At this point we may remark, that as far back as 1848, the same year that the Peace Congress was held in Brussels, Feb. 2nd, a treaty (the Guadaloupe-Hidalgo Treaty) was concluded between the United States of America and Mexico, containing a clause that a committee of arbitration shall settle, not only such differences as may arise directly concerning that treaty, but also shall, as the highest authority, adjudicate as far as possible all disputes which may arise between the high contracting States.3
Switzerland concluded, July 20th, 1864, a similar treaty with the Hawaian Islands, and on October 30th with San Salvador.4
Siam, whose monarch has given many proofs of sympathy for Oskar II., concluded a similar treaty, May 18th, 1868, with the United Kingdoms, and also with Belgium, Aug. 29th of the same year.5 The Central and South American Republics, Honduras, and the United States of Colombia did the same when on April 10th, 1882, they signed an arbitration treaty between themselves.6
Since that time this vigorous idea has grown into the Central and South American Arbitration League, and is now making good way towards being applied to the whole of America.
The question now is, whether the value of peace treaties, in general or in particular, which are established between mutually distant small States can be estimated as highly as the good intention of their creation, which is habitually acknowledged to be good? Are they something to be depended upon? Will they be carried into effect?
That depends in the first place upon what is meant by peace treaties.
If reference is made to certain international settlements which the conquered, with hatred in their hearts, bleeding, upon their knees were forced to accept, we may at once grant that they imply no security for peace, but, on the contrary, are a fresh source of warlike complications.
Thus, for example, the conclusion of peace which France was forced to sign at Versailles, Feb. 26th, 1871, and by which Alsace-Lorraine was torn from France, became a volcano which now for nineteen years has held the nations in suspense and unrest, and still threatens to ruin Europe.
Neither would it be advisable to set much store on such obligations as the Western Powers undertook in the agreement which goes by the name of the November Treaty, to help us to defend the northern part of our peninsula against Russia; because a guaranteed neutrality implies in reality more danger than safety, if the guarantee is not mutual; that is, in this instance, if our eastern neighbour is not included in the guarantee; which is so far from being the case that the treaty, on the contrary, is a source of menace and distrust to him.7
With respect to certain treaties of alliance, whose object is to collect the greatest possible number of bayonets as a mutual security against other powers, who, on their side, seek to protect themselves by uniting their forces, nobody can see in them anything else than a guarantee for an armed peace, which, by the necessity of its nature, leads to war.
If, on the contrary, by peace treaties are meant such international contracts as are not written in blood; such as relate to trade and commerce, industry, art, science and so on, it would be in vain to seek for a single instance of the breach of contract, either on the side of the weaker or the stronger.
Neither can any example in our time be pointed to of open violation of the rights of a small country in its quality of an independent State, as long as these rights have stood under the mutual guarantee of the great powers.
As evidence to the contrary, the London treaty of May 8th, 1853, has been adduced, which was intended to secure Denmark's neutrality; the Treaty of Paris, April 14th, 1856, respecting the Black Sea; and the fifth article of the Peace of Prague in 1866. But here the fault lies in a misunderstanding.
What the Treaty of London established was not the indivisibility of Denmark, but of the Dano-German monarchy. The German territory was to be fast linked to the Danish. This was admitted, as a principle, by the treaty to be fitting and right, but the treaty contained no trace of stipulations as to guarantee.
With respect to Russia's breach of treaty of the stipulations as to her banishment from the Black Sea as a military power,8 it must be remembered that the representatives of the powers, and of Russia also, on January 17th, 1871, signed a protocol, whereby it was settled as an essential axiom in international law, that no power can absolve itself from the obligations which are entered into by treaty without the consent of the contracting parties. Therefore Russia openly acknowledged that her declaration of not choosing to abide by the injunctions stipulated for in the Treaty of Paris respecting the Black Sea, was precipitate, and that, consequently, the treaty was permanently in force until it was formally abrogated. This took place in the new treaty of March 3rd, of the same year. Besides, here comes in what was said above about the value of such treaties as are concluded after brute force has determined the issue. And this not only was the case in the Black Sea stipulations, but also with respect to the unfulfilled promises of article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, whereby the Danish people was to be given the opportunity for a plebiscite in determining upon their reunion with Denmark. As to the peace treaties between the lesser States, which certainly have important trade relations one with another, but which, on account of their mutually distant position, cannot reasonably be expected to go to war with each other, it is true that one cannot in general attribute any special importance to them. Nothing is gained by over-estimating their value. But they deserve to be brought forward as enrichments of international law and guide-posts for other States. And that the small States need not wait until the great ones are ready to unite appears just as much in accordance with the nature of the case as with the interests of their own well-being.
Calvo, undeniably the first authority in these matters, emphasizes as a significant fact, that no single example can be pointed to in which States, after their mutual disputes have been referred to the consideration or judgment of arbitrators, have sought to withdraw from the operation of the decision. And according to Henry Richard and other authorities, by allowing international questions to be settled by arbitration, at least in sixty-seven instances, disputes of a menacing character have been averted.
I shall not here give a detailed account of all these instances, but only with the greatest conciseness refer to some of them.
In 1794 a contest between England and the United States of America respecting St. Croix river was settled by arbitration; in 1803 France was in the same way condemned to pay 18 million francs to the United States of America for unlawful seizure of vessels; in 1818 a threatening dispute between Spain and the United States of America was settled by arbitration, and a contention between these and England was arranged by the Emperor of Russia, who was chosen as arbitrator, etc.
The best known of such disputes was the so-called Alabama question, which threatened a desolating world-war. This affair sprang out of the North American civil war 1861-65. The Southern States had privateers built in England, among which the Alabama especially wrought great mischief to the Northerners. The Government of the Union considered that England had broken her neutrality in allowing the equipment of the privateer, and requested compensation.
A bitter feeling grew up and war appeared inevitable. But on January 24th, 1869, an agreement was happily entered into, which, with fresh negotiations, led to the Washington treaty, May 8th, 1871. In harmony with this the dispute was referred for settlement to a Court of Arbitration consisting of five members, of which England and the United States each chose one, and the neutral states of Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil, likewise each chose one. These five met on December 15th, 1871, as a tribunal of arbitration, at Geneva, and delivered their judgment on September 14th following (four votes against England's one), that the English Government had made a breach in its duty as a neutral power with respect to some of the privateers under consideration, and therefore England would have to pay an indemnity of 15½ million dollars to the United States.9
England