FIRST THEY
TOOK ROME
How the Populist Right Conquered Italy
David Broder
First published by Verso 2020
© David Broder 2020
All rights reserved
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
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Verso
UK: 6 Meard Street, London W1F 0EG
US: 20 Jay Street, Suite 1010, Brooklyn, NY 11201
Verso is the imprint of New Left Books
ISBN-13: 978-1-78663-761-1
ISBN-13: 978-1-78663-763-5 (UK EBK)
ISBN-13: 978-1-78663-764-2 (US EBK)
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress
Typeset in Adobe Garamond Pro by Hewer Text UK Ltd, Edinburgh
Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY
Contents
1. The Pole of Good Government
3. A Country for Old Men
4. Send in the Clowns
5. Salvini’s Triumph
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
Notes
Index
AN – Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance; postfascist, 1994–2009)
CDU – Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union; centre-right, 1945–present)
CSU – Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union; centre-right, 1945–present)
DC – Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy; big tent, 1942–94)
DP – Democrazia Proletaria (Proletarian Democracy; far-left, 1975–91)
DS – Democratici di Sinistra (Democrats of the Left; centre-left, 1998–2007)
FdI – Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy; postfascist, 2014–present)
FI – Forza Italia (centre-right/Berlusconian, 1994–2009, 2013–present)
IdV – Italia dei Valori (Italy of Values; centre-left, anti-corruption, 1998–present)
LeU – Liberi e Uguali (Free and Equal; centre-left, 2017–present)
M5S– Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement; big tent, anti-corruption, 2009–present)
MSI – Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement; neofascist, 1946–95)
NAR – Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (neofascist, 1977–81)
NCD – Nuovo Centrodestra (centre-right, 2013–17)
PaP – Potere al Popolo (Power to the People)
PCI – Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party, 1921–91)
PD – Partito Democratico (Democratic Party)
PdCI – Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (Party of Italian Communists; communist, 1998––present)
PdL – Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom, centre-right/Berlusconian, 2009–13)
PDS – Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left; centre-left, 1991–98)
PRC – Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (Communist Refoundation Party; communist, 1991–present)
PSDI – Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Democratic Socialist Party; centre-left, 1947–98)
PSI – Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party; centre-left, 1892–1994)
RC – Rivoluzione Civile (Civic Revolution, far-left, anti-corruption, 2013)
SEL – Sinistra Ecologia Libertà (Left Ecology Freedom; centre-left, 2009–16)
SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party; centre-left, 1875–present)
UU – Uniti nell’Ulivo (United in the Olive Tree; centre-left, 2004–07)
As an English resident of Rome, I never cease to hear middle-class Italians singing the praises of a ‘normal country’ – Britain. Seen from Italy, ours is a land of efficient bus services, friendly locals offering up trays of tea and cakes, and earnest professionalism in public life. When one recent Italian president came under criticism in a wiretapping scandal, the country’s leading newspaper lamented the absence of the ‘businesslike respect’ that supposedly characterises exchanges in the House of Commons.
This isn’t the only curious model. As Italy prepared to join the eurozone, one leading editor at La Repubblica issued a book entitled Germanizzazione, characterising the single currency as a German takeover – but saying this was a good thing. Mario Monti, who became prime minister in 2011, concurred that if Italy was to become a ‘normal country’ it would require some ‘external bind’ – what he called ‘denying our own selves a little’. What seemed least of all ‘normal’ in such comments was their obsession with foreign models.
Perhaps we should instead question the idea that Italy is really so unusual. Studies of Italian political history often present it as a patchwork of cultural peculiarities, the anomalous result of late national unification and its position on the periphery of Europe. Yet, in the age of Brexit and Donald Trump, the volatility and fragmentation of Italian public life no longer seem unique. Today, its institutional turmoil is rather less a mark of backwardness and more like a vision of our own future.
Former Trump aide Steve Bannon recognised this in October 2018 when he chose to site his populist academy at a monastery near Rome – what he called the ‘centre of the political universe’. He came to Italy to learn from Matteo Salvini, the latest leader to turn the country’s politics upside down. After almost three decades in which democratic institutions have withered, Salvini has not just turned his Lega into an all-Italian force but polarised the entire political field around his nationalist agenda.
The last thirty years of turmoil have, indeed, made volatility the new normal in Italian public life. Its parties change names constantly; leading political personnel are prone to outrageous antics; and Italians love to talk about the idiosyncrasies that supposedly