Albert Taylor Bledsoe
An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will
Published by Good Press, 2019
EAN 4064066172909
Table of Contents
OF EDWARDS’ USE OF THE TERM CAUSE.
THE INQUIRY INVOLVED IN A VICIOUS CIRCLE.
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REGARDING VOLITION AS AN EFFECT.
OF THE MAXIM THAT EVERY EFFECT MUST HAVE A CAUSE.
OF THE APPLICATION OF THE MAXIM THAT EVERY EFFECT MUST HAVE A CAUSE.
OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE FEELINGS AND THE WILL.
OF THE LIBERTY OF INDIFFERENCE.
OF THE ARGUMENT FROM THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF GOD.
OF EDWARDS’ USE OF THE TERM NECESSITY.
OF NATURAL AND MORAL NECESSITY.
OF THE SELF-DETERMINING POWER.
OF THE DEFINITION OF A FREE AGENT.
OF THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
SECTION I.
OF THE POINT IN CONTROVERSY.
It is worse than a waste of time, it is a grievous offence against the cause of truth, to undertake to refute an author without having taken pains to understand exactly what he teaches. In every discussion, the first thing to be settled is the point in dispute; and if this be omitted, the controversy must needs degenerate into a mere idle logomachy. It seldom happens that any thing affords so much satisfaction, or throws so much light on a controversy, as to have the point at issue clearly made up, and constantly borne in mind.
What then, is the precise doctrine of the Inquiry which I intend to oppose? The great question is, says Edwards, what determines the will. It is taken for granted, on all sides, that the will is determined; and the only point is, or rather has been, as to what determines it. It is determined by the strongest motive, says one; it is not determined by the strongest motive, says another. But although the issue is thus made up in general terms, it is very far from being settled with any tolerable degree of clearness and precision; ample room is still left for all that loose and declamatory kind of warfare in which so many controversialists delight to indulge.
The question still remains to be settled, what is meant by determining the will? In regard to this point, the necessitarian does not seem to have a very clear and definite idea. “The object of our Inquiry,” says President Day, “is not to learn whether the mind acts at all. This no one can doubt. Nor is it to determine why we will at all. The very nature of the faculty of the will implies that we put forth volitions. But the real point of inquiry is, why we will one way rather than another; why we choose one thing rather than its opposite,” p. 42. One would suppose from this statement, that we have nothing to do with the question, why we put forth volitions, but exclusively with the question, why we will one way rather than another. Here the author’s meaning seems to be plain, and we may imagine that we know exactly where to find him; but,