Do you think the nations with permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council have too much influence?
The Security Council has a lot of problems. One of its problems is that it’s not powerful enough and it can only really call for countries to do things; and if they don’t want to do these things there’s nothing the Security Council can do about it. It’s also internally divided so it’s rare that all five permanent members can agree on some policy. Since they all have a veto, in most instances the Security Council is irrelevant. I think that’s unfortunate and that the veto ought to be abolished. The permanent members of the Security Council have undue power because they don’t reflect the geopolitical realities of our temporary world. It’s crazy that Brazil and India are not permanent members of the Security Council. And if you’re going to put in India, you might as well put in Pakistan as well. I could think of at least three major powers that should be added as permanent members, and their absence has made the organization very unbalanced.
Can you talk about how the veto has been used by members of the UN Security Council to prevent action against genocidal regimes?
It certainly prevented intervention to stop Milošević’s actions in the former Yugoslav Republic because of the Russian veto. Syria is another example. The Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria is genocidal, and the world hasn’t been able to do anything about it because of the Russian and Chinese veto. ■
BRIDGET CONLEY
Bridget Conley is research director at the World Peace Foundation (WPF). She specializes in mass atrocities, genocide, museums and memorialization. Before she joined the WPF she served as research director for the US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Committee on Conscience for 10 years, where she helped establish the Museum’s program on contemporary genocide.
What are some policies that have helped prevent potential genocides in the past?
In most cases, there is a tradeoff between using influence to condemn and isolate a regime or other actors that might be willing to use violence against civilians, and actively engaging such regimes to resolve the core political crisis that drove them to pursue such policies. It must be made clear that atrocities are not an outcome that can be tolerated, but this is balanced with an approach that does not push a regime or other actors further into a corner where they feel like they have nothing left to lose. It’s that tradeoff that is very difficult to manage, and it’s rarely managed well. The people who are strong advocates for intervention will always be more in favor of cracking down on regimes, while there will always be another side that is willing to appease beyond the last moment. Wisdom often falls within the nuanced area in between, and rarely receives accolades from either side.
Do you believe that kind of nuance is often missing in public discussions in the media about how to stop genocide or mass atrocities?
Media discussions are rarely that helpful. The media tends to tilt towards paying attention to the more extreme positions: it’s either we’re against atrocities (which we all should be), or we are to accept them as a political reality. This isn’t necessary. You can be really critical of a regime while still engaging with it and working on ways to increase protections for civilians. This is what diplomats often try to do. But the discussions in the public realm seem to focus on two clear-cut opposing positions: you’re either for this or for that.
Do you think the public’s perception of the definition of genocide varies from the actual definition of genocide that was established in the 1948 Genocide Convention?
I think there is a wide variance between the public perception and the actual definition that was established at the Convention. In my opinion, the quirks of the Genocide Convention render it particularly difficult and possibly unhelpful to understanding campaigns of violence against civilians. I think there are better articulations of genocide. ‘Mass atrocities’ has been the more relevant term in many situations.
Are there times when crimes against humanity that don’t fit the exact definition of genocide are even worse than some previous examples that do fit the definition of genocide?
I once had a young student who, when I was giving a presentation on genocide, asked: ‘What about the slave trade? Wasn’t that genocide?’ I don’t think it was genocide, but I think 400 years of institutionalized dehumanization has its own exigencies. I think people have a responsibility to understand harms, rather than ranking harms. I think ranking harms is a very distasteful endeavor. For me, the challenge is to understand the harm being done to people and to work against this harm in whatever form it appears. That’s what social justice should be about, not about ranking harms.
Do you think it would be smart to add class and political organization to the number of victim groups (ethnic, racial, religious and national are the current groups listed in the international definition of genocide) listed when it relates to genocide?
No, and it’s not because I view class-based or politically motivated killings as less harmful than ethnic, racial, religious or national group-related killings; it’s because I think trying to correct the Genocide Convention is less of a fruitful path than trying to use other terms that we already have, like crimes against humanity. This already provides a legal path for the type of prevention and protection that might be necessary in some cases.
What is your opinion of the UN’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine? Is this a good idea?
I think that the core concepts and ideas of the Responsibility to Protect are deeply valuable and I think we have seen them play out as coalitions have been built around the idea. My caveat is that I do think it’s dangerous to create a policy spectrum that includes an authorization for war within a protection mandate. Military intervention should be held out of R2P as a separate way to engage in a conflict. I just don’t think it should live in the same house as prevention and a non-coercive response.
Do you think providing protections to the citizens of Benghazi would have been a better policy than helping to overthrow Muammar Qadafi’s regime in Libya?
I remember the time when Qadafi’s forces were slowly moving eastwards towards Benghazi and there were legitimate and strong fears that something terrifying would happen if they took it. There were some other towns that Qadafi’s forces had taken where massacres had not taken place, but the leadership in those towns had already fled, so Benghazi was seen as kind of the last stand for the resistance fighters. I do think there is logic to seeing Benghazi as a place where there was a strong imperative to provide protection for civilians. However, regime change is a very radical step.
You don’t have to be an apologist for Qadafi to say regime change wasn’t the right policy. Changing how a State functions is exceptionally difficult, and finding a new leader is a key part of that process. Often the new leader will repeat the old patterns of the leadership they have just overthrown. Political relationships are more complex than one person and if there is no structure to hold in place a different type of relationship then you get what happened to Libya after Qadafi was overthrown. The situation was very chaotic and highly lethal.
You seem to stress the importance of seeing conflicts on a country-by-country basis as opposed to seeing Sudan as another Rwanda, or Syria as another Iraq?
There are