Power Magnetic Devices. Scott D. Sudhoff. Читать онлайн. Newlib. NEWLIB.NET

Автор: Scott D. Sudhoff
Издательство: John Wiley & Sons Limited
Серия:
Жанр произведения: Техническая литература
Год издания: 0
isbn: 9781119674634
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concrete terms, suppose we wished to minimize volume and loss for some electromagnetic device. If our first objective was volume and our second objective was loss, we would repeatedly minimize loss with different constraints on the volume. In this case, each ε value would correspond to a different volume. For each numerically different volume constraint, we would get the corresponding loss and thereby—one single‐objective optimization at a time—build up a Pareto‐optimal front between volume and loss.

      As it turns out, GAs are well‐suited to compute Pareto‐optimal sets. This is because they operate on a population. In multi‐objective optimizations, the population of designs can be made to conform to the Pareto‐optimal set. This allows a GA to determine the Pareto‐optimal set and Pareto‐optimal front in a single analysis without requiring the solution of a separate optimization for every point on the front as is needed in the weighted sum method, ε‐constraint method, and weighted metric methods.

      GAs are well‐suited for multi‐objective optimization, and there are a large number of approaches that can be taken. The goal in all of these methods is to evolve the population so that it becomes a Pareto‐optimal set.

      Multi‐objective GAs fall into two classes, nonelitist and elitist. The elitist strategies are particularly effective because they explicitly identify and preserve, when possible, the nondominated individuals. Elitist strategies include the elitist nondominated sorting GA (NSGA‐II), distance‐based Pareto GA, and the strength Pareto GA [11]. In order to keep the present discussion limited that we might soon start discussing device design, we will somewhat arbitrarily focus our attention on the elitist NSGA‐II.

function R=front(S) if ∣S∣=1 R=S else i=floor(∣S∣/2) T=front(S1:i) B=front(Si+1|S|) N=solutions of B not dominated by any solution of T R=T ∪ N end end

      (1.8-1)equation

      In executing this example, calls 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, and 15 return nondominated sets because their input and output argument set size is 1. In calls 3, 6, 10, and 13, no member of an input set T can be dominated by the corresponding set B because of the ordering with respect to the first objective. The return arguments of calls 3, 6, 10, and 13 cannot have dominated members because the input sets to these calls (T and B) were nondominated, no member of T can be dominated by a member of B, and every member of B is checked against every member of T. Thus, proceeding from the bottom of Figure 1.18 to the top as subroutine calls are made, we see that the process involves a gradual combining and sifting of smaller nondominated sets to yield a larger nondominated set.

Schematic illustration of application of Kung’s method.

      In addition to Kung’s method, two more processes will be needed in order to set forth the elitist NSGA‐II. The first of these is nondominated sorting (NDS). In order to understand NDS, let us consider again Figure 1.15 with population P = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. As we have already discussed, the nondominated set is {1,6,8}, which was found using Kung’s algorithm. Let us consider this set front 1, denoted F1. Now suppose we remove the members of F1 from P, and find the nondominated set of the remaining population by again applying Kung’s algorithm. This will yield the second front, given by F2 = {2, 3, 7}. Now let us once more consider the population P but now less the members in F1 and F2. Finding the nondominated set of the remaining population by again applying Kung’s algorithm yields the third front, F3 = {4, 5}. In this way, it is possible to associate with every member of the population a rank with regard to which front they are associated. This ranking will be used to compare different members of the population in order to determine which members will become a part of the mating pool.

      Although a population member on the first front can be said to be superior to a member on the second front, the question arises as to how to compare solutions on the same front. This issue will