Annie Heloise Abel
The American Indian as Participant in the Civil War
The Slaveholding Indians Series
Madison & Adams Press, 2021.
Contact: [email protected]
EAN: 4064066383152
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Table of Contents
I. The Battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn, and Its More Immediate Effects
II. Lane's Brigade and the Inception of the Indian
III. The Indian Refugees in Southern Kansas
IV. The Organization of the First Indian Expedition
V. The March to Tahlequah and the Retrograde Movement of the "White Auxiliary"
VI. General Pike in Controversy with General Hindman
VII. Organization of the Arkansas and Red River Superintendency
VIII. The Retirement of General Pike
IX. The Removal of the Refugees to the Sac and Fox Agency
X. Negotiations with Union Indians
XI. Indian Territory in 1863, January to June Inclusive
XII. Indian Territory in 1863, July to December Inclusive
XIII. Aspects, Chiefly Military, 1864-1865
I. THE BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE, OR ELKHORN, AND ITS MORE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS
The Indian alliance, so assiduously sought by the Southern Confederacy and so laboriously built up, soon revealed itself to be most unstable. Direct and unmistakable signs of its instability appeared in connection with the first real military test to which it was subjected, the Battle of Pea Ridge or Elkhorn, as it is better known in the South, the battle that stands out in the history of the War of Secession as being the most decisive victory to date of the Union forces in the West and as marking the turning point in the political relationship of the State of Missouri with the Confederate government.
In the short time during which, following the removal of General Frémont, General David Hunter was in full command of the Department of the West—and it was practically not more than one week—he completely reversed the policy of vigorous offensive that had obtained under men, subordinate to his predecessor.1 In southwest Missouri, he abandoned the advanced position of the Federals and fell back upon Sedalia and Rolla, railway termini. That he did this at the suggestion of President Lincoln2 and with the tacit approval of General McClellan3 makes no difference now, as it made no difference then, in the consideration of the consequences; yet the consequences were, none the less, rather serious. They were such, in fact, as to increase very greatly the confusion on the border and to give the Confederates that chance of recovery which soon made it necessary for their foes to do the work of Nathaniel Lyon all over again.
It has been most truthfully said4 that never, throughout the period of the entire war, did the southern government fully realize the surpassingly great importance of its Trans-Mississippi District; notwithstanding that when that district was originally organized,5 in January, 1862, some faint idea of what it might, peradventure, accomplish did seem to penetrate,6 although ever so vaguely, the minds of those then in authority. It was organized under pressure from the West as was natural, and under circumstances to which meagre and tentative reference has already been made in the first volume of this work.7 In the main, the circumstances were such as developed out of the persistent refusal of General McCulloch to coöperate with General Price.
There was much to be said in justification of McCulloch's obstinacy. To understand this it is well to recall that, under the plan, lying back of this first appointment to the Confederate command, was the expectation that he would secure the Indian Territory. Obviously, the best way to do that was to occupy it, provided the tribes, whose domicile it was, were willing. But, if the Cherokees can be taken to have voiced the opinion of all, they were not willing, notwithstanding that a sensationally reported8 Federal activity under Colonel James Montgomery,9 in the neighborhood of the frontier posts, Cobb, Arbuckle, and Washita, was designed to alarm them and had notably influenced, if it had not actually inspired, the selection and appointment of the Texan ranger.10
Unable, by reason of the Cherokee objection thereto, to enter the Indian country; because entrance in the face of that objection would inevitably force the Ross faction of the Cherokees and, possibly also, Indians of other tribes into the arms of the Union, McCulloch intrenched himself on its northeast border, in Arkansas, and there awaited a more favorable opportunity for accomplishing his main purpose. He seems to have desired the Confederate government to add the contiguous portion of Arkansas to his command, but in that he was disappointed.11 Nevertheless, Arkansas early interpreted his presence in the state to imply that he was there primarily for her defence and, by the middle of June, that idea had so far gained general acceptance that C.C. Danley, speaking for the Arkansas Military Board, urged President