It is an open ended assignment – the civil authorities can seek assistance of the army in varied other fields as well. During the Commonwealth Games at Delhi, the army was tasked to construct a foot bridge against tight time frame as the one constructed by civil agencies had collapsed. Similarly, the army provided uniformed manpower for awards ceremonies. Construction of pontoon bridges to facilitate movement of pilgrims during Kumbh Melas is a regular task assigned to the army.
Military Civic Action
The concept of military civic action encompasses all activities performed by the military for the socio-economic betterment of the people. In the United States, civic action has been defined as – “Use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others, contributing to economic and social development which would also improve the standing of the military forces with the population”.
Thus, civic action has twin objectives of helping the population and improving the image of the military. As these tasks do not fall within the ambit of conventional charter of duties of the army, a certain degree of discretion is available to the army. Its participation is comparatively on voluntary basis, driven by a sense of concern for fellow countrymen.
Indian army considers civic action to be an important part of its duty to the nation. Since Independence, it has been making enormous contribution towards economic development of remote and under-developed areas. Through constructive participation in nation building tasks, it has been performing the role of a catalysing agent for national integration, education and modernisation. In insurgency prone areas, civic action forms an integral part of the overall politico-military initiative to win the hearts and minds of the affected people. In inaccessible areas where civil institutions are non-functional, it runs schools, provides basic medical cover, runs water supply schemes, constructs play grounds and provides vocational training to local youth.
The Way Forward
Military is the embodiment of a nation’s conscience and will. Therefore, its role assignment deserves due deliberation. Being a part of the apparatus of the legitimate government, military owes allegiance to the people of the country. J.P. Moreigne’s describes it aptly when he says that a nation’s army constitutes, from a sociological point of view, a human collectivity which is structured into a society by the ends of which it has to serve.
Undoubtedly, internal security is as important as external security. However, it must never be forgotten that external security can be ensured only by the armed forces whereas other organisations can be trained and equipped to undertake internal security assignments. Although employment of the army on counter-insurgency duties cannot be avoided, it should be restricted to the barest minimum when nation’s survival gets threatened. As every counter insurgency operation becomes a protracted affair, the army should be replaced by para-military forces once the situation stabilises. For that purpose, necessary competence must be developed in para-military forces. The army should be used as a shock-action therapy and withdrawn at the earliest. In any case, the role of the army in controlling internal strife should never be allowed to get institutionalised.
The army’s assistance in the maintenance of law and order to prevent anarchy can never be questioned. However, it should be summoned as a last resort. Recurrent employment in law and order duties can prove taxing to a soldier psychologically. Frequent switching of roles can dilute a soldier’s focus on his primary task. Some soldiers may also acquire political leanings and even ambitions, as has been witnessed in many developing countries. Worse, state police forces fail to develop their own competence. Everyone looks up to the army to restore order and the civil law enforcement agencies lose credibility and respect of the population.
Army’s assistance in disaster relief brings the army and the society closer to each other. It improves army’s image. It is the best possible example of soldiers’ concern for fellow countrymen. But frequent employment on disaster relief duties may result in a loss of training time. It may also breed a certain degree of complacency in civil agencies and over-dependence on the army. It will be better for the civil agencies to develop adequate in-house capacity to be able to handle most of the emergencies themselves.
As regards military civic action, the army should continue to participate in well-selected activities. However, two points need to be kept in mind. First, only the effort that the army can spare without affecting its operational efficiency should be diverted towards civic action tasks. As warned by Hugh Hanning, civic action must not be construed as substitution of warfare by welfare. Secondly, since most civic action functions normally fall under the charter of the civil administration, army’s entry should not be seen as a failure of the civil agencies to do their job. Therefore, selection of civic action programmes should be such that they do not undermine the civil administration – civic action should supplement the efforts of civil agencies and not attempt to replace them.
Finally, it must never be forgotten that the raison d’être for the existence of the army is to ensure national defence against external threats. Nothing should be done to dilute that focus. The army must be kept free of all avoidable non-military commitments to allow it to remain prepared for its primary task. More importantly, excessive participation in aid to civil authority commitments can have an adverse affect on the apolitical nature of the army. It may start entertaining ideas of a permanent role for itself in civilian functions. “India is notable among all the new states for the stable subordination of the military to the civil power,” remarked Edward Shils. Nothing should be done to upset this well established military-civil equation.
Need for a Specialised Force for Internal Unrests
Policy and methodology to counter the Naxalite threat have been subjects of intense debate recently. Army’s reluctance to get embroiled has been questioned in some government quarters. Sadly, opinions are being expressed, both by military and non-military experts, more as short term fire-fighting solutions rather than well analysed long term strategy.
It requires no crystal gazing to foresee increasing unrest amongst various sections of Indian society. Awareness has fired the urge of the people for a higher standard of living and enhanced opportunities for advancement. As the country fails to ensure that fruits of development get equitably and evenly distributed across the complete spectrum of society, disadvantaged segments lose confidence in the fairness of governance. They resort to violent means to wrest their perceived share of resources from an apathetic government. Naxalite unrest is a manifestation of the same challenge to the lawful authority of the state. Needless to say, in addition to effective use of force, convincing measures have to be initiated at political, economical, social and cultural levels to restore credibility of governance amongst the aggrieved people.
This article restricts itself to the nature and type of force that should be employed to counter Naxalites. As the alienated populace is highly motivated and possesses intimate knowledge of the local terrain, a well equipped and suitably trained force becomes an absolute necessity. India has three broad options open to it – employment of an existing central police force (CPO) with additional training and equipment; deployment of the army to crush armed resistance; and raising of a special force for the assignment. Each of these have been analysed below to identify the most suitable option.
Use of CPO
The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is currently countering the Naxalites. CRPF came into existence as Crown Representative’s Police on 27th July 1939. It became the Central Reserve Police Force on enactment of the CRPF Act on 28th December 1949. Over the last sixty years, it has grown into sizeable entity with 207 battalions. It is a federal law enforcement agency and a police force. It has been organised, equipped, structured and trained to supplement efforts of state police forces in the maintenance of law and order.
Presently, a crisis of identity is overwhelming CRPF. A part of the blame for the prevailing confusion about its exact character can