Theodore Ayrault Dodge
The Campaign of Chancellorsville
Published by Good Press, 2019
EAN 4064066247140
Table of Contents
II. CONDITION OF THE COMBATANTS.
III. HOOKER AND THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
IV. THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.
VI. THE PROPOSED CAVALRY RAID.
VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING.
VIII. THE REAL MOVE BY THE RIGHT WING.
IX. LEE'S INFORMATION AND MOVEMENTS.
XI. THE POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.
XII. JACKSON'S MARCH, AND SICKLES'S ADVANCE.
XIII. HOOKER'S THEORIES AND CHANCES.
XIV. POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.
XV. THE SITUATION AT SIX O'CLOCK.
XVII. THE CONDUCT OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.
XXI. THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW.
XXVI. SEDGWICK'S CHANGE OF ORDERS.
XXVIII. SEDGWICK MARCHES TOWARDS HOOKER.
XXXIII. HOOKER'S FURTHER PLANS.
XXXIV. THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC RE-CROSSES.
XXXV. OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS.
XXXVI. HOOKER'S RESUME OF THE CAMPAIGN.
XXXVII. SOME RESULTING CORRESPONDENCE.
Transcriber's Appendix: Transcription notes
I. INTRODUCTION.
It must seem to the casual reader of the history of the war of 1861–65, that enough has already been written upon the campaign of Chancellorsville. And there are numerous brilliant essays, in the histories now before the public, which give a coup-d'oeil more or less accurate of this ten-days' passage of arms. But none of these spread before the reader facts sufficiently detailed to illustrate the particular theory advanced by each to account for the defeat of the Army of the Potomac on this field.
The stigma besmirching the character of the Eleventh Corps, and of Howard, its then commanding general, for a panic and rout in but a small degree owing to them; the unjust strictures passed upon Sedgwick for his failure to execute a practically impossible order; the truly remarkable blunders into which Gen. Hooker allowed himself to lapse, in endeavoring to explain away his responsibility for the disaster; the bare fact, indeed, that the Army of the Potomac was here beaten by Lee, with one-half its force; and the very partial publication, thus far, of the details of the campaign, and the causes of our defeat—may stand as excuse for one more attempt to make plain its operations to the survivors of the one hundred and eighty thousand men who there bore arms, and to the few who harbor some interest in the subject as mere history.
To say that Gen. Hooker lapsed into blunders in explaining his share in this defeat, is to use a form of words purposely tempered to the memory of a gallant soldier, who, whatever his shortcomings, has done his country signal service; and to avoid