Uncertain Democracy
Uncertain Democracy
U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution
Lincoln A. Mitchell
PENN
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia
Copyright © 2009 University of Pennsylvania Press
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher.
Published by
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Mitchell, Lincoln Abraham.
Uncertain democracy : U.S. foreign policy and Georgia’s Rose Revolution / Lincoln Mitchell.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8122-4127-3 (alk. paper)
1. Georgia (Republic)—Politics and government—1991– 2. Democracy—Georgia (Republic) 3. Elections—Georgia (Republic) 4. Georgia (Republic)—History—Rose Revolution, 2003. 5. United States—Foreign relations—Georgia (Republic) 6. Georgia (Republic)—Foreign relations—United States. I. Title.
JQ1759.7.A95M58 2008
| 947.5808 6—dc22 | 2008031043 |
Contents
1 Georgia and the Democracy Promotion Project
4 How Democratic Was the Rose Revolution?
6 The U.S. Role in the Rose Revolution
7 Georgia and the United States After the Revolution
8 Georgia and the Fading of the Color Revolutions
Postscript—War with Russia and Georgia’s Future
Preface
This book is called Uncertain Democracy for two reasons. First, years ago I promised myself that if I ever wrote a book about the Rose Revolution I would avoid a title with expressions or metaphors involving flowers or colors. Second, and probably of greater import, there remains an uncertain quality about Georgia’s Rose Revolution. It is still not clear whether democracy will develop in Georgia or to what extent the Rose Revolution was a democratic breakthrough.
Revolution or regime change was not the object of the years of democracy assistance programs funded by the United States in Georgia, nor was the Rose Revolution the product of years or even months of plotting by either Georgians or Americans. As I argue in this book, U.S.-funded democracy assistance programs had far more modest and ambiguous goals. This is not to say that these programs did not have an impact, but that the revolution, when it did come, surprised many. Fair elections, functioning political institutions, and a strong civil society were the stated goals of these programs, but it was thought these would come about gradually within the context of an evolving and democratizing political system in Georgia.
The Rose Revolution had something of an accidental quality for Georgian political activists, politicians, and others who led it. They sought to mobilize citizens to stop the 2003 parliamentary election from being stolen by moving quickly and decisively when an unforeseen opportunity arose after the fraudulent election of November 2003. Demanding President Eduard Shevardnadze’s resignation was the most powerful way they could accomplish this, but it was only after a few weeks of demonstrations following the election that the activist leadership began to think that this demand could become a reality and lead to the dramatic events of the Rose Revolution.
Ultimately, the collapse of the Shevardnadze regime was the result of a number of factors, including the strength of Georgian civil society, the strategic actions of the political opposition in November 2003, the impact of U.S. democracy assistance, and the weakness of the regime itself. This volume not only explores these elements, but also examines the events themselves closely, providing background information that is essential for understanding the Rose Revolution. It will also take a close look at the U.S. role and impact on those events.
I hope here to explore the origins and impact of Georgia’s Rose Revolution and place it in the framework of the U.S. democracy assistance project and a broader academic context. Although this work has a somewhat academic perspective, my relationship to the Rose Revolution and its leaders is not an entirely academic one.
From fall 2002 through late summer 2004, I lived in Georgia, where I served as Chief of Party for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). NDI is a U.S.-based NGO that works in the area of democracy assistance. The NDI mission in Georgia was funded primarily by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). According to the mission statement on NDI’s Web site, NDI
is a nonprofit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. … NDI provides practical assistance to civic and political leaders advancing democratic values, practices and institutions. NDI works with democrats in every region of the world to build political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, and to promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government.
Through my position at NDI, I was not only an observer of the Rose Revolution; I played a role in the events as well. The extent of that role is addressed in some depth in Chapter 6. I also had a chance to work closely with and get to know many of the individuals who played key roles in the events before, during, and after. A number of the observations, descriptions, and comments in this work draw heavily on my personal experience with these people.
Because of my position I had access to information and people during the events covered in this book. While only in a very few occasions do I draw on direct quotes from conversations during this time, I have relied on my notes, observations, and correspondence from 2002 to 2004 to help tell the story of the Rose Revolution as best I can.
This book is not meant to be an account of my role in