to receive visitors. General Lee left the island at six o’clock in the evening.

      April 11. The President sent a message, together with Consul Lee’s report, to the Congress, and Senator Chandler thus analysed it:

      First: A graphic and powerful description of the horrible condition of affairs in Cuba.

      Second: An assertion that the independence of the revolutionists should not be recognised until Cuba has achieved its own independence beyond the possibility of overthrow.

      Third: An argument against the recognition of the Cuban republic.

      Fourth: As to intervention in the interest of humanity, that is well enough,