Edward Foord
Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812
Published by Good Press, 2019
EAN 4064066231514
Table of Contents
CHAPTER I
THE PRELIMINARIES
The Russian Campaign of 1812 was the last and greatest of Napoleon's efforts to impose his dominion upon Continental Europe; and it resulted in perhaps the most tremendous overthrow that any world-conqueror has ever sustained. A review of the immediate causes of the mighty struggle is necessary and not without interest, but it is difficult, as one studies Napoleon's character, to resist the conclusion that it was inevitable. The career of the Corsican adventurer whom genius and good fortune had made Emperor of France, resembles the fateful development of a Greek tragedy. By 1812 his pride had reached its height. Whatever set itself in opposition to his will must be trodden under foot. Russia, impelled partly by a natural sense of independence, partly by economic causes, made up her mind to resist him, and the consequence was an attack upon her by the tyrant of south-western Europe.
The effects of the Continental system varied in different parts of Europe, but everywhere they were bad. France, wealthy in herself, and with the material advantage of being able to maintain her overgrown armies at free quarters in foreign countries, felt them least—a fact which probably accounts for Napoleon's long continuance in power. Elsewhere the pressure was cruel, especially in Sweden, which practically depended for economic existence upon her sea-borne commerce. Russia, though self-supporting as regards food supplies, also suffered materially from the cessation of her trade with Great Britain; and the classes which felt the pressure most were those of the nobles and merchants, which embodied and voiced such public opinion as existed in the country. There was also in Russia a healthy sense of independence, coupled with a feeling of possessing such strength as made destruction, at the hands even of Napoleon, impossible. Such opinions were certain to penetrate sooner or later to the Tzar and his advisers; and, in spite of much irresolution and diversity of views, they could not fail to exercise considerable influence. Besides, the commencement of a new independent Poland, in the shape of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, established by Napoleon on the western frontier of Russia, was an ever-present source of anger and uneasiness. The Grand Duchy was, to all intents and purposes, a military camp, a sort of French advanced guard against Russia. Within its bounds everything was subordinated to military organisation, and its large army, organised and trained on French principles, and with French aid, was a very real menace.
Napoleon's political marriage with Maria Louisa of Austria, at a moment when he was ostensibly negotiating for the hand of Alexander's sister, added to the Tzar's sense of his people's sufferings and his empire's danger a feeling of personal injury. Next year this was aggravated by Napoleon's abrupt annexation of the coast-lands of north-west Germany, including Oldenburg, whose ruler was Alexander's brother-in-law. In the beginning of 1811 the Tzar issued a commercial decree which virtually prohibited various French imports into Russia, and also permitted the import of Colonial goods under a neutral flag. The measure must, of course, have been under consideration for some time, and Russia's financial straits amply account for it, but coming as it did on the heels of Alexander's protests against the seizure of Oldenburg, it enraged Napoleon. In a letter to the King of Württemberg he described it as a declaration of hostility, and, since any movement in the direction of independence inevitably called down his furious wrath, he was probably right.
At the same time these events were scarcely the cause of hostilities—they merely hastened them. Whatever diplomacy might do, neither Napoleon nor Alexander had any belief in the permanence of the truce which had been called in 1807. Soon after his second marriage Napoleon had observed to Metternich that war with Russia was in the nature of things. The retention of strong garrisons in the Prussian fortresses on the Oder, the steady increase in the forces of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and the continued occupation of Danzig, almost on the Russian frontier, were measures which can hardly be regarded as directed otherwise than against Russia. Moreover, besides the troops of Napoleon's German vassals, an army of 100,000 Frenchmen occupied Germany. It is absurd to suggest, in the face of all this, that war was forced upon Napoleon by Russia—except, of course, in so far as independent action of any kind always challenged his hostility.
Whatever Alexander's personal feelings might be—and there is no doubt that he was to some extent fascinated by the French Emperor's personality—he was gradually forced into the conviction that peace was impossible. In 1810 he appointed as War-Minister General Barclay de Tolly, an officer who had greatly distinguished himself in the French and Swedish wars; and the reorganisation of the Russian forces was energetically proceeded with. Count Arakcheiev, Alexander's harsh and brutal, but undoubtedly industrious and energetic, minister, had already done much, especially in the direction of improving the arsenals and reserves of arms. Barclay's measures were steadily directed to preparing for a war on the western frontier. The country was surveyed, roads examined and improved, magazines formed, fortifications planned and begun, and, above all, troops steadily concentrated. Progress was, however, slow. Apart from the backward state of the country as a whole, divided counsels in the Imperial Cabinet, the poverty of the exchequer, and the strain of the long and by no means successful Turkish war, it was necessary to proceed cautiously, for fear of provoking Napoleon too soon into offensive action.
The preparations were, in fact, entirely defensive in character, and appear very modest beside Napoleon's vast armaments and fortifications on territory which was not his own. The Russian ministers, indeed, appear to have been generally rather over-confident of their country's ability to resist a French invasion. Some of them, at any rate, wished to take up arms in 1811, counting on the support of Austria and Prussia. They pointed out that Napoleon would calculate upon Russia's steady weakening owing to loss of trade, and that therefore speedy action was desirable. The Grand Chancellor, Count Rumiantzev, was a strong partisan of the French alliance. Alexander himself, though determined to stand firm against aggression, was not anxious for war, and apparently hoped that it might be avoided—as indeed it might have been, but for the fact that peace with England, which was desired by, and necessary to, Russia, implied from Napoleon's standpoint war with France. The impression which the Russian Government generally conveyed in foreign countries was one of great irresolution.
This impression was indeed somewhat erroneous. The war-party in Russia was by far the larger of the two into which public opinion was naturally divided, since it included nearly everyone whose interests were adversely affected by the Continental system—in other words, the majority of the nobles and merchants. It was, however, divided, comprising a narrowly patriotic section which looked merely to the preservation of Russian territory, and another, naturally smaller, consisting of men who saw more or less clearly that to ensure European peace Napoleon must be not merely repelled, but crushed once and for all. The peace-party though small was very influential, including the Chancellor Rumiantzev, Alexander's own mother, and his brother Constantine.
Ultimately, of course, everything depended upon the character of the Tzar, and this was such as to give the friends of France great hopes of being able to influence him. Alexander was essentially a dreamer, much under the influence of vaguely exalted aspirations which were terribly contrasted with the mass of selfishness, luxury, and brutality which environed and repelled him. He was impulsive rather than calmly and steadily determined, and both at Tilsit