The authors believe that it is possible to limit situations in space-time. Therefore, this approach has an advantage over classical risk analysis, which is only a snapshot at a given moment; we are therefore obliged to redo the risk analysis periodically in view of changing conditions, context and functioning.
Chapter 3, particularly well developed, presents the hazard hyperspace grid, which is the qualification tool. It contains the five characteristics mentioned above. The analysis of major accidents shows that there are several causal chains called SCDs or systemic cindynogenic deficits: four cultural (conviction of absence of peril, unfavorable to complexity, no-communication attitude, no-attention to the outside world), two organizational (production dominates risk management, dilution of responsibilities) and four managerial (absence of a feedback policy, no-risk management methodology, no training for risk management and safety personal, insufficient knowledge and lack of preparation for crisis management).
Chapter 4 provides decision support. It builds the deficit matrix and the dissonance matrix from which a decision-maker will decide whether or not to mitigate hazards, with the aim of minimizing the consequences of deficits and dissonances. We are not sure that this is an optimization. The decision-maker lacks quantitative benchmarks on both the likelihood and magnitude of the consequences. Their decision could lead to cost overruns or security under the target. This seems to be the weak point of the approach, which can certainly be improved.
In conclusion, the authors believe that the cindynics approach is mature and allows us to understand and explain how dangerous situations are created. We also think this for a posteriori analyses in view of the three applications discussed in the book. The authors state that a priori analysis is possible, which is highly probable, but we think that the aid to the decision-maker should be reinforced. This can only be done if we move towards quantification.
At the end of the book, three technological accidents are dealt with: the Bhopal disaster, the Queen Mary II footbridge and Deep Water Horizon. The reader will find the direct application of the chapters of the book. The results highlight the deficiencies, the main risk factors, for example, for Deep Water Horizon: production pressure and lack of physical understanding of the phenomena; for Bhopal: conviction of absence of peril, lack of feedback and so on, but no mention is made of toxic gas dispersion models.
Several perspectives are proposed by the book. It seems to us that the priorities are the following:
– to develop applications, in any sector;
– to develop links with the SWOT method (Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats, which is a business strategy tool for determining options and identifying factors that are favorable or unfavorable to the achievement of objectives);
– to help the decision-maker choose options to reduce risk;
– to develop and analyze complexity in the design phase.
The cindynics approach is clearly applicable, it is mature, and it can be used to better understand the organization’s risk factors, to better approach a design process.
This book is, at the same time, a state-of-the-art of knowledge, a synthesis and a working tool. It should be of interest to a wide audience of actors involved in risk management. It is a good answer to many topics for managers, project managers, design engineers, feedback analysts, authorities, researchers and PhD students, among others, in short, for all practitioners, whether they are beginners or experienced.
André LANNOY
Vice President of the Institut pour la Maîtrise des Risques
July 2021
Preface
Danger existed long before man, who, in order to survive, was forced to face it by taking risks.
A bit of history
Ever since man has existed, he has always been confronted with dangers that he had to face if he wanted to survive, leaving him mostly helpless and afraid of the forces of nature. Ancient populations, considering dangers as a divine punishment, devoted themselves to oracles [DES 03].
Later, the needs of development, domination and trade brought new forms of danger. Towards the end of the Middle Ages, the notion of risk emerged when, in order to obtain a better situation, humans sought to confront danger. It was then considered as an accident that man could try to prevent. It was only on the basis of the geometry of chance, initiated in 1650 by Blaise Pascal, that a first stage of probabilistic studies led to the establishment of mortality statistics [LEB 00]. Since the 18th century, theology and philosophy could not justify such a manifestation of divine anger, it was only after the earthquake that struck Lisbon in 1755 that the notion of responsibility for the positive and negative consequences of personal decisions appeared. The concept of risk was then born, and gradually, damage ceased to be perceived as divine punishment.
To counter the danger, each human being, each community, and then each profession has therefore invented, adapted and perfected solutions according to its specificity, the history of the nature of the difficulties encountered and the types of risks.
However, since its appearance at the end of the Middle Ages, the notion of risk has gradually obscured the concept of danger because it “has been progressively enriched by its contact with the disciplines that it has invaded, namely in turn probabilistic calculation, game theories, economics, engineering and technological risk control, psychology and risk perception, and sociology” [KER 11].
All of these developments in the area of risk have led to a multitude of concepts and methods1 that make it possible to achieve safety adapted to the context of activities, better operating safety of the equipment used and an ability to assess and control risks.
However, have we really lost awareness of the notion of danger?
For example, let us look at recent milestones of progress:
1950 to 1970
The increasing number of technical failures in electronic equipment prompted a great deal of research.
Although they existed long before our era [LAN 18], approaches to operational safety and risk control were structured from the 1950s onwards. New technologies (high-performance weapon systems, telecommunications, etc.) were developed, in particular with numerous forms of electronic equipment. The reliability of new equipment could not be compared to that of mechanical equipment, leading to an increase in technical failures. Based on this observation, many research programs were launched within companies operating in the fields of telecommunications, nuclear and space. After these years of research, the overall number of accidents was considerably reduced between 1950 and 1970.
1970 to 1986
In the face of a series of disasters, research focused on human failures.
This period was unfortunately marked by a series of technological disasters (Flixborough, Seveso, Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Chernobyl, Challenger). These unexpected crises highlighted the fact that human-generated failures at the operator level had to be added to technical failures. This new consideration also contributed to the reduction in the number of accidents and disasters.
1986 to 1990
Research